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ABSTRACT
A brief presentation of the background to this thesis is given followed by an outline
of the main clinical aspects and theories of anxiety and depression. The concept of
comorbidity in relation to the two disorders is then introduced and the resulting
clinical and theoretical issues reviewed. The most prominent models of mixed
anxiety depression are consequently introduced with particular emphasis on
cognitive and dimensional perspectives.
One aim of the experimental investigations carried out was the provision of evidence
of discriminant group validity amongst three clinical groups (anxious or depressed
only and mixed outpatients) by means of clinical interview, self-report measures and
a variety of cognitive tasks. A review of attentional and mnemonic processes in
anxiety and depression is reported together with the results of a preliminary
investigation showing the presence of different cognitive patterns in the three clinical
groups on implicit and explicit memory tests.
Another fundamental aspect of cognition and emotional disorder, prospective
cognitions, is then addressed. Firstly, with the employment of a Personal Future Task
examining the anticipation of personal positive and negative life events in the three
clinical groups. Secondly, in order to evaluate the effects of possible mediating
factors in future-directed thinking a multi-level framework of cognition-emotion
relation was used. This involved the use of subliminal and supraliminal emotional
priming (sad, fearful, happy and neutral faces) assessing pre-attentive and attentional
biases and their potential influence on the execution of a Subjective Probability
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Judgement Task for depression-relevant, anxiety-relevant and positive future events.
Results form the two tasks revealed specific patterns for the three clinical groups in
terms of generation and valence of events, mood-congruency, probability
judgements, prime type and reaction times.
A further follow-up investigation of recovered and not recovered outpatients from
the three clinical groups examined three aspects of autobiographical memory:
accuracy of prediction; reality monitoring; implicit theory of consistency and change.
A second aim was to explore the temporal relationship between anxiety and
depression. This was achieved with the employment of a neuropsychological face-
processing task typically associated with lateralisation biases in anxiety and
depression and a range of anxiety mood-induction techniques with a student sample.
Results provided evidence that the shift from an anxiety towards a depressive state
may serve an evolutionary adaptive mechanism devoted to the prevention from
exhaustion.
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CLINICAL ASPECTS AND THEORIES.
"In the mid twentieth century the times in which we were living
were called the Age ofAnxiety. More recently they came to be
called the Age of Depression. Since no one has yet announced an
end to the Age of Anxiety, we are now presumably living in an
Age of both Anxiety and Depression."
(Charles G. Costello, "Anxiety and Depression. The Adaptive Emotions")
1.1. General introduction.
Anxiety and depression are, to some extent, part of everyday living. However, the
point at which ordinary emotions become emotional disorders may be difficult to
identify, and it is generally defined as the point above a particular threshold
(arbitrary to a certain degree) at which those negative emotions become persistent
and severe enough to create problems for the individual who experiences them.
In general terms, the experience of both anxious or depressive emotional states are
interlinked with three other aspects: physical reactions, behaviours and cognitions.
Physical reactions may include muscle tension, sleep disturbance, palpitations and
fatigue. Behavioural aspects may consist of restlessness, psychomotor retardation,
tearfulness and suicidal attempts. Cognitions comprise poor concentration, worry,
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indecisiveness and generally biased information processing (perception, encoding,
storage, retrieval and anticipation), which may set up a vicious circle by generating
negative distortions in thinking and, in turn, further biased processing.
Anxiety and depression constitute the two most common complaints amongst both
the general and clinical populations. Epidemiological studies reveal that
approximately 8.3-19.3% and 14.6-24.9% of the general population will experience
an affective or anxiety disorder respectively in their lifetime (e.g. Kessler,
McGonagle, Zhao, Nelson, Hughes, Eshleman, Wittchen & Kendler, 1994; Regier,
Burke & Burke, 1990). These are indicative figures drawn from a variety of studies
that vary considerably in terms of the methodology adopted (see Section 1. 4. 2. in
this Chapter, and Section 2. 3. 1. in Chapter 2, for details of some of these studies).
Although the debate about whether the two disorders are distinct or states of a single
underlying affective disorder (varying in severity) is still ongoing, several studies
have shown considerable overlap of the two disorders in terms of aetiology,
symptomatology, treatment response, and family history (e.g. Maser & Cloninger,
1990; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 1998). With a lifetime diagnostic overlap of some
56%, the co-occurrence of the two disorders (commonly referred to as
"comorbidity") has therefore become one of the most topical issues in
psychopathology research.
The empirical work described in this thesis has a twofold purpose. Firstly, it aims at
the provision of evidence of discriminant group validity amongst three clinical
groups: anxious only, depressed only and mixed anxious and depressed outpatients
(i.e. evidence that the three groups can be operationally distinguished or
discriminated from each other).
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We shall concentrate on the investigation of cognitive processes in clinical anxiety,
depression, and mixed anxiety depression, in an attempt to identify cognitive profiles
that specifically characterise and distinguish the three clinical groups from a control
group. In particular, the emphasis will be on attention, memory and prospective
cognitions, as these would appear to play a central role in the vulnerability,
maintenance and recovery processes.
Much of the experimental work carried out in this area has focussed on the study of
cognitive aspects of anxiety or depression in isolation. On the one hand, this has
given the opportunity to explore basic cognitive functions - attention and memory in
particular - and to develop fundamental models of cognition and emotion (e.g.
Williams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; 1997) that have facilitated our
understanding of essential elaboration of information processes in anxiety and
depression. On the other hand, new experimental paradigms and techniques have
been developed, which aid researchers in testing new hypotheses and current
theoretical models.
However, during the last decade or so, mounting evidence for comorbidity of anxiety
and depression deriving from epidemiological, genetic, biologic and treatment
studies, has given rise to several issues ranging from classification and theoretical
concerns to new methodological and research questions (e.g. Katon & Roy-Byrne,
1991; Maser & Cloninger, 1990). This body of evidence has pushed cognitive
researchers towards the consideration of the co-manifestation of the two disorders
and the necessity to address the resulting hypotheses experimentally. Hence, the
inclusion in more recent studies of a mixed group and/or the more careful
appreciation of both anxiety and depression levels in the participants, also in the
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hope that this might be able to account for the inconsistencies present in
psychological literature.
In this thesis we shall report the results of a preliminary investigation showing
specific implicit and explicit memory biases in mixed anxiety depression compared
to depression or anxiety only and a control group. We shall then build upon this
investigation and explore the domain of prospective cognitions in more detail. This
will be done in two stages. Firstly, a clinical sample of depressed, anxious, mixed
anxious-depressed outpatients and a control group will be compared in their
performance on a Personal Future Task assessing their aptitude in generating
possible personal future positive and negative life events as well as their probability
judgements for the same events. Secondly, a more complex design will be employed
involving the execution of a Subjective Probability Judgement Task in which
participants will be asked to rate the likelihood that a set of future events might
happen to them during the next twelve months. In order to test for mood-congruency
effects, the same sample will be presented with possible depression-relevant,
anxiety-relevant and positive future events and required to provide probability
judgments. Moreover, an emotional priming paradigm (e.g. Power & Brewin, 1990)
applied to complex stimuli (emotional sad, fearful, happy and neutral faces) will be
utilised both subliminally and supraliminally in an attempt to manipulate the
participants' mood experimentally at both levels, pre-attentive (i.e. unconscious) and
attentive (i.e. conscious). This will allow us to test for any modulating effects on the
participants' future-directed thinking due to the potential influence of the emotional
primes.
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An investigation of mental representations closely related to autobiographical
memory processes will be carried out by following-up a number of recovered and not
recovered outpatients from the three clinical groups and our control sample. This will
tap into three important aspects of psychopathology: accuracy of prediction, reality
monitoring, and biased memory for previous attitudes and mental states.
Anxiety and depression tend to overlap both within and across episodes. Within a
single episode, anxiety symptoms are more likely to precede symptoms of depression
and, across episodes, an anxiety disorder is more likely to precede a mood disorder
(e.g. Mineka et ah, 1998). Therefore, with the intention of providing a clearer
understanding of the typical manifestation of the disorders, a second intention behind
the work reported in this thesis is that of investigating more closely one of the central
features of comorbidity: the temporal relationship between anxiety and depression.
A student sample was recruited and administered a modified version the Chimeric
Faces Task (CFT) (e.g. Levy, Heller, Banich & Burton, 1983). This is a
neuropsychological face-processing task typically associated with opposing
lateralisation biases in anxiety and depression due to different levels of activation of
the posterior region of the right hemisphere of the brain.
The CFT, which included the basic emotional faces (angry, disgusted, fearful, happy
and sad), in conjunction with a variety of anxiety mood-induction techniques was
employed in this experiment as a reliable candidate for the provision of a sensitive
measure ofmood shifts from anxiety to depression.
However, before we begin to report the experimental work outlined above, we shall
dedicate the remaining part of this chapter to the introduction of anxiety and
depression as separate emotional disorders and the presentation of the main clinical
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aspects and theories. Then, in Chapter 2, we shall introduce the concept of
comorbidity, review the evidence in its favour, and illustrate the main clinical issues
and theoretical models of mixed anxiety depression.
1. 2. Anxiety: definition and clinical aspects.
1.2. 1. The nature of anxiety.
As mentioned above, a certain level of anxiety is a normal part of everyday life. Its
main function is to keep us motivated to make the necessary effort to handle
potentially threatening situations (e.g. Rachman, 1998). In general terms, the level of
functioning of the anxious individual determines whether we are dealing with
pathological or adaptive anxiety. The difference may lie in the ability to identify
adequately the source of threat (in a psychopathological state the person may not be
aware of what is feared), or in the appraisal of a particular situation which, in clinical
anxiety, becomes biased or irrational or out of proportion.
As one might expect, there is no universally accepted definition of anxiety, however,
a description of the main features or components of emotional disorder - anxiety, in
this case - will be given here. Anxiety is often described as a state of unpleasant
tension, dread, apprehension and nervousness, accompanied by autonomic
hyperarousal (e.g. Eysenck, 1997; Rachman, 1998). Characteristic physiological
symptoms of anxiety include a general sympathetic autonomic activation (i.e.
increased secretion of adrenaline or noradrenaline), muscle tension, dry mouth,
dizziness, increased heart rate, sweating, breathing difficulties. Behaviourally,
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anxiety is characterised by avoidance of the feared situations since this reduces the
intensity of the physical symptoms. Typical cognitive aspects include hypervigilance,
worry, anticipating the worst, poor concentration.
When an individual experiences these symptoms only transitorily in response to a
particular life event, then the individual is said to be experiencing "state" anxiety. In
contrast, "trait" anxiety is referred to as a more stable and enduring personality
disposition to regularly perceive situations as threatening and to react to them with
increased levels of anxiety (i.e. the individual is more prone to experience State
anxiety) (e.g. Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & Jacobs, 1983). Many
individuals who present with clinical levels of anxiety report feeling nervous and
anxious "all their lives" and describe their "chronic" condition worsening in times of
stress.
There may also be substantial cultural variation in the expression of anxiety, with
some cultures expressing more somatic and others more cognitive symptoms (e.g.
Al-Issa & Oudji, 1998). Moreover, the prevalence of anxiety disorders appears to be
more common in the age group 15-30 years, with women having about twice the
incidence of anxiety disorders as men, and declines as a function of increasing
education and income (e.g. Zuckerman, 1999).
1. 2. 2. Psychiatric classification of anxiety disorders.
The DSM-IV-TR (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - Fourth
Edition - Text Revision; American Psychiatric Association, 2000), and the ICD-10
(International Classification of Diseases - Tenth Edition; World Health
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Organization, 1990; 1993) are the most widely used diagnostic classification systems
of mental disorders. Although the two classification systems are equivalent under
many respects, in this thesis the use of the DSM-IV-TR was preferred because it
gives more precise research criteria. According to the DSM-IV-TR anxiety disorders
are divided into categories in terms of evidence provided by research on factors such
as: essential and associated features, specific culture, age of onset, gender ratio,
prevalence, course, familial pattern and differential diagnosis. This subdivision
provides explicit inclusion and exclusion diagnostic criteria that can be operationally
used in clinical research. The taxonomic classification of anxiety disorders in DSM-
IV-TR is the following:
• Panic Disorder (with or without Agoraphobia): recurrent panic attacks
characterised by discrete and sudden onset of physiological symptoms such as
palpitations, shortness of breath, dizziness and accompanied by intense
apprehension, impending doom and fear of losing control.
• Agoraphobia: fear (or avoidance) of being in any place or situation (usually
public or crowded) in which help might not be available or from which it might
be difficult to escape.
• Specific Phobia', fear and avoidance of specific objects or situations that do not
present a real danger.
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Social Phobia: fear and avoidance of one or more types of social or performance
situations (usually speaking, eating or writing) in which the individual feels
exposed to the scrutiny of others.
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, characterised by obsessions (persistent and
intrusive ideas, images or thoughts) which cause anxiety and distress, and
compulsions (repetitive behaviours or mental acts) which serve to neutralise
anxiety.
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, aftermath of a traumatic event in which the
individual experiences increased arousal, anxiety, and avoidance of stimuli
associated with the event.
Acute Stress Disorder, characterised by the same symptoms as those of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, but lasting for four weeks or less.
Generalised Anxiety Disorder, persistent, excessive and uncontrollable anxiety
and worry (often about minor things) that last for at least six months.
Anxiety Disorder Due to a Medical Condition', characterised by symptoms of
anxiety that are deemed to be a direct physiological consequence of a medical
condition.
22
• Substance-Induced Anxiety Disorder, characterised by symptoms of anxiety that
are deemed to be a direct physiological consequence ofmedication or drug abuse.
• Anxiety Disorder Not Otherwise Specified: includes disorders which cause
anxiety or phobic avoidance that do not meet criteria for any of the above defined
anxiety disorders.
Despite the care with which such a long list has been compiled, which is certainly
useful when examining each of the phenomena separately, the overlap between the
above subgroups of anxiety disorders in the clinical population is considerable,
which makes the proposed distinction debatable at least in terms of practical validity
(e.g. Clark, Watson & Reynolds, 1995). Often, a clinically anxious individual meets
diagnostic criteria for more than a single anxiety disorder. This could be due to
common aetiological factors amongst anxiety disorders or to the fact that symptoms
of various anxiety disorders are not entirely disorder specific (e.g. Zuckerman, 1999).
This is particularly true for Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD), which appears to
be the most common form of anxiety disorder (e.g. Brown, Di Nardo, Lehman &
Campbell, 2001).
For these reasons, and due to the fact that GAD encompasses most of the features of
anxiety described above, in this thesis we have decided to include in the anxious
group outpatients who meet diagnostic criteria for GAD with or without a
concomitant diagnosis of Panic Disorder, Agoraphobia or Social Phobia, since these
are its most frequently related anxiety disorders.
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The detailed DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria for GAD are reported on Table 1. 1.
below.
Table 1.1. Diagnostic criteria for Generalized Anxiety Disorder.
A. Excessive anxiety and worry (apprehensive expectation), occurring more days
than not for at least 6 months, about a number of events or activities (such as
work or school performance).
B. The person finds it difficult to control the worry.
C. The anxiety and worry are associated with three (or more) of the following six
symptoms (with at least some symptoms present for more days than not for the
past 6 months).
(1) restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge
(2) being easily fatigued
(3) difficulty concentrating or mind going blank
(4) irritability
(5) muscle tension
(6) sleep disturbance (difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless unsatisfying
sleep)
D. The focus of the anxiety and worry is not confined to features of an Axis I
disorder, e.g., the anxiety or worry is not about having a Panic Attack (as in
Panic Disorder), being embarrassed in public (as in Social Phobia), being
contaminated (as in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder), being away from home or
close relatives (as in Separation Anxiety Disorder), gaining weight (as in
Anorexia Nervosa), having multiple physical complaints (as in Somatization
Disorder), or having a serious illness (as in Hypochondriasis), and the anxiety
and worry do not occur exclusively during Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.
E. The anxiety, worry, or physical symptoms cause clinically significant distress or
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
F. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g.,
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g.,
hyperthyroidism) and does not occur exclusively during a Mood Disorder, a
Psychotic Disorder, or a Pervasive Developmental Disorder.
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1. 3. Depression: definition and clinical aspects.
1.3. 1. The nature of depression.
The term depression is commonly used in day-to-day conversation to describe the
experience of a normal low mood. Like anxiety, it may be adaptive in that it can
function as a signal that we are in an unpleasant situation and that we need to take the
necessary action in order to improve matters (e.g. Williams & Hargreaves, 1995).
However, if depression becomes more prolonged and deepens, it begins to cause
more problems than it solves.
Clinical depression is typically marked by great sadness, hopelessness and loss of
interest and pleasure in usual activities (e.g. Champion, 2000). Physical symptoms
include fatigue, poor sleep, loss of appetite, decreased sexual interest. Behavioural
changes include feeling restless or slowed down, and withdrawal. Cognitively,
depressed individuals are unable to concentrate, have low self-esteem, feelings of
guilt, shame, and suicidal thoughts.
The onset of a depressive episode can occur at any age in adult life, and may include
a prodromal period of anxiety and mild depressive symptoms that can last for weeks
before a full depressive episode develops, which can then last for about 4-6 months.
As for anxiety, women are about twice as likely as men to develop a depressive
disorder. In particular, following a depressive episode, women are more likely to
become depressed again than men (Amenson & Lewinsohn, 1981). However, more
recent investigations show that the greater incidence of depressive disorders in
women aged 15-54 years may result from a higher prevalence of "somatic
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depression" (i.e. associated with fatigue, appetite and sleep disturbance) and anxiety
in women than in men (Silverstein, 1999); and that there is a clear reversal of gender
difference in prevalence of depression over the age of 55 (i.e. post-menopausal
years) (Bebbington, Dunn, Jenkins, Lewis, Brugha, Farrell & Meltzer, 1998). This
finding offers some support to the possibility that the hormonal changes of a
woman's menstrual cycle may play a role in vulnerability. On the other hand, other
studies have pointed out that gender ratios differ significantly with age - with about
twice as many boys as girls being treated for depression prior to mid-adolescence
(Harrington, 1993) - according to marital status, with lower rates for currently
married persons compared to divorced, separated, or never married individuals, and a
greater risk for divorced or separated men than for women in most countries (e.g.
Zuckerman, 1999). Therefore it might be more fruitful to consider the onset of a
depressive disorder bearing in mind the transitions that are likely to occur in each
stage of life (e.g. gaining independence, love relationships, work, child rearing), the
demands that these place on more vulnerable individuals and the social support (e.g.
partner, friends or other family members) that the person receives (Champion, 2000).
1. 3. 2. Psychiatric classification of mood disorders.
The DSM-IV-TR diagnostic classification of mood disorders divides and sets criteria
for Depressive Disorders (Unipolar Depression), Bipolar Disorders and two mood
disorders based on aetiology as follows:
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Major Depressive Disorder: characterised by at least one Major Depressive
Episode (i.e. minimum of 2 weeks of depressed mood or loss of interest or
pleasure together with at least four more additional depressive symptoms) (see
Table 1.2. below).
Dysthymic Disorder, characterised by at least 2 years of depressed mood for most
of the time together with additional symptoms of depression, but not severe
enough to meet criteria for a Major Depressive Episode.
Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified', category used when an individual
has symptoms of depression that do not meet criteria for the above depressive
diagnoses or for any other diagnosis in which depression is a feature.
Bipolar IDisorder: characterised by at least one Manic Episode (i.e. minimum of
1 week of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive or irritable mood
together with at least three more additional manic symptoms), usually
accompanied by a Major Depressive Episode.
Bipolar II Disorder, characterised by at least one Major Depressive Episode and
accompanied by at least one Hypomanic Episode (i.e. much like a Manic Episode
but briefer and less severe).
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• Cyclothymic Disorder, characterised by at least 2 years of repeated mood swings,
but that are not severe enough to meet criteria for a Major Depressive Episode or
Manic Episode.
• Bipolar Disorder Not Otherwise Specified: category used when an individual has
bipolar symptoms that do not meet criteria for the above bipolar diagnoses.
• Mood Disorder Due to a General Medical Condition: either high or low moods
that are prominent and persistent, caused by various types of physical illness.
• Substance-Induced Mood Disorder, either high or low moods that are prominent
and persistent, caused by medication or drug abuse.
• Mood Disorder Not Otherwise Specified: includes disorders with mood
symptoms that do not meet criteria for any of the above defined mood disorders.
Of the variety of mood disorders described above, in our study we will only consider
depressive disorders, or unipolar depression (i.e. Major Depressive Episode and
Dysthymic Disorder), because it is nosologically distinct from bipolar depression and
because of its higher overlap with anxiety disorders (e.g. Zuckerman, 1999).
As for the anxiety disorders reported previously, depressive disorders show a
substantial overlap with each other. This amounts at approximately to 50% for Major
Depressive and Dysthymic Disorders. The number of cases who fulfil the criteria for
both disorders at the same time is so high that their comorbidity has been referred to
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as double depression (Keller & Shapiro, 1982). Some of the patients who meet
criteria for Dysthymic Disorder (DD) may in reality be suffering from a Major
Depressive Episode (MDE) that has been attenuated either by some form of
treatment or spontaneously, or from a chronic form of MDE (Brown et al., 2001).
Therefore, in our investigations, we will include outpatients who meet diagnostic
criteria for either a Major Depressive Episode and/or Dysthymic Disorder.
The detailed DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Episode are
reported on Table 1. 2. below.
Table 1. 2. Criteria for Major Depressive Episode.
A. Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2-
week period and represent a change from previous functioning; at least one of
the symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure.
(1) depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either
subjective report (e.g., feels sad or empty) or observation made by others
(e.g., appears tearful)
(2) markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most
of the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account or
observation made by others)
(3) significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g., a change of
more than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in
appetite nearly everyday
(4) insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day
(5) psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by others,
not merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed down)
(6) fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day
(7) feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be
delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being
sick)
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(8) diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every
day (either by subjective account or as observed by others)
(9) recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal
ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for
committing suicide
B. The symptoms do not meet criteria for a Mixed Episode.
C. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
D. The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g.,
a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g.,
hypothyroidism).
E. The symptoms are not better accounted for by Bereavement, i.e., after the loss of
a loved one, the symptoms persist for longer than 2 months or are characterized
by marked functional impairment, morbid preoccupation with worthlessness,
suicidal ideation, psychotic symptoms, or psychomotor retardation.
1. 4. Theories of anxiety and depression.
It is beyond the remit of this thesis to provide a comprehensive report of every theory
of anxiety and depression. However, at this point it is useful to introduce briefly
some of the most influential theoretical accounts of anxiety and depressive disorders.
A general overview of the psychodynamic, biological, behavioural and cognitive
approaches will now be considered in turn, before a summary of this chapter is
given.
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1.4. 1. Psychodynamic perspective.
In order to illustrate the basic ideas about the origin of anxiety and depression from a
psychodynamic point of view, the description of a few key concepts is necessary.
The founding father of the psychodynamic perspective was Sigmund Freud (1856-
1939). In a nutshell, the basic concept of his theory is that most of our mental activity
takes place unconsciously (Freud, 1915/1949). According to Freud, the human mind
can be divided into three structural levels. At the bottom lies the unconscious, which
contains desires, memories, fears and other psychological materials that are not
attended to. At the top (above the surface) is the conscious, consisting of a narrow
range of mental activities and events of which the individual is aware at any
particular moment. In between the two lies the preconscious, which contains those
mental materials that are normally unconscious but that can be retrieved quite easily.
Moreover, Freud divided the mind into three structural forces called the Id, the Ego
and the Superego (Freud, 1923/1984). The Id is the foundation of the psychic
structure. It contains the primitive biological drives ("libido") and it is the source
from which both the Ego and Superego must "borrow" their energy when they later
develop. The Id seeks immediate gratification, operating on what Freud called the
pleasure principle. It is entirely hedonistic, seeking its own pleasure and release from
any tension without taking into account the logic of reason, reality or morality. Next
is the Ego, which, unlike the Id, is primarily conscious. Its task is to deal with reality
and thus it operates on the reality principle by mediating between the immediate
gratification desired by the Id and the restrictions demanded by reality. The Superego
is that part of the mind that represents the moral standards of the parents and the
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society in general, which are internalised throughout childhood, and so it operates as
the conscience.
Human behaviour is conceptualised as the interplay of these three forces, referred to
as the psychodynamics of the personality. Thus, the Ego has to deal with both the Id,
which seeks only satisfaction of the primitive drives, and the Superego, which seeks
only the satisfaction of the moral ideals, as well as reality.
Freud distinguishes between realistic anxiety, which is the Ego's reaction to a
dangerous situation in the external world, and neurotic anxiety, which is the result of
internal dynamics (Freud, 1926/1979). In the latter case, anxiety arises from the fear
of punishment that would occur if an Id impulse broke through the Ego's control.
The punishment could then ensue from either the Superego, in the form of guilt, or
from reality.
In order to cope with anxiety, the Ego develops defense mechanisms, which are
unconscious strategies utilised to distort or deny reality and protect the individual
from experiencing anxiety at a conscious level (Freud A., 1937). Normally, these
strategies serve an adaptive function, however, if anxiety is too intense it can still be
experienced consciously and, as the defence mechanisms become too rigid in an
attempt to keep anxiety at bay, neurotic behaviour may emerge. From a
psychodynamic point of view, the type of the anxiety disorder experienced will
depend on the type of defence mechanism employed by the Ego (i.e. the particular
defense style of the individual), which in turn depends on the nature of the
underlying conflict. So, for example, in the case of phobias anxiety is displaced from
the feared Id impulse and moved to a situation or object that has a symbolic
connection to it, but if the Ego does not develop the displacement defense
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mechanism then the person will experience constant distress and apprehension
without knowing why (i.e. GAD). Moreover, since most of the Ego's energy is
employed in the maintenance of the defences, the individual will have little Ego
strength left for other important functions (e.g. problem solving, reasoning etc.).
There are several psychodynamic models of depression that share a number of salient
features in terms of formulation (e.g. see Arieti & Bemporad, 1978; Greenberg &
Mitchell, 1983). Depression is seen as an unconscious intra-psychic conflict and is
associated to the grief in response to loss (real or symbolic) of a love object: a loved
one, an ideal, a valued plan, and so on (Freud, 1917/1984). The potential for
depression is formed early in childhood when insufficient or too much gratification
of the child's needs may lead the individual to become extremely dependent on
others for the maintenance of self-esteem. Moreover, the primal wound of a loss or
threatened loss of a principal caretaker (usually a parent) maybe reactivated as a
result of a recent loss. The person plunges into a sense of helplessness and
hopelessness and incorporates (introjects) and identifies with the lost object, perhaps
in an attempt to undo the loss. However, because of the conflicting feelings (positive
and negative) towards the lost object, the person becomes the object of his/her own
hate and anger on one side, and feels guilty for real or imagined sins against the lost
person on the other side. As in the case of neurotic anxiety, also these unconscious
conflicts result in a weakened Ego.
Despite its undisputed contribution to the field of abnormal psychology, the
psychodynamic perspective is very much open to the criticism of being based on
clinical evidence (i.e. observation of patients in therapy) rather than on more rigorous
scientific evidence, standing at the antipode of the perspective considered next.
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1. 4. 2. Biological perspective.
Genetic, neuropsychological and biochemical studies suggest that organic
predisposition and dysfunction play a role in the vulnerability, development and
maintenance of anxiety and depressive disorders (e.g. see Zuckerman, 1999).
Twin studies show that the concordance rate of anxiety disorders is about double in
identical twins (34%) compared to fraternal twins (17%) whereas, for unipolar
depression the rates are 53% for both monozygotic and 29.4% for dizygotic twins
(e.g. Kendler, Pederson, Johnson, Neale & Mathe, 1993; Torgesen, 1983). On the
other hand, family studies show that amongst the anxiety disorders, panic disorder
seems to have the strongest genetic basis with rates ranging from 13-16% for first-
degree relatives of patients, compared with rates of 1-2% in relatives of healthy
controls (e.g. Zuckerman, 1999). For major depression, first-degree relatives of
patients seem to have a 5.9-28.6% risk of developing a depressive disorder compared
to a 0.7-5.8 risk for relatives of controls (Nurnberger & Gershon, 1992).
However, although these studies provide some evidence that anxiety and depression
may be inherited to a certain extent, they do not give an answer to the question "what
is inherited?". In the case of anxiety, some answers have been attempted with the
proposal of biological theories of personality that assume individual differences in
Trait anxiety (or Neuroticism) to depend largely (approximately 50%) on genetic
factors and based on different levels of cortical arousal and activation of other brain
structures (Eysenck, 1967; Gray, 1982). According to Eysenck (1967) positive
emotions are associated with moderate levels of arousal whilst negative emotions are
associated with levels of arousal that are either too high or too low. Anxiety is
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characterised by high resting levels of cortical arousal and high autonomic nervous
system activity, which depend on the functioning of the so-called "visceral brain".
This consists of the hypothalamus, hippocampus, amygdala, septum and cingulum.
Similar structures have been identified by Gray (1982): the septo-hippocampal
system, its monoaminergic afferents form the brain stem, and its cortical projections
to the frontal lobe, referred to as the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS). The BIS is
a system sensitive to signals of aversive outcomes. It functions as a comparator,
comparing the predicted state of the environment with the actual current state of the
environment on a moment-to-moment basis. Any perceived mismatch between the
two (i.e. a likely punishment or frustrative nonreward) would result in the BIS being
activated and the inhibition of ongoing behaviour. Another twin system called
Behavioural Approach System or Behavioural Activation System (BAS) is, in
contrast, sensitive to signals of desirable outcomes (Fowles, 1988; Gray 1987). Its
biological substrate includes the dopaminergic pathways and it initiates approach
behaviour when a reward (or relieving non-punishment) outcome is perceived as
likely. Anxiety is thought to reflect activation of the BIS, whereas depression would
reflect disruption of the BAS.
Some empirical evidence in support of Gray's (1982; 1987) view derives from
neuropsychological studies investigating individual differences in asymmetric
prefrontal activation. Subjects with greater left-sided prefrontal activation reported
more BAS activity and Positive Affect, whereas subjects with greater right-sided
prefrontal activation reported more BIS activity and Negative Affect (Davidson,
1999). More recently, Henriques & Davidson (2000) have provided further evidence
of a decreased responsiveness to reward in depressed individuals, consistent with the
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hypothesis that the left anterior hypoactivation in depression reflects a diminution in
approach-related motivation and behaviour.
Current neuropsychological models of anxiety and depression (e.g. Heller, 1993;
Heller, Nitschke & Miller, 1998) combine the above reported anterior asymmetric
activity implicated in the valence dimension of emotion (i.e. positive vs. negative)
with the arousal dimension associated with lateralisation of posterior regions of the
brain. In particular, high arousal is associated with increased right parietotemporal
activity and low arousal with a decreased activity of the same region.
Furthermore, pharmacological studies have sought to understand the role played by
neurotransmitters in mood and anxiety disorders and have identified a number of
abnormalities in the levels of catecholamines such as dopamine (DA) and
noradrenaline (NA), and the indoleamine serotonin (5-HT). Typically, depression is
associated with low levels of DA, NA and 5-HT, whilst anxiety is associated with
high levels of NA and 5-HT (e.g. Deakin, 1998; Goldberg & Huxley, 1992).
Moreover, there is evidence that the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis
(FIPA), a major hormone system involved in the response to prolonged exposure to
stress, is overactive in depression (e.g. Holsboer, 1999).
Biological researchers have made much progress in elucidating brain-behaviour
relationships, however, a note of caution should be considered against the dangers of




Behavioural theorists argue that anxiety disorders are the result of faulty learning
(e.g. Bandura & Rosenthal, 1966; Wolpe & Rowan, 1988). The processes of
acquisition and maintenance of anxiety can be divided into two stages. At first, a
person can learn to fear (conditioned response: CR) a neutral stimulus (conditioned
stimulus: CS) - an object or event - if this is associated with an aversive stimulus
(unconditioned stimulus: UCS), via classical conditioning. Secondly, the person
finds that escaping from CS will produce a relief from CR (i.e. negative
reinforcement) so that the avoidance response becomes habitual via operant
conditioning (Mowrer, 1960). This theoretical model seems to fit many cases of
anxiety disorders quite well, however there are other cases in which an anxiety
disorder may develop in the absence of a previous unpleasant experience with the
feared object or situation (e.g. Ost, 1987). In an attempt to overcome this impasse it
has been proposed that, besides learning to fear something as a result of an
unpleasant experience with it, fears can be learned through imitating the reactions of
others, referred to as vicarious learning (e.g. Bandura & Rosenthal, 1966). Another
question that is not directly addressed by the two-stage model outlined above is the
fact that people tend to fear only certain objects or events, such as snakes or heights,
and not others. Seligman (1971) argued that via natural selection human beings are
physiologically prepared to be more sensitive and fear certain stimuli that would
have been threatening to our evolutionary ancestors. This proposal has been referred
to as the "preparedness hypothesis".
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In behavioural terms depression is the result of extinction. In other words, the
depressed individual does not receive sufficient positive reinforcement from his/her
environment and as a consequence stops enacting those behaviours that may be
potentially reinforcing. Lewinsohn (1974) proposed that the positive reinforcement a
person receives is a function of three factors: (1) the number of potentially
reinforcing stimuli (activities or experiences) for the person; (2) the availability of
reinforcers in the person's environment; and (3) the person's ability in obtaining such
reinforcement (usually, social skills).
Although the adoption of learning paradigms has led to the development of useful
treatment techniques, such as the systematic desensitization (Wolpe, 1961), the fact
that a treatment based on learning principles is effective in changing a particular
behaviour does not necessarily show that that behaviour was itself learned in a
similar way. Therefore, the objection of oversimplification can be made, as well as
the criticism of determinism.
Another, well known, behavioural approach to mood disorders is Seligman's (1975)
learned helplessness model of depression. This model was developed following a
series of laboratory experiments in which dogs were exposed to inescapable electric
shocks! When the same dogs were later subjected to escapable shocks, they were
lethargic and did not initiate escape responses, showing severe learning deficits. The
dogs had learned that the shocks were uncontrollable (i.e. there was no contingency
between the animals' responses and the outcome they achieved) and developed a
state of helplessness. This state of helplessness was thought to resemble a depressive
state so closely that Seligman (1975) proposed that, like learned helplessness,
depression was a learned reaction to uncontrollable and inescapable stressors.
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Normal adaptive responses are undermined by the fact that the person expects his/her
lack of control over the reinforcement. This is an important point that distinguishes
the learned helpless model form the extinction model outlined above where the core
factor here is an objective lack of positive reinforcement from the individual's
environment.
This represents a first shift from a rigid behaviouristic explanation of emotional
disorder in terms of mere observable aspects of behaviour, and opens the way to
models that include a cognitive level of explanation of anxiety and depression, which
will be considered next.
1. 4. 4. Cognitive perspective.
In cognitive theories, cognitive processes (i.e. the way people think about
themselves, the world and the future) play a decisive role in emotional behaviour
(e.g. Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1984).
The original learned helplessness model was able to explain the passivity of
depressive behaviour, but not other central characteristics of depression, such as
guilt, suicidal thoughts, sadness, nor the considerable variation in terms of duration
or severity of the disorder. It was found possible to induce a dysphoric state in a
laboratory by exposing people to helplessness training consisting in unsolvable
discrimination tasks (e.g. Hiroto & Seligman, 1975). However, it soon became clear
that the way the person perceived a negative experience was crucial to whether or not
a depressive state arose. As a result, Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale (1978) adapted
the model to include the concept of attribution. The essence of this reformulated
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helplessness model is that individuals prone to become depressed tend to attribute
negative life events to internal, stable and global causes; whereas, they attribute
positive life events to external, unstable and specific causes. However, this
"depressogenic attributional style" does not seem to be specific to depression and
several studies have failed to find significant differences in attributional styles
between anxious and depressed individuals (e.g. Ganellen, 1988; Telgassi &
Hoffman, 1982). The reformulated helplessness model has been developed further
and called the hopelessness theory of depression (Abramson, Metalsky & Alloy,
1989). This revision states that some forms of depression (hopelessness depression)
are caused by a state of hopelessness. The individual will have an expectation that
negative events will occur, positive events will not occur, and that he/she will be
unable to influence future outcomes (i.e. helplessness). Diatheses are the
depressogenic attributional style, low self-esteem and the assumption that negative
life events will necessarily have severe negative consequences. More recently, Alloy,
Kelly, Mineka and Clements (1990) have extended the hopelessness theory of
depression to account for the comorbidity of depression with anxiety disorders and
referred to it as the helplessness-hopelessness model of anxiety and depression, but
this will be dealt with in Chapter 2.
Another major cognitive theory of anxiety and depression is Beck's cognitive
therapy model (e.g. Beck, Emery & Greenberg, 1985; Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery,
1979). According to this theory, the knowledge that people acquire about themselves
and the world in general is stored in stable mental structures called schemas. These
schemas constitute the person's beliefs and assumptions and are used to perceive,
interpret and think about the self, the world and the future. Early experiences may
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influence the constructions of schemas in such a way that they become dysfunctional
and generate negative biases when used by the individual to interpret experience.
Accordingly, a "depressogenic cognitive triad" will comprise a negative view of self,
the world and the future; whereas, an "anxiogenic cognitive triad" will consist of a
view of self as vulnerable, the world as threatening and the future as unpredictable.
The theory proposes that a critical incident will occur in a person's life, which may
involve loss or threat in the case of depression or anxiety respectively. This will
trigger the dysfunctional schemas, which will generate negative automatic thoughts
and in turn depression or anxiety.
Cognitive theorists go a step beyond behaviourism by considering not only visible
behaviours but also intangible, yet measurable, factors (i.e. thoughts). However, they
give negative thoughts or hopelessness a causal status in the generation of a disorder,
which is in turn diagnosed for the presence of the same negative thoughts or
pervasive hopelessness, lending themselves to the criticism of tautology.
The last decade has witnessed the emergence of several multi-level models of
cognition and emotion, such as the Perceptual Motor Processing (Leventhal &
Scherer, 1987), the Multiple Entry Modular Memory System (MEM; Johnson &
Multhaup, 1992), the Interacting Cognitive Subsystems (ICS; Teasdale & Barnard,
1993), the Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF; Wells & Matthews, 1996),
the Schematic, Propositional, Analogical and Associative Representation Systems
(SPAARS; Power & Dalgleish, 1997). In these models, the emotional effects of
internal and external events are understood taking into account the separate
contributions of different types and levels of information, mental representations, and
their interactions. Summarising and focusing on the similarities among these models,
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emotions and emotional disorders can be generated automatically (e.g. through a low
sensory-perception level) or through a higher and more controlled and effortful
schematic level (i.e. following appraisal of the meaning of an event). This
differentiation Compares well also with neurobiological models, whereby emotions
can be elicited as an immediate response of the amygdala to sensory-perceptual
aspects of a given stimulus, or expressed through the modulation of the hippocampus
where the stimulus might be related to episodic memories of a particular event
(LeDoux, 1995).
The obvious advantages of complex multi-level theories, which are able to explain
the cognition-emotion relationship on several levels, can however limit the amount
of verifiable predictions with the risk of making such models not falsifiable.
1. 5. Summary.
In this Chapter, the issue of comorbidity between anxiety and depression has been
introduced and an outline of the aims of this thesis has been given.
The methodology employed in the experimental investigations reported in the next
Chapters draws from paradigms used in cognitive psychology and neuropsychology,
which have been duly modified and extended to address specific hypotheses.
The concepts of anxiety and depression - considered separately - have been
illustrated, and their main clinical aspects and diagnostic classifications have been
reported. Detailed inclusion and exclusion criteria have been given for the anxious
and depressed groups of outpatients involved in this work, and it has been
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highlighted how within each emotional disorder there is considerable overlap
amongst subtypes of anxiety or depression.
Finally, the main theoretical views of anxiety and depression have been briefly
presented with a description of some of the key features for each the approaches
considered.
In the next Chapter we shall go onto consider the central issue of this thesis: the




"No one ever told me that grief felt so like fear"
(C. S. Lewis, "A GriefObserved")
2. 1. Introduction.
In this Chapter we shall endeavour to address the complex issue of overlap between
anxiety and depression in an attempt to build a clear picture of the subject. During
the last two decades, there has been an increasing emphasis on the phenomenology
of affective and anxiety disorders (e.g. Barlow & Campbell, 2000; Katon & Roy-
Byrne, 1991; Maser & Cloninger, 1990; Mineka et al., 1998). We will start by
describing the different ways in which anxiety, depression and their relationship have
been conceptualised. Then, a review of the evidence for mixed anxiety depression
(MAD) will follow, with support deriving from a range of perspectives. These will
include epidemiological, genetic, biological and treatment studies.
Most of the research impetus has originated from a number of attempts to define
operational inclusion and exclusion criteria in order to delineate the margins between
the two disorders. Consequently, we will address the resulting diagnostic
classification problems before turning our attention to the phenomenology and
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features of MAD. Finally, we will present the theoretical models that have been put
forward to explain the co-occurrence of anxiety and depression.
2. 2. Views of anxiety and depression.
Traditionally there have been three distinct conceptual models that define how
anxiety and depression relate to each other. The two disorders have been considered
as: (a) distinct disorders, qualitatively different; (b) variations of the same underlying
disorder, quantitatively different; or (c) phenomenologically (qualitatively and
quantitatively) different, when both present, from either pure anxiety or depression
(e.g. Katon & Roy-Byrne, 1991; Stahl, 1993; Stavrakaki & Vargo, 1986).
The following is a description of each model with a review of research findings on
which each position is based.
2. 2. 1. Traditional dichotomous position.
According to this position, anxiety and depression are classically viewed as discrete
entities (see Figure 2. 1. below). The pioneering studies in this field have been
carried out by the Newcastle Group (Gurney, Roth, Garside, Kerr & Schapira, 1972;
Roth, Gurney, Garside & Kerr, 1972). Although aware of the overlap between
anxious and depressive symptomatology, the Newcastle Group suggested that the
two disorders could be shown to differ if the appropriate statistical methods were
used. Their studies showed such differentiation in terms of clinical symptoms,
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course, treatment, prognosis and rating scales (Mountjoy & Roth, 1982a; 1982b). In
particular, the Group found poorer social adjustment, dependent personality traits,
higher neuroticism and lower extraversion scores, an earlier age of onset, longer
duration of the illness and a greater prevalence of psychiatric disturbance in first-
degree relatives for anxiety compared to depressive disorders. Moreover, the anxious
and depressed groups of the Newcastle studies also differed in terms of treatment
response, as electro convulsive therapy (ECT) and tricyclic antidepressants were
found to be more beneficial to depressed patients and traditional anxiolytics were
more effective in anxious patients. This differentiation was upheld also at follow-up
with ratings showing a better prognosis for depressed patients in terms of global
adjustment, frequency and severity of symptoms. Furthermore, anxious patients
showed an increased physiological response, whereas depression was associated with
a psychological response to stress. Finally, factor analyses of rating scales identified
a depression factor in both groups, but an anxiety factor only in the anxious group.
Thus, it was concluded that diverse clinical patterns had been isolated and evidence
was provided that showed differences between anxious and depressive syndromes.




These first studies have been followed by more recent research supporting the notion
that the two disorders can be distinguished on a number of parameters.
Cognitively, in anxiety states patients are overwhelmed with uncertainty about a
dangerous future and feel insecure and helpless. On the other hand, the central theme
of depression is loss accompanied by hopelessness, self-depreciation and suicidal
ideation (e.g. Akiskal, 1985; Beck, 1976). In addition, anxiety is associated with
heightened negative affective arousal, whereas depression is related to reduced
positive affect (e.g. Tellegen, 1985). Behaviourally, both anxiety and depression can
show increased activity, but psychomotor retardation is unique to clinical depression.
On the other hand, anxiety, but not depression, is characterised by autonomic
activation, which is particularly evident in psychophysiological studies, for example
on skin conductance (e.g. Ward, Doerr & Storrie, 1983).
From a more "normal" perspective, the identification of basic emotions - anger,
disgust, fear, happiness, and sadness (e.g. Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987) - could be
used to defend the dichotomous position, in that the basic emotion of "fear" can be
viewed as the core disordered emotion in anxiety states and, conversely, "sadness"
can be seen as the core disordered emotion in depression. However, it could be
argued that clinical anxiety and depression are the result of more than a single
negative emotion (cf. Power & Dalgleish, 1997).
The dichotomous position is largely based on cross-sectional studies looking at
distinctive features of the two disorders mainly from the perspective of the medical
model. Historically, this can be attributable to the revival of interest in diagnosis and
classification during the 1970s, which led to the reaffirmation of the concept of
multiple discrete disorders and the use of categorical operational criteria in clinical
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judgement (Neo-Kraepelian Paradigm). The concept of two separate disorders was
then accepted in clinical practice and implemented in treatment protocols with the
preferential use of benzodiazepines and tricyclic antidepressants in anxiety in
depressive disorders respectively. This approach was most useful in the definition of
discrete diagnostic groups for early clinical studies of novel therapeutic treatments,
however the increasing recognition that anxiety frequently coexists with depression
has led to the emergence of alternative standpoints.
2. 2. 2. Unitary position.
The main source of evidence in support of the conceptualisation of anxiety and
depression as belonging to a single continuum of affective disorder derives from
clinical studies showing overlap in their symptomatology (e.g. Katon & Roy-Byrne,
1991). These are conceived as symptomatic stages of a single affective disorder
varying in severity with the ratio of anxiety and depressive symptoms changing over
time so that the type of diagnosis will depend upon when, in the course of the illness,
the clinical assessment is made.
This concept has received further support from studies that have concentrated on the
possible aetiological factors and course of anxiety and depression. We have already
seen that early studies (e.g. Roth et ah, 1972) reported an earlier age of onset for
anxiety compared with depression. Moreover, Schapira, Roth, Kerr & Gurney (1972)
noted that longstanding anxiety states tended to acquire depressive characteristics
over time, and that the average length of time between the onset of anxiety and the
development of depressive symptoms was five years (Clancy, Noyes, Hoenk &
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Slymen, 1979). In agreement with this evidence, Lesse (1982) proposed the axis
stress—»anxiety—>depression in an attempt to explain the relationship between the
two disorders, suggesting that high levels of stress can lead to the emergence of
anxiety, which in turn can lead to the emergence of depression. Although the
possibility that, in some situations, depression may be the primary response to stress
was not ruled out, Lesse was unable to document a severe depressive state in the
absence of previous symptoms of anxiety.
This proposal has been substantiated by more recent studies and constitutes the basis
of some recent neurobiological theories of stress in the aetiology of anxiety and
depression (e.g. Gulley & Nemeroff, 1993; Paul, 1988). In this case, genetically
vulnerable individuals with a sub-syndromal prodrome may, under stress,
decompensate and progress to symptoms of anxiety, then mixed anxiety depression
and, finally, depression (see Figure 2. 2.).




Additional support for the unitary approach derives from studies that report the lack
of a specific response to drug treatment. That is, traditional antidepressants are
effective anxiolytics and some anxiolytics produce antidepressant effects (e.g.
Rickels & Schweizer, 1993; Sussman, 1993). Moreover, the high psychometric
correlation between anxiety and depression rating scales (e.g. Bystritsky, Stoessel &
Yager, 1993) has been cited as evidence in favour of this position.
Adherents of the unitary approach of anxiety and depression tend to oppose and
dismiss the differential diagnostic considerations reviewed above, as of theoretical
rather than clinical significance. Most of the studies that advocate a unitary view
refer to the broader longitudinal sequence and overlap between the two disorders
rather than focusing on specific cross-sectional differentiations. Thus, supporters of
this position consider studies that concentrate on aetiology, course of illness and
treatment of critical value when embracing this theoretical approach.
2. 2. 3. Mixed position.
The two conceptual positions reviewed above represent opposing views of the
relationship between anxiety and depression, seen as either two distinct disorders or
as manifestations of a single disorder. Together with these contrasting positions there
is a third intermediate standpoint that brings together evidence from both extremes of
the debate in search of a more balanced stance, in good interactionist spirit!
However, to dissipate any sense of moderation and compromise that an intermediate
position may provoke, we will start by saying that this does not constitute a unitary
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perspective and that the subdivisions within the mixed position reflect different
theoretical approaches.
The first point of view refers to the concept of comorbidity. The term was first
coined by FeinStein (1970) and was defined as "any distinct additional clinical entity
that has existed or that may occur during the clinical course of a patient who has the
index disease under study" (pp. 456-457). This applies only to diseases and disorders
and not to symptoms. Thus, symptoms can be said to co-occur with a disorder, but
they are not comorbid either with a disorder or with other symptoms.
Therefore, comorbid anxiety and depression in an individual indicates that the person
meets diagnostic criteria for both an anxiety and depressive disorders (see Figure 2.
3.). This can be seen as a modern extension of the dichotomous position, in that it
takes into account the possibility that the two disorders may coexist, but it retains its
emphasis on the original categorical approach. Consequently although coexisting, the
two disorders are seen as discrete entities.
Figure 2. 3. Comorbid representation of anxiety and depression. (Adapted
from Stahl, 1993.)
Depression Comorbid Generalised Anxiety Disorder Anxiety
Major Depressive Disorder
In the case of an individual who meets criteria only for one of the disorders but who
presents with symptoms from other categories but to the extent that they are
insufficient to diagnose a second disorder, only one diagnosis will be given. This is
seen as the need to improve diagnostic precision by increasing the discriminant
power of the diagnostic criteria.
A second variation of the comorbid approach refers to the concept of sub-threshold
(e.g. Stahl, 1993). This is an even more lenient version of the original dichotomous
position, in that, the co-occurrence of anxiety symptoms in a major depressive
episode (or vice versa) that are not severe enough to reach the "threshold" defined in
the inclusion diagnostic criteria, is seen as of relevance and should therefore require
attention. This will inevitably have important implications for both treatment and
prognosis.
The greater flexibility shown by this second version seems to represent an attempt to
overcome the obstacle erected by the strict application of the definition of
comorbidity, that is the prohibitive use of the term to describe the co-occurrence of a
disorder and symptoms from another diagnostic category.
Whereas the comorbid perspective recognises that anxiety can be an additional
secondary state in patients with a depressive disorder (and vice versa), the sub-
syndromal position proposes that some individuals may have chronic symptoms of
anxiety and depression that are not severe enough to require a diagnosis of anxiety or
affective disorder. However, if under stress, the person may decompensate and
develop a mixed anxiety depressive disorder (see Figure 2. 4. below).
The sub-syndromal category represents here a vulnerability factor that would account
for individuals with low levels of symptoms who might be at a higher lifetime risk
for an anxiety, depressive or mixed anxiety depressive disorder.
52
Figure 2. 4. Sub-syndromal representation of anxiety and depression.








Depression Comorbid Generalised Anxiety Disorder Anxiety
Major Depressive Disorder
This seems to represent an evolution of the dimensional unitary position reviewed
above. Most important, the original unitary view was based on a unidimensional
model of anxiety and depression with anxiety at one end and depression at the
opposite end of a continuum. This had central implications in terms of prediction of
course of illness as a function of severity ranging from prodrome (sub-syndromal) to
anxiety, to mixed anxiety depression, to depression. However, the sub-syndromal
mixed position has added flexibility to its model, which has at least two dimensions,
because an individual may develop either a "pure" anxious state, a "pure" depressive
state or a mixed state without having to go through a predefined "disorder pathway"
based on a severity diagnostic hierarchy (typical of categorical models) (e.g.
Boulenger & Lavallee, 1993). This surmounts the double impasse of having a
spurious model and the inability to account for the fact that when the two syndromes
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coexist there is increased chronicity of the illness, reduced response to conventional
therapies, a poorer outcome and prognosis (e.g. Angst, 1997; Emmanuel, Simmons
& Tyrer, 1998; Fawcett, 1997; Lydiard, 1991). In other words, mixed anxiety
depression seems to represent a disorder qualitatively and quantitatively different.
2. 3. Evidence for the mixed position.
There is a substantial amount of evidence in favour of the mixed point of view of
anxiety and depression, be it comorbidity, sub-threshold or sub-syndromal. Some of
it has already been reviewed above as in support of the unitary position; however, at
this point it will be covered in more details below with a review of studies that have
investigated the phenomenon more closely.
2. 3. 1. Epidemiological and longitudinal studies.
We have already seen in Chapter 1 that anxiety and depressive disorders constitute
the most common mental disorders in the general population. Here we will review
some specific epidemiological evidence that the two disorders often manifest
concurrently.
Epidemiological investigations in psychiatric illness have produced substantial
variation in their findings (e.g. Baldwin, 1998). This can plausibly be attributed to
methodological differences, such as various sampling methods and diagnostic
instruments, to different diagnostic criteria and lack of consensus on the definition of
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overlap, and finally, but not least important, to differences in timeframe (cross-
sectional vs. longitudinal), population studied (young adults vs. older adults), period
in history, and culture.
A relatively recent study (The National Comorbidity Survey) conducted in 34 US
states between 1990 and 1992 on a sample of over 8,000 respondents revealed a 12-
month comorbidity of 51.2% and lifetime comorbidity of 58% between major
depression and any anxiety disorders. Moreover, 62% of people with GAD
developed a major depressive disorder in the same year (Kessler, Nelson,
McGonagle, Liu, Swartz & Blazer, 1996). Further analyses of the National
Comorbidity Survey and Midlife Development in the United States Survey also
showed that the majority of respondents with GAD at 12 months (58.1% and 69.7%
respectively) also met criteria for major depression (Kessler, DuPont, Berglund &
Wittchen, 1999).
A previous US study (The National Institute of Mental Health, 1980 Epidemiologic
Catchment Area Program) carried out in five sites on a sample of more than 20,000
community and institutionalised adults reported a six-month and lifetime prevalence
of affective and anxiety disorders of 1.9 and 3.6% respectively (Regier, Burke &
Burke, 1990).
The World Health Organisation (WHO) Study on Psychological Disorders in
Primary Health Care conducted in 15 centres worldwide, distinguished between
supra-threshold comorbidity (4.6%) accounting for about 42% of the current cases of
anxiety and depression, and sub-threshold [term here and below used to indicate sub-
syndromal overlap, as reported above] comorbidity (1.3%) accounting for about 18%
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of the current sub-threshold cases of anxiety and depression (Sartorius, Ustiin,
Lecrubier & Wittchen, 1996).
Another study that differentiated between supra and sub-threshold co-occurrence of
anxiety and depression is the Munich Follow-Up Study carried out over 7 years,
between 1974 and 1981 (Wittchen & Essau, 1993). Here the prevalence of lifetime
comorbidity varied between 67.8% in a clinical sample of 218 patients and 44.4% in
the general population (N = 1366) for supra-threshold disorders, and only 0.8% for
sub-threshold comorbidity. However, Stein, Kirk, Prabhu, Grott & Terepa (1995)
reported more comparable rates of supra (19.2%) and sub-threshold (12.8%) mixed
anxiety depression in a primary care sample of 796 attendees.
The Stirling County Study carried out in Canada shows very high rates of overlap
between anxiety and depression in 1952 (72%) and in 1970 (75%) in samples of just
over 1,000 people in both years of study (Murphy, 1990).
In Europe, the Zurich Cohort Study of young adults reported a mean 6.8% cross-
sectional and 15.4% longitudinal association between anxiety and depression after a
7 year follow up from 1979 to 1986. Besides, over the same period, of those who had
received a diagnosis of anxiety disorder in 1979, 36% were diagnosed as having
mixed anxiety depression, 13% depression, and 10% anxiety only, at follow up. In
contrast, of those who had originally received a diagnosis of depression, 19%
developed a mixed disorder, 14% anxiety only, and 28% remained depressed. Taken
together, these data show a large overlap between the two disorders as well as the
relative stability of a diagnosis of depression compared to anxiety (Angst, Vollrath,
Merikangas & Ernst, 1990).
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A similar pattern comes from a Swedish study (The Lundby 25-Year Prospective
Study) carried out between 1947 and 1972. Approximately 25% of the individuals
with anxiety, plus other unspecified psychiatric symptoms, developed depression;
whereas, among those with depression plus other unspecified psychiatric symptoms
only 7% switched to anxiety (Hagnell & Grasbeck, 1990).
In conclusion, there seems to be strong evidence of both within-episode and across-
episode overlap between anxiety and depression. Additionally, longitudinal
epidemiological studies show that over time the direction of the relationship between
the two disorders is more likely to be of anxiety moving towards depression than the
reverse.
2. 3. 2. Family, genetic, and biological studies.
Some evidence from family and genetic studies was reported in Chapter 1 regarding
the inheritability of anxiety and depression and the higher risk of developing the
same disorder in first-degree relatives of probands. Here we will review further
evidence that indicates familial transmission of anxiety and depression and that the
two disorders may be manifestations of the same underlying aetiological factor.
Early family studies of depression and panic disorders show an increased risk of
depression among relatives of probands with depression and a similar increase in risk
of developing a panic disorder among relatives of probands with panic disorder (e.g.
Crowe, Noyes, Pauls & Slymen, 1983; Van Valkenburg, Akiskal, Puzantian &
Rosenthal, 1984). Maier, Buller and Hallmayer (1988) argued that although there
seems to be specificity in the familial transmission of depressive and panic disorders,
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the increased prevalence of panic disorder in relatives of probands with depression
only and, vice versa, the increased risk of depression in relatives of probands with
panic disorder, suggests that there is some shared aetiological factor between the
two.
Results from a twin study (Torgersen, 1990) investigating the relationship among
depression only, anxiety only and mixed anxiety depression in a sample of 177 twin
pairs suggest that depression and mixed anxiety depression share the same aetiology,
whereas, "pure" anxiety shows no relationship with either of the other two disorders.
Furthermore, mixed anxiety depression seemed more strongly influenced by genetic
factors than was depression.
This last notion was supported in a study that examined differences in familial
environmental factors, such as parental rearing style and bonding, among patients
with depression only, anxiety only, and mixed anxiety depression. Results showed
that low scores in parental care was the best discriminating variable between the
mixed group and the other two groups of patients, supporting the view that mixed
anxiety depression may have a different aetiology (Alnses & Torgersen, 1990).
However, a larger study (N = 1033) of female twin pairs carried out in Virginia, US
(Kendler, 1996; Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath & Eaves, 1992) shows that the same
genetic factors influence the liability to major depression and GAD in women. On
the other hand, environmental risk factors that predispose to GAD or depression may
be relatively distinct.
Also family and genetic studies of children show that offspring of anxious or
depressed parents are at high risk of developing a depressive, an anxious or both
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disorders, and also that adult relatives of children with anxiety or depression have
high rates of the two disorders (e.g. Weissman, 1990).
Neurobiological studies have identified a number of biological markers that may be
responsible for the overlap of anxiety and depressive disorders.
One possible candidate in producing many of the symptoms of anxiety and
depression is hyperactivity of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical axis (HPA).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is evidence of dysregulation of this hormone
system in depression; yet, the HPA seems to be involved in a similar fashion in
anxiety.
In response to stress, the hypothalamus secretes corticotropin releasing factor (CRF)
that stimulates the anterior pituitary gland to release adrenocorticotropic hormone
(ACTH), which travels to the adrenal cortex where it releases Cortisol and other
corticosteroid hormones, which elevate blood sugar and increase the metabolic rate
throughout the body. In addition, CRF increases the firing rates of noradrenergic
neurons located in the locus ceruleus, also involved in the stress response and
associated with anxiety.
It is proposed that CRF is involved in the production ofmany signs and symptoms of
both anxiety and depression, such as disturbed sleep, alterations in locomotor
activity, agitation, decreased food consumption and sexual behaviour (Butler &
Nemeroff, 1990; Gulley & Nemeroff, 1993).
Other candidates include dopamine (DA), noradrenaline (NA), and serotonin (5-HT).
Since anxiety is associated with high levels of NA and 5-HT, whereas depression is
associated with low levels of DA, NA and 5-HT, it has been suggested that depletion
of these neurotransmitters as a result of anxiety may explain the emergence of
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depression in anxious patients (e.g. Goldberg & Huxley, 1992). Among these
neurotransmitters, the role of 5-HT has been particularly advocated as a common
neurochemical link between anxiety and depression.
Serotonin would appear to be implicated in the individual's adaptive responses to
aversive life events. 5-HT2 receptors mediate acute adaptive responses (e.g. anxiety
and avoidance of aversive stimuli), whereas 5-HTia receptors are thought to be
involved in long-term adaptation to chronic stress and are therefore related to
resilience. If this resilience system breaks down the development of a depressive
state will be the likely result (e.g. Deakin, 1998; Stahl, 1997). Related is the use
serotonin selective reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) as pharmacological management of
patients with mixed anxiety depression (e.g. Nutt, 1997; Zajecka & Ross, 1995).
In summary, despite the methodological inconsistencies in the studies review above,
there seems to be a considerable amount of evidence from family, genetic and
neurobiological studies that common aetiological factors as well as biological
correlates (see also the BIS/BAS approach described in Chapter 1, Section 1. 4. 2.)
may be involved in both anxiety and depression.
2. 4. Classification issues.
Although the co-occurrence of anxiety and depression is a phenomenon widely
accepted, there is no clear agreement about the extent to which they are interrelated.
The proportions of overlap range considerably from about 1% for sub-threshold
comorbidity reported by Wittchen and Essau (1993) in the Munich Follow-Up Study,
60
to approximately 75% in the Stirling County Study (Murphy, 1990). As a
consequence, contrasting parties have interpreted these variations as supportive of
the unitary or the dichotomous position.
These discrepancies seem to be due mainly to differences in sample selection,
methodology used in the assessment of anxiety and depression, and to the criteria
and level of psychopathology considered.
Of this view are Hiller, Zaudig and Bose (1989) who suggested that these apparent
inconsistencies could be explained by looking at the phenomenon at different levels:
symptomatological, syndromic, and diagnostic (see Figure 2. 5.).
Figure 2. 5. A model of overlap between anxiety and depression. (Source:
Hiller et al., 1989.)




By screening a sample of 420 adult outpatients in Munich and by examining the data
according to the three different levels, the authors demonstrated that the proportion
of outpatients included in the mixed anxiety depression group (i.e. the rate of
overlap) varied consistently. Specifically, the overlap rates were 28.5% at the
diagnostic level, but went up to almost double (52%) at the symptomatological level,
whereas intermediate rates were obtained when syndromes were taken into
consideration.
Katon and Roy-Byrne (1991) also argued that minor forms of anxiety and
depression, more common in primary care settings, may show greater overlap in
symptom profiles and, as such, may be more difficult to distinguish compared to
more severe forms of the disorders which include more distinct symptomatology.
These data have important implications for the classification of psychiatric disorders
and have proved to be a major challenge for the present diagnostic classification
systems. There are at least three ways in which "the problem of comorbidity" has
been addressed within the neo-Kraepelinian paradigm currently in force.
The first one is the introduction of a multiaxial system. The DSM-IV-TR (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000) contains five different axes: Axis I (Clinical
Syndromes), Axis II (Mental Retardation and Personality Disorders), Axis III
(General Medical Conditions), Axis IV (Psychosocial and Environmental Problems),
and Axis V (Global Assessment of Functioning Scale). The first three axes are
nosological and the last two are dimensional. DSM-IV-TR acknowledges the
phenomenon of comorbidity and encourages the clinician to use all of the axes.
However, comorbidity often occurs within the same axis.
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Another way of addressing the phenomenon has been the use of the distinction
between primary and secondary (e.g. see Klerman, 1990). This implies a causal
inference between two distinct disorders (i.e. "due to"), and it is often used to
indicate an organic cause of the disorder, which is considered aetiological and
therefore higher (i.e. primary) in the hierarchy. However, many researchers and
clinicians alike see the use of a hierarchy with strict exclusion criteria and causative
implications about the relationship among disorders as largely arbitrary. Moreover,
the primary-secondary distinction is often used to indicate a chronological sequence
of two disorders or a symptomatic predominance of one disorder over another.
A third approach makes use of the genetic concept of spectrum disorder, first used
by Kety, Rosenthal, Wender and Schulsinger (1968) in the Danish adoption studies.
Here the classic distinction between genotype and phenotype is extended so that for
example, a genotype that is considered to be a genetic predisposition to anxiety, can
manifest itself in a number of different ways: panic disorder, GAD, phobias and so
on and cause comorbidity within a single class of disorders. Alternatively,
personality disorders, such as avoidant or dependent may be chronic variations of
anxiety or depression respectively. However, in this sense the term "spectrum" could
be used to refer to "dimension".
More problems with the current classification systems derive by the continuous
emerging of new sub-categories within each disorder. For example, as we have seen
in Chapter 1 there are 11 different types of anxiety disorders. Generally, the more
slices you cut in a diagnostic cake the higher the comorbidity rates will be. What is
more, the higher the number of similar or identical items shared by inclusion criteria
belonging to different typologies, the higher the overlap.
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Finally, the threshold or cut-off point used to determine whether or not an individual
meets inclusion criteria for a certain disorder will largely influence the degree of
comorbidity among disorders. Given that such thresholds are arbitrary to a large
extent, it may be more beneficial to measure anxiety and depressive disorders on
dimensions to better allow the analysis of the critical factor of severity of the
disorders.
On the other hand, the use of diagnostic taxonomies has some undisputed
advantages, in that, it facilitates both clinical practice and understanding, and assists
research by having a standard set of diagnostic criteria. Besides, the dimensional and
categorical approaches are not necessarily incompatible since categories could be
defined as the convergence of several dimensions, with some dimensions being more
central and defining features of a category and making up a particular profile (e.g.
Barlow, 1988).
2.4. 1. The diagnostic category of mixed anxiety depressive disorder.
Of the three mixed conceptual models of anxiety and depression presented above, so
far the one that has found expression in the current classification systems is the sub-
syndromal position. This is a diagnostic category reserved for those patients who
suffer from a non-specific pattern of anxious and depressive symptoms that are not
severe enough (i.e. do not reach the threshold levels) to justify a diagnosis of an
anxiety or depressive disorder. It is therefore a "sub-threshold" category that
acknowledges the unitary nature of anxiety and depression but only when they
present themselves in milder forms, that is at the symptomatological and syndromic
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levels (cf. Hiller et al., 1988). From now on we shall refer to this category as sub¬
threshold as opposed to sub-syndrome, in order to be consistent with the current
literature on the topic and avoid confusion.
This new category, Mixed Anxiety-Depressive Disorder (MAD), was first introduced
in the most recent version of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10;
World Health Organization, 1990; 1993). Although the ICD-10 does not give clear-
cut research criteria for this new category (labelled F41.2), the manual defines MAD
as a mixture of anxiety and depressive symptoms of equal importance, with at least
some autonomic symptoms, that are mainly related to cases seen in primary-care
settings.
This has consequently prompted the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association,
1994) task force to investigate the phenomenon more closely and identify operational
criteria that could be used to categorise sub-threshold MAD (Zinbarg, Barlow,
Liebowitz, Street, Broadhead, Katon, Roy-Byrne, Lepine, Teherani, Richards,
Brantley & Kraemer, 1994).
A total of 666 patients from 5 primary-care medical centres and 2 outpatient mental
health centres were screened and administered a semi-structured psychiatric
interview assessing DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) diagnostic
criteria. Results revealed that 80% of the cases "not otherwise specified" were judged
to meet definite levels of impairment and distress. Of these sub-threshold outpatients,
14% had previously fulfilled diagnostic criteria for major depression, and 84%
reported that their problems with anxiety and depression had begun more than 6
months prior to the time of interview. The modal presentation among these patients
was a non-specific pattern of anxious and depressed symptoms. Principal component
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analyses of items and scales used for the psychiatric assessment led to the
identification of four main symptomatic criteria: negative affect, anxiety, depression,
and physiological arousal. Sub-threshold patients could also be significantly
differentiated from patients with major depression, GAD and panic disorder for
having lower levels of depression, anxiety and physiological arousal respectively.
Moreover, of the four symptomatic criteria identified, negative affect was the one
that yielded higher scores. This dimension is very similar to that of general distress
and, being common to both anxious and depressed syndromes, it is thought to be a
manifestation of chronic personality traits related to neuroticism (e.g. Clark, Watson
& Mineka, 1994).
Consequently, the negative affect symptom list was used to define the operational
criteria for MAD. By using these criteria and excluding all participants with a history
of Axis I disorder, 54% of the sub-threshold patients received a final diagnosis of
MAD. The DSM-IV task force admitted that many of these cases could be included
in the current nomenclature by lowering the definitional thresholds for either GAD or
major depression, or by creating a new mixed anxiety depression category. However,
although symptomatic discriminant validity was demonstrated, it was concluded that
there was not enough evidence regarding its predictive validity (e.g. associated
features, familial pattern, longitudinal and treatment studies) to warrant its inclusion
as an official Axis I diagnosis in the DSM-IV. Moreover, since the MAD patients
could not be differentiated from sub-threshold patients with a previous history of
psychiatric disorders, it was not clear whether the MAD symptom profile could be
better thought of as a distinct diagnosis or a mild form or prodromal phase of GAD
or major depression. The final recommendation was therefore to include the MAD
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category in the appendix of the DSM-IV reserved for proposed diagnostic categories
that need further research study. This is also included in the latest version (DSM-IV-
TR) with the following research criteria (see Table 2. 1. below):
Table 2. 1. Research criteria for Mixed Anxiety Depressive Disorder.
A. Persistent or recurrent dysphoric mood lasting at least 1 month.
B. The dysphoric mood is accompanied by at least 1 month of four (or more) of the
following symptoms:
(1) difficulty concentrating or mind going blank
(2) sleep disturbance (difficulty falling or staying asleep, or restless,
unsatisfying sleep)
(3) fatigue or low energy
(4) irritability
(5) worry
(6) being easily moved to tears
(7) hypervigilance
(8) anticipating the worst
(9) hopelessness (pervasive pessimism about the future)
(10) low self-esteem or feelings of worthlessness
C. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
D. The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g.,
a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition.
E. All of the following:
(1) criteria have never been met for Major Depressive Disorder, Dysthymic
Disorder, Panic Disorder, or Generalized Anxiety Disorder
(2) criteria are not currently met for any other Anxiety or Mood Disorder
(including an Anxiety or Mood Disorder, In Partial Remission)
(3) the symptoms are not better accounted for by any other mental disorder.
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Even if somehow overcoming the concept of comorbidity, the sub-threshold
approach does not take into account all the cases often encountered in clinical
practice in which the two disorders coexist above threshold (i.e. patients who meet
the diagnostic criteria for both an anxiety and a depressive disorder). For such
patients the DSM-IV-TR currently maintains its original comorbid position and
appeals to the primary-secondary distinction and diagnostic hierarchies with
exclusionary rules as seen above.
Since one of the aims of this thesis is the attempt to provide evidence of discriminant
group validity among anxious, depressed, and mixed anxious depressed groups of
outpatients, it has been decided to include both sub and supra-threshold cases of
mixed anxiety depression in the mixed group. That is to say, people who meet either
the above DSM-IV-TR research criteria for sub-threshold MAD or individuals who
meet full criteria for both an anxiety and a depressive disorder as described in
Chapter 1. Furthermore, given the high probability of overlap between anxiety and
depression, and given the purpose of distinguishing as far as possible the mixed
group from the other two clinical groups (anxious only and depressed only) it has
been decided to apply some additional inclusion research criteria for the "pure"
anxious and depressed groups:
• Include in the depressed group outpatients who meet diagnostic criteria for a
depressive disorder (see Chapter 1) and who present with sub-threshold anxiety
(or with secondary anxiety, meaning symptomatic non-predominance).
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• Include in the anxious group outpatients who meet diagnostic criteria for an
anxiety disorder (see Chapter 1) and who present with sub-threshold depression
(or with secondary depression, meaning symptomatic non-predominance).
These steps will allow us to identify a mixed group (sub or supra-threshold) with
anxiety and depressive disturbance of comparable intensity; a depressed group with
high depressive disturbance and "relatively low" anxiety levels; and an anxious
group with high anxiety disturbance and "relatively low" depression levels.
At this point, it is essential to stress two important aspects. The first one is that the
term "relatively low" is here used to indicate the point along the anxiety and
depression dimensions that conforms to sub-threshold levels as defined by the DSM-
IV-TR criteria. The second point is that sub-threshold levels of anxiety and
depression found in a clinical population are likely to be significantly higher than the
ones found in the general population, so that our anxious and depressed groups will
probably still show some (hopefully) minor effect due to the presence of "secondary"
depression and anxiety respectively.
2. 5. Important features of anxiety-depression overlap.
In recent years, three important features of the overlap between anxiety and
depression have been identified that merit particular theoretical attention and
empirical investigation (Alloy et al., 1990; Mineka et ah, 1998).
69
These phenomena are: (a) the temporal relationship between anxiety and depression;
(b) the differential co-occurrence of depression with various anxiety disorders; and
(c) the relative infrequency of "pure" depression compared with "pure" anxiety.
This will now be considered in turn.
2. 5. 1. Temporal relationship between anxiety and depression.
The temporal relationship between anxiety and depression has been examined both
across and within episodes. Longitudinal studies of lifetime comorbidity reviewed
above have observed the stability of anxiety and depressive diagnoses over time and
have revealed that mood disorders are more likely to follow an anxiety disorder than
vice versa.
Kandell (1974) found that only 2% of individuals who had first received a diagnosis
of depression were five years later re-diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. In contrast,
about 24% of those individuals first diagnosed with an anxiety disorder were later re-
diagnosed with a depressive disorder.
Results pointing in the same direction have also been reported by later studies. For
example, Angst et al. (1990) report that about 33% of depressed cases went on to
develop anxiety or mixed anxiety depression seven years later; whereas, 49% of
anxiety cases developed depression or mixed anxiety depression. Similarly, in the
Lundby study (Hagnell & Grasbeck, 1990) only 7% of the individuals with
depression developed anxiety, while 25% of anxiety cases switched to depression.
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The elevated risk of depression in those with a temporally primary anxiety disorder is
also reported in the NCS data (Kessler et ah, 1996) where 62% of people with GAD
developed major depression in the same year.
Likewise, within a single episode of illness symptoms of anxiety are more likely to
precede symptoms of depression. Initial observations of this phenomenon have been
reported in human and non-human primates' responses to separation and loss of an
attachment figure (e.g. Mineka & Suomi, 1978). More recently, Bowlby (1980)
described a biphasic response in young human children of protest followed by
despair as a consequence of prolonged physical separation from their mothers or as a
response to loss through death of an attachment figure. According to Bowlby, the
protest response is a prototype for anxiety, and the despair response is a prototype for
depression in adults. Noteworthy is the fact that when both a protest and a despair
response are experienced, the protest (anxiety) always precedes the despair
(depression). Experimental literature on uncontrollable aversive stimuli (e.g.
Seligman, 1975) also suggests that depressive symptoms are more likely to follow
anxiety, than vice versa.
Thus, the probability of experiencing anxiety followed by depression, both within a
single episode and across episodes, seems to be much higher than the reverse.
2. 5. 2. Differential co-occurrence of depression with anxiety disorders.
A second feature of overlap is the differential co-occurrence of major depression
with various anxiety disorders. Evidence for this phenomenon derives from clinical,
family and epidemiological studies.
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Alloy et al.'s (1990) review suggested that people who received a diagnosis of GAD,
social phobia or simple phobia, were less likely to experience depression than
individuals diagnosed with panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD),
agoraphobia and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
The more recent NCS data (Kessler et ah, 1996) largely confirmed these conclusions,
however, a particularly strong association of GAD with major depression was
reported, so that of all the anxiety disorders, GAD was the most likely to co-occur
with depression. In 1992, Brown and Barlow found that agoraphobia and OCD were
more likely to overlap with depression, while simple phobia was the least likely and
GAD and social phobia were midway between the two. The NIMH-ECA project
(Regier et ah, 1990) reported that depressed individuals were twice as likely to suffer
from panic disorder (18%) compared to simple phobia (9%). Lepine, Wittchen and
Essau (1993) also found a strong association of panic disorder and agoraphobia with
major depression, but only weaker association between social phobia and major
depression.
Finally, genetic analyses also help clarify this issue. A study looking at the genetic
architecture of depressive and anxiety disorders identified two main genetic factors
(Kendler, Walters, Neale, Kessler, Heath & Eaves, 1995). The first one was defined
by major depression and GAD (with loadings of .64 and .47 respectively) and more
moderately by panic disorder (.35). The second factor was defined by panic disorder
(.58) and phobias (.57).
In summary, although results from various studies are not always consistent, it would
appear that GAD, panic disorder with agoraphobia, OCD and PTSD are more
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strongly associated with major depression, whereas social phobia and simple phobia
in particular are less likely to overlap with depression.
2. 5. 3. Infrequency of "pure" depression.
Studies of anxiety and depression that have investigated episodes of illness cross-
sectionally have often found that it is much more difficult to identify cases of "pure"
depression than it is to find cases of "pure" anxiety (e.g. Dobson, 1985).
This phenomenon appears to exist both at symptomatic and at diagnostic levels. At a
symptomatic level, people with major depression score consistently as high as or
higher on self-report scales assessing levels of clinical anxiety (e.g. Di Nardo &
Barlow, 1990). At a diagnostic level, it also occurs that the probability of an
individual with a depressive disorder meeting diagnostic criteria for an anxiety
disorder is greater than the reverse. This has generally been found in epidemiological
studies, such as the ECA (Regier et al., 1990) where about 25% of individuals with
an anxiety disorder also received a diagnosis of depression, against 43% of depressed
people who also received a diagnosis of anxiety disorder. Kessler et al. (1996)
confirmed this finding in the NCS data analyses with 58% of depressed individuals
having a concomitant anxiety disorder. Thus, in many cases, anxiety seems to
precede and to develop into depression, whilst depression usually follows an anxiety
state and is more stable over time.
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2. 6. Theoretical models of mixed anxiety depression.
As we have seen above, the debate between the dichotomous and unitary models of
anxiety and depression has gradually dwindled and given way to more refined ways
of conceptualising the relationship between the two disorders.
A range of "mixed" views has emerged. At one end of the spectrum, the "diagnostic
confusion" of anxiety and depression due to the categorical overlap occurring above,
below, or both above and below thresholds at the same time, has been resolved by
appealing to the concepts of comorbidity, primary-secondary distinction and
hierarchical exclusionary rules. At the other end, a more unitary and dimensional
view has conceptualised mixed anxiety depression as a disorder that is both
qualitatively and quantitatively different from either "pure" anxiety or "pure"
depression, and that can vary in severity along a continuum so as to occur above or
below any preset threshold.
Given the strong emphasis placed by the medical taxonomic model on the need to
search for discrete boundaries among diagnostic categories, it is perhaps not
surprising that the theoretical models that have developed to account for the co¬
occurrence of anxiety and depression adopt a dimensional perspective.
One such model, reviewed below, represents an extension of the hopelessness theory
of depression (Abramson et al., 1989) reviewed in Chapter 1 to the helplessness-
hopelessness theory of anxiety and depression (Alloy et ah, 1990), which is able to
account for many of the features of anxiety-depression overlap.
Other models have instead made use of a range of multivariate statistical techniques
in an attempt to identify common and unique factors of anxiety and depression at a
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phenotypic level. The results of these analyses have provided the basis for promising
structural models of anxiety and depression, and two of the most influential ones,
Goldberg's (1994; 1996; Goldberg & Huxley, 1992) biosocial model, and Clark and
Watson's (1991) tripartite model, will also be reviewed below.
2. 6. 1. Helplessness-hopelessness theory.
The first theoretical account of mixed anxiety depression to be considered is the
helplessness-hopelessness model (Alloy et ah, 1990). This model integrates the
hopelessness theory of depression (Abramson et ah, 1989), with findings from
research indicating the central causal role played by perceived uncontrollability in
the development of anxiety (e.g. Barlow, 1988; Mineka & Kelly, 1989). Once a
negative life event is perceived as likely to happen, an individual will detennine to
what degree the event is within his/her control (i.e. control style). Then, once the
negative event has occurred, the person will also judge to what extent the cause of
the event is internal, stable and global (i.e. depressogenic attributional style). Within
a diathesis-stress framework, Alloy et al. (1990) proposed that both control style and
depressogenic attributional style in a particular content domain (e.g. work or career)
provide the individual with specific vulnerability to hopelessness depression when
the individual has to deal with negative life events within the same domain (e.g. job
loss). Both styles are therefore deemed to be distal contributory causes that operate
early in the etiologic sequence to hopelessness depression.
According to this model, the interrelation of three cognitive components of
helplessness and hopelessness will determine the relationship between anxiety and
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depression. These components are: helplessness expectancy, negative outcome
expectancy, and certainty of these expectancies. In particular, a person who expects
to be helpless in trying to control important future outcomes, but who is unsure about
his/her helplessness, will experience "pure" anxiety. This is due to the fact that the
individual believes that future control may be possible, so he/she engages in
activities (e.g. intense scanning of the environment, worry) that are aimed towards
attempts to gain control, but that result in high arousal and a strong autonomic
reaction. In contrast, an individual who is certain about their helplessness, but who is
still uncertain about whether a negative outcome will occur (or a positive outcome
will not occur), will experience mixed anxiety depression. The person will give up
his/her idea of control and as a result this state will be characterised by a more
passive behaviour accompanied by worry about future events. Finally, individuals
who are certain about their uncontrollability of important future events and are also
certain that negative events will occur (and positive events will not) will experience
hopelessness depression. In this last case, helplessness becomes hopelessness and
anxiety gives way to a depressive state characterised by loss of interest, despair and
suicidality. Hence, hopelessness is seen as a proximal (i.e. that operates relatively
late in the causal pathway to the disorder) sufficient, but not necessary, cause of
depression.
Therefore, this theory views anxiety and depression as sharing the expectation of
uncontrollability (i.e. helplessness) but differing in that only depression is
characterised by the expectation that negative outcomes will occur (i.e. hopelessness)
due to the attribution that causes of negative events are internal, stable and global
(see Table 2. 2. below).
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Table 2. 2. Relationship between cognitive expectancies and symptom
patterns proposed by the helplessness-hopelessness theory.
Symptom Pattern
Pure Anxiety Mixed Anxiety Hopelessness
Depression Depression
Expectancy
Helplessness Uncertain Certain Certain
Negative Outcome None Uncertain Certain
This theory is able to account for the three features of comorbidity reviewed above in
the following way. The sequential relationship between anxiety and depression is
explained by the progression from helplessness to hopelessness. The certainty of
negative outcome expectancy for a particular life event is likely to follow expectancy
of helplessness (certain or uncertain), that is, hopelessness depression is more likely
to occur after all the person's efforts to gain control have failed, than the reverse. The
across-episode sequence is thought to occur because prior experience of anxiety and
helplessness may render an individual more vulnerable to future stressors and to
certain helplessness and hopelessness. Consistent with this view are findings that
anxiety is often preceded by threat or danger events, depression is often preceded by
a major loss event, and mixed anxiety depression is often associated with both types
of events (Brown, Harris & Eales, 1993; Finlay-Jones & Brown, 1981).
The higher frequency of "pure" anxiety compared to "pure" depression is accounted
for by the observation that helplessness, which causes anxiety, can occur without
hopelessness. In contrast, hopelessness cannot occur without helplessness, in that the
former is seen as a subset of the latter. As a result, individuals who are hopeless
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perceive themselves as being also helpless, whereas the opposite may not necessarily
be the case.
Finally, the differential overlap of various anxiety disorders with depression is
explained by the fact that some anxiety disorders, such as panic disorder,
agoraphobia, OCD, and PTSD are characterised by a more pervasive and chronic
sense of helplessness compared to more circumscribed disorders, such as social and
specific phobias. The more pervasive nature of some anxiety symptoms and the
consequent helplessness experienced by the individual are more likely over time to
lead to depression. However, Alloy et al. (1990) are unable to explain the high rates
of co-occurrence between GAD and major depression (Kessler et al., 1996).
Recent empirical support exists for those parts of the theory that relate to the
cognitive vulnerability to depression. For example, Gibb, Alloy, Abramson, Rose,
Whitehouse, Donovan, Hogan, Cronholm and Tiemey (2001) found that college
students at high cognitive risk for depression, based on the presence of negative
cognitive styles, reported childhood emotional, but less childhood physical
maltreatment than did low-risk participants. In addition, levels of maltreatment were
related to levels of hopelessness and depression. More evidence from the Temple-
Wisconsin Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression (CVD) Project, confirmed the
cognitive vulnerability hypothesis, in that, high-risk participants had higher lifetime
prevalence of major and hopelessness depression and were more vulnerable to
clinically significant depressive disorders and suicidality compared to low-risk
participants (e.g. Abramson, Alloy, Hogan, Whitehouse, Donovan, Rose, Panzarella
& Raniere, 1999; Alloy, Abramson, Hogan, Whitehouse, Rose, Robinson, Kim &
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Lapkin, 2000; Alloy, Abramson, Whitehouse, Hogan, Tashman, Steinberg, Rose &
Donovan, 1999).
However, other important assumptions posited by the extended helplessness-
hopelessness theory, have not been verified empirically. For example, the model
does not predict any negative outcome expectancy (certain or uncertain) in anxiety,
whilst predicting certain negative outcome expectancy in depression. Conversely,
research in prospective cognitions shows that anxious individuals typically report an
increased anticipation of negative events, whereas depression is associated with a
decreased expectancy for positive events but an equal anticipation of negative life
events compared to controls (see MacLeod, 1999 for a review). Other recent studies
have also failed to find the predicted association between anxiety and helpless causal
attributions (Swendsen, 1997; Waikar & Craske, 1997). Likewise, its key predictions
about the sequential relationship of anxiety and depression still need to be
demonstrated. Nonetheless, the helplessness-hopelessness model of anxiety and
depression offers a good theoretical framework and some of its aspects will be
addressed experimentally in this thesis.
2. 6. 2. Goldberg's biosocial model.
Goldberg (1994; 1996; Goldberg & Huxley, 1992) has formulated an integrative
model of common mental disorders - anxiety and depression in particular - that
articulates biological variables (e.g. genetic vulnerability, neurotransmitters) and
social variables (e.g. social environment, life events) within a dimensional
perspective.
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In 1987, Goldberg, Bridges, Duncan-Jones and Grayson used latent trait analysis to
examine the relationship between psychiatric symptoms that constitute common
psychiatric disorders encountered in primary care. Latent trait analysis is a form of
dichotomous factor analysis suitable for variables, such as symptoms and diagnoses,
that are not normally distributed in the population, and which are either present or
absent (Duncan-Jones, Grayson & Moran, 1986). A latent trait model gives a
mathematical picture of the relationship between a set of symptoms and the
underlying latent illness (e.g. anxiety or depression), which is assumed to be
normally distributed in the general population with a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1. In particular, the analysis provides two measures about each
symptom: the threshold and the slope. The threshold is a measure of severity of a
symptom and it represents the point on the underlying illness dimension where 50%
of the population will possess that particular symptom. The slope, on the other hand,
is a measure of the discriminatorypower of a symptom, that is, how good a symptom
is a measure of the underlying dimension. These analyses were carried out on a final
sample of 283 patients from 15 general practices in the Greater Manchester area, UK,
who presented with their first psychiatric illness. Assessments were carried out using
the Psychiatric Assessment Schedule (PAS), which consists of the short (40-item)
version of the Present State Examination, and 19 additional DSM-III (American
Psychiatric Association, 1980) symptoms (Surtees, Dean, Ingham, Kreitman, Miller
& Sashidharan, 1983). Results indicated that two dimensions rather than a one-
dimensional solution provided the best fit for the data, but also that an additional
third dimension offered no further advantage (see Table 2. 3. below).
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Subjective nervous tension 0.36 4.47
Worrying 0.38 6.06
Irritability 0.50 2.13
Muscular tension 0.75 1.71
Poor sleep 0.76 1.65
Tension pains 0.85 1.71
Free-floating anxiety 1.01 1.54
Health worries 1.24 1.09
Delayed sleep 1.24 1.34
Observed anxiety 1.88 0.98
Latent trait: depression
Anergia 1.09 1.18
Loss of interest 1.23 2.65
Loss of libido 1.29 1.15
Observed depression 1.32 1.96
Self-depreciation 1.42 1.34
Low self-confidence 1.60 1.68
Loss of appetite 1.67 1.07
Hopelessness 1.74 1.50
Subjective inefficient thinking 1.92 1.06
Social withdrawal 1.93 1.05
Weight loss due to poor appetite 2.43 0.76
Early waking 2.48 0.88
Slow, underactive 3.18 0.90
Diurnal variation; worse morning 5.23 0.44
The two resulting dimensions of anxiety and depression were also highly positively
correlated with each other (.70) so that two axes drawn at an angle to one another
defined a two-dimensional space within which symptoms clustered into two
reasonably distinct groups corresponding to anxiety and depression (see Figure 2. 6.).
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Figure 2. 6. -The two latent traits of anxiety and depression. (Source:










Noteworthy, as well as these two dimensions there was a third cluster of non specific
symptoms which included: tiredness or exhaustion, restlessness, poor concentration,
simple ideas of reference, depressed mood, situational anxiety, neglect due to
brooding.
Figure 2. 6. also shows that an equivalent way to conceptualise the two dimensions is
by considering the two axes that correspond to illness severity and "anxiety-
depression imbalance" (i.e. the axis running from anxiety to depression). By
definition, most people will be found around the area of intersection between the
depression and the anxiety axes, whereas well being, happiness and contentment
would be found in the area to the left of the point of intersection.
In order to explain the reason why the anxiety and depression symptom dimensions
overlap, Goldberg (1994; Goldberg & Huxley, 1992) argues that common social and
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biological variables take part in the vulnerability, destabilisation (decompensation)
and restitution (how long the illness will last) processes.
Goldberg and Huxley (1992) review evidence which suggests that genetic factors do
not determine which disorder (anxiety or depression) and individual will develop, but
they simply determine the individual's overall vulnerability to emotional disorders.
Environmental causes of vulnerability, such as parental loss or deprivation also
seemed to be non-specific causes of vulnerability, but only when followed by poor
parenting and childrearing, and neglect. However, the authors report studies that
seem to suggest that parental discord and traumatic events may favour later anxiety,
whereas, a combination of low care and overprotective parents may favour
depression. Moreover, the authors present also evidence that shows how long-term
social adversity (e.g. poor housing, unemployment) and poor social support
contribute to complete the picture of vulnerability factors.
According to Goldberg and Huxley (1992), the greater risk (i.e. vulnerability) of
some individuals to develop common mental disorders can be captured by measures
of personality traits, such as the N score of general neuroticism (Eysenck & Eysenck,
1991). Goldberg (1994) defines neuroticism as an individual's sensitivity to
reinforcing events, either rewarding or punishing. However, since depression and
anxiety relate to the reward (loss) and punishment (threat) systems respectively and
these systems are in a state of reciprocal inhibition, depression will lead to secondary
anxiety, and vice versa. Thus, for example, being diagnosed as having cancer will
lead to an initial anxiety state through the activation of the punishment system, which
in turn will lead to depression through the inhibition of the reward system. Similarly,
the loss of a valued source of reinforcement (e.g. death of a spouse, being sacked)
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will lead to primary depression through the loss of reward, but this will lead to
secondary anxiety through the release of the punishment system. Therefore,
whichever is released first, the other is likely to follow as a secondary consequence.
Goldberg (1994; Goldberg & Huxley, 1992) also points out the presence of
biological correlates of reward and punishment systems indicating their relationship
with Gray's (1982; 1987) BIS and BAS systems and with dopamine and serotonin
receptors as reviewed above.
The authors refer to destabilisation (or decompensation) as those factors that will
cause a person to experience anxiety or depression at a particular time of his/her life.
These factors are negative life events and include the onset of physical illness, and
personal and social circumstances. Also Goldberg (1994; 1996; Goldberg & Huxley,
1992), like Alloy et al. (1990) did above, refers to research that supports the
specificity hypothesis, which relates anxiety to threat and danger, and depression to
loss. As we have already reported, there is evidence of specific events causing
specific disorders (Brown, Harris & Eales, 1993; Finlay-Jones & Brown, 1981). This
can be summarised in the Table 2. 4. below.
Table 2. 4. Possible relationship between types of life event and specific
symptoms.
Types oflife event Possible intervening mechanisms Predominant symptoms
THREAT Stress, emotional reactivity ANXIETY
THREAT Poor coping ability MIXED ANXIETY
+ LOSS DEPRESSION
LOSS Negative self-evaluation, poor DEPRESSION
support, generalised hopelessness
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According to Goldberg's dimensional model, it is hypothesised that once individuals
have decompensated, they do not hold a fixed position within the two axes, but move
around in response to environmental stresses. To say it with Goldberg and Huxley
(1992):
"In the individual case, the exact sequence of events in the development of
symptoms of anxiety and depression may arise through complex combinations of
events and reactions to them. Anxiety may arise first in the context of a threat of loss,
and then depressive symptoms are predominant when the loss occurs. Anxiety may
arise again as the changes, challenges, and opportunities occasioned by the loss have
to be addressed, and depression may arise again in so far as the person becomes
hopeless in the face of continued failure to meet these challenges and adjust to the
changes required by the loss or by the crisis in their lives." (p. 103).
The last of the three processes, restitution, refers to those factors that will cause the
individual to lose his/her symptoms and lead to recovery. Once again, several factors
can work towards this process. Goldberg (1994; Goldberg & Huxley, 1992)
distinguishes among four types of restitution:
• Chemical restitution-, this includes self-administered recreational drugs, tobacco,
alcohol, and prescribed anxiolytics and antidepressants. This type of restitution
may be maladaptive when it creates dependence.
• Neurotic restitution: this refers to behavioural and intrapsychic manoeuvres that
are used by the individual in order to reduce anxiety or guilt. For example,
obsessive-compulsive symptoms, avoidance or depersonalisation can reduce
anxiety. However, this type of restitution can be rather maladaptive since it often
substitutes a set of symptoms with another set. Nonetheless, Goldberg (1994;
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Goldberg & Huxley, 1992) prefers to see this as a different mechanism for trying
to remove distressing symptoms rather than the development of another disorder.
• Psychosocial restitution: this includes psychotherapy but also social support by
partner, friends etc. In some cases this can also be maladaptive if it leads to
chronic somatisation, which is often rewarded by the response of others.
• Environmental changes: these include important changes in the person's life,
positive self-evaluation, a reduction in ongoing difficulties, fresh start.
The main strength of Goldberg's bio-social model is that of bringing together
common mental disorders, such as anxiety and depression, into a unifying theoretical
framework. This model has no difficulty in accounting for the co-occurrence of
anxiety and depression in that their overlap is predicted on two grounds: they share
common biological subsystems, and they are associated with common social factors.
The model can explain the symptom overlap given the strong correlation between the
two dimensions of anxiety and depression and can also account for the temporal
relationship between the two in a way that is more flexible than the one proposed by
the helplessness-hopelessness theory. In fact, not only the model predicts a shift from
anxiety into depression but, depending on the individual's specific environmental
and social circumstances, also the reverse is possible. On the other hand, this model
does not attempt to provide any explanation for why the first causal pathway (i.e.
from anxiety to depression) is more common; nor does the model give a justification
for the other two features of overlap, namely: the differential co-occurrence of
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depression with various anxiety disorders and the relative infrequency of "pure"
depression compared to anxiety.
Thus, although this model offers a unifying theoretical framework of anxiety and
depression, its utility may be more valuable when investigating aetiological factors
(vulnerability) and the clinical aspects of decompensation and restitution. Given the
more general tone of its predictions this model offers less testable hypothesis about
the relationship of anxiety and depression that can be examined in a laboratory
setting.
2. 6. 3. Clark and Watson's tripartite model.
Another phenotypic structural representation of anxiety and depression is provided
by Clark and Watson's (1991) tripartite model.
This model is based on an earlier two-factor affective model (Watson & Tellegen,
1985; Watson, Clark & Carey, 1988). Seminal work of Tellegen (1985) recognised
that affective experiences could be characterised by two basic dimensions of affect:
Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA). PA indicates the degree to which an
individual reports he/she is experiencing positive mood states, such as feeling
energetic, enthusiastic, joyful, confident, proud, assertive, friendly. In contrast, NA
refers to the extent to which an individual is experiencing a broad range of negative
mood states, including not only fear and sadness, but also hostility, guilt, anger, self-
dissatisfaction.
According to the two-factor model of affect (Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Watson,
Clark & Carey, 1988), these two general dimensions are differentially associated
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with anxiety and depression. In particular, the authors argue that NA is strongly
related to both anxiety and depression, whereas, PA is negatively correlated to
depression and largely unrelated with anxiety. Therefore, this two-factor dimensional
model conceptualises NA as a non-specific factor common to both anxiety and
depression, and PA as a specific factor primarily related to depression.
In 1991, Clark and Watson reviewed the psychometric convergent and discriminant
validity of a large number of self-report and clinical rating scales of anxiety and
depression and identified a third factor, Physiological Hyperarousal (PH), which was
relatively specific to anxiety. Consequently, the authors extended the original two-
factor model to a three-factor model, tripartite model, which offers a more accurate
theoretical framework for anxious and depressive phenomena.
Accordingly, the first factor, NA, is responsible for the overlap between anxiety and
depression and includes all those non-specific symptoms (e.g. dysphoria, poor
concentration, irritability, sleep disturbance) common to both types of disorders.
More recently, NA has been regarded as a general distress factor and identified as a
stable and heritable personality trait equivalent to Neuroticism (N) and, as such, also
a vulnerability factor for the development of anxiety and depression (Clark et al.,
1994).
The second factor, low PA, is characterised by a cluster of symptoms (e.g.
anhedonia, lack of energy, disinterest) relatively specific to depression and, parallel
to NA, it has been regarded as a temperamental core of the broader personality trait
of Extraversion (E), and therefore related to positive emotionality, energy, affiliation,
and dominance (Clark et ah, 1994). Finally, the third factor, PH, encompasses a
group of physiological symptoms (e.g. feeling dizzy or light-headed, difficulty
88
breathing, racing heart) reflecting autonomic hyperarousal and is relatively unique to
anxiety.
Following the tripartite formulation of anxiety and depression a number of studies
have subjected existing psychometric instruments to factor analyses to investigate the
phenotypic structure of anxiety and depression at both symptomatic and cognitive
levels in clinical and nonnal samples (e.g. Clark, Steer & Beck, 1994; Dyck, Jolly &
Kramer, 1994; Jolly, Dyck, Kramer & Wherry, 1994; Jolly & Dykman, 1994). These
studies have largely supported the tripartite model and reported results consistent
with the three-factor solution. However, given the fact that these studies used
measures that were mostly laden with items assessing NA, one limitation of these
studies is that they tended to produce a quite large non-specific general distress factor
and rather small specific factors (i.e. low PA and PH). In order to overcome these
limitations and provide a test for the tripartite model, an ad hoc measure, the Mood
and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire (MASQ) was created (Watson, Clark, Weber,
Assenheimer, Strauss & McCormick, 1995a; Watson, Weber, Assenheimer, Clark,
Strauss & McCormick, 1995b).
The MASQ is a 90 item self-report measure divided into 5 subscales. Three of these
scales, General Disturbance (GD), Non-Specific Anxiety (N-SA), and Non-Specific
Depression (N-SD) represent the non-specific NA dimension. The remaining two
sub-scales, Anxious Arousal (AA) and Anhedonic Depression (AD) reflect the
dimensions specific to anxiety and depression respectively. This scale was subjected
to factor analyses with data collected from five different samples (3 student, 1 adult,
and 1 patient) and the hypothesised three dimensions emerged in each of the data
sets. Mean correlations among the sub-scales were as follows: between GD and N-
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SA r = .78; GD and N-SD r = .76; N-SA and N-SD r = .69; GD and AA r = .66; GD
and AD r= .59; AA and N-SA r = .72; AD and N-SD r = .70; AA and AD r = .34.
Thus, the specific scales provide the best differentiation between anxiety and
depression.
More recent studies that examined the convergent and discriminant validity of the
MASQ have generally revealed the presence of three factors relating to general
distress, PA, and PH and that the MASQ specific sub-scales measure the constructs
of depression and anxiety with minimal overlap when compared with other more
commonly used self-report scales (e.g. Keogh & Reidy, 2000; Joiner & Lonigan,
2000; Ruth & Mehrotra, 2001).
The tripartite model has also been recently broadened by other studies that have
shown the emergence of the hypothesised three factors in clinical samples of children
and adolescents (e.g. Chorpita, Albano, & Barlow, 1998; Joiner, Catanzaro &
Laurent, 1996).
Although there is plenty of evidence demonstrating the existence of three distinctive
factors, the nature of the relationship between these dimensions has been more
debatable. In fact, results from some earlier studies (e.g. Clark et al., 1994; Steer,
Clark, Beck & Ranieri, 1995) suggested a hierarchical three-factor model, with two
narrow lower order dimensions of anxiety (PH) and depression (low PA) constructs
that are highly interrelated, and a broader higher order factor of general distress (NA)
that represents the strong degree of overlap between the two lower order factors.
However more recent studies have found three separable first order factors and have
suggested that a non-hierarchical arrangement of the three factors may be preferable
to a hierarchical one (e.g. Chorpita et al., 1998; Joiner, 1996; Joiner et al., 1996).
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To a certain extent these differences in findings seem to reflect the type of
assessment instruments used in the structural analyses. Earlier studies used more
traditional instruments with items mostly tapping the general NA factor, whereas,
more recent studies used more carefully selected items specifically linked to the
tripartite model. More recently, Brown, Chorpita, and Barlow (1998) tested various
alternative models that examined the structural relationship among DSM-IV mood
and anxiety disorders and the tripartite dimensions ofNA, PA and PH on a sample of
350 outpatients with anxiety and mood disorders. Their results indicated a higher
order non-specific NA factor related to both depressive and anxiety disorders, a
higher order PA factor specifically related to depression (but also to social phobia),
and a lower order PH factor specifically related (but in different ways) to anxiety
disorders, especially GAD and panic disorder with agoraphobia (see Figure 2. 7.
below).
Given the heterogeneity of anxiety disorders, Barlow and colleagues (Barlow, 1991;
Brown & Barlow, 1992; Brown et al., 1998; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996) proposed a
hierarchical model of the anxiety disorders in which each anxiety disorder is thought
to contain a shared higher order factor of NA and a specific unique lower level
component that distinguishes one anxiety disorder from all the others. Following the
evidence provided by Brown et al. (1998), Mineka, Watson, and Clark (1998)
proposed an integration of the original tripartite model with Barlow's hierarchical
model of anxiety disorders. This integration comprises a higher order NA factor that
is shared among depressive and anxiety disorders and is responsible for their overlap.
In addition, each disorder will be characterised by a specific component that will
differentiate it from all the others. For example, low PA will be relatively specific to
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depression, PH will be relatively specific to panic disorder (Brown et. al., 1998;
Joiner, Steer, Beck, Schmidt, Rudd, & Catanzaro, 1999), whereas the nature of the
relatively unique components specific to each of the other anxiety disorders need yet
to be clarified.
,
Figure 2. 7. A structural model of anxiety and depression. (Source: Brown et
al., 1998.)
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The formulation of this multilevel hierarchical model represents a good step forward
for our understanding of the relationship between anxiety and depressive disorders in
terms of a combination of common and relatively unique components.
In addition, this model can also be used to account for the patients' relative inability
to distinguish anxiety from depression compared to the much more differentiated
concept of unpleasant emotions held by psychiatrists (Leff, 1978). In fact, patients
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are more likely to communicate their experience of unpleasant emotions in terms of
general distress (i.e. NA), whereas, as suggested by Leff (1978), health professionals
are more likely to identify the relatively unique components of depressive and
anxiety disorders on the basis of their training.
Although this model does not offer any explanations regarding the dynamic
relationship between anxiety and depression (i.e. their temporal relationship and the
seemingly related phenomenon of the relative infrequency of "pure" depression), it
does offer a valuable account of their overlap at symptomatological, syndromic, and
diagnostic levels. This will be extremely useful in our experimental work since we
will need to differentiate among three clinical groups (i.e. anxious only, depressed
only and mixed anxious-depressed) and attempt to understand the nature of the
unique contributions that anxiety, depression and their combination will place on the
experimental tasks at hand.
2. 7. Summary.
In this Chapter we have presented alternative views of anxiety and depression and
have delineated the evolution of the theoretical debate regarding the different
conceptualisations of the overlap between anxiety and depression. We have then
examined the evidence in favour of a "mixed" position by reviewing
epidemiological, longitudinal, family, genetic and biological studies of the two
disorders. The classification issues surrounding the diagnosis of mixed anxiety
depression have been addressed, and then detailed inclusion and exclusion criteria
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have been given for the mixed group and the implications for formation of the other
two clinical groups have also been considered. Finally, the main features of anxiety-
depression overlap have been described and three of the major and most influential
theoretical models of mixed anxiety depression have been presented and evaluated.
These will constitute much of our theoretical framework and will be used to guide us
in the generation of specific hypotheses in the next experimental Chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
PRESENT AND PAST: ATTENTIONAL AND MNEMONIC
PROCESSES IN ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION.
A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF
MIXED ANXIETY DEPRESSION.
"The perfect past was present there, and I could see
it whole"
(G. A. Studdert Kennedy, "Judgment")
3. 1. Introduction.
One of the implicitly or explicitly stated hypotheses of many psychological theories
of anxiety and depression is that differences in how individuals process information
(emotional information, in particular) may play a crucial role in the aetiology,
development, maintenance, and treatment of emotional disorders (e.g. Mathews &
MacLeod, 1994). For example, the more anxious individuals will attend to
threatening information from their environment, the more they will encode
information which is potentially threatening which, in turn, will maintain or increase
their anxious state and selective processing in a circular fashion (e.g. Mathews,
1990). Similarly, depressed individuals tend to recall relatively unhappier memories
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compared to normal controls, which in turn maintains or worsens their depressed
mood (e.g. Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). Consequently, over the past two decades
researchers have increasingly turned to information processing paradigms derived
from experimental cognitive psychology in order to understand attentional and
mnemonic biases occurring at different levels of information processing.
One of the basic questions that experimental psychopathologists have had to address
is whether the biases observed in both anxious and depressed individuals occur at an
automatic or controlled level of information processing, an issue which is closely
intertwined with the distinction made between conscious and unconscious mental
processes and the corresponding level of awareness an individual holds at a
particular time (see e.g. Ohman, 1999, for a recent review). The distinction is based
on the concept of "limited cognitive resources", that is, an individual possesses a
limited amount of processing resources and these are allocated selectively and
strategically across stimuli and tasks at hand at any specific moment (Shiffrin &
Schneider, 1977). Thus, automatic information processing is defined as being
resource independent, while controlled processes are defined as being resource
dependent (Schneider, Dumais & Shiffrin, 1984). For a more detailed list of other
important features of automatic and controlled processes see Table 3.1. below.
Although several researchers have attempted, or claimed, to measure purely
automatic or controlled processes, today it is largely recognised that there is no
single measure influenced merely by automatic or controlled processes, rather,
experimental tasks seem to involve different degrees of each process ranging along
an automatic-controlled continuum so as to measure mainly automatic or mainly
controlled processes (e.g. Jacoby, Yonelinas & Jennings, 1997; McNally, 1995).
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Table 3. 1. Characteristics of automatic and controlled information
processing. (Adapted from Schneider, Dumais & Shiffrin,
1984.)
Characteristic Automatic processing Controlled processing
Cognitive resources Independent Heavily dependent
Intentional control Incomplete Complete
Attention Not required, may be called Required
Effort Little, if any Much
Serial-parallel dependence Parallel Serial
Awareness Little, if any High
Indivisibility Holistic Fragmentised
Storage in long-term memory Little, if any Large amounts
Performance level High Low, except for simple tasks
Practice Gradual improvement Little effect
Modification Difficult Easy
Bearing this essential distinction in mind, we shall now proceed to consider briefly
some of the most accredited cognitive models of information processing in emotional
disorders. In particular we will focus on those models that have been especially
constructed to account for depressive and anxious performance impairment and
biases in memory and attention. Then, we will provide an overview of the attentional
and mnemonic biases occurring in anxiety and depression. Finally, we will present
the details of a preliminary comparative study of anxiety, depression and mixed
anxiety depression in this area, in an attempt to provide some evidence of
discriminant validity among the three clinical groups.
3. 2. Theoretical models of attention and memory in anxiety and depression.
In Chapter 1 Beck's cognitive theory of anxiety and depression was introduced (e.g.
Beck et al., 1985; Beck et ah, 1979). According to this theory, individuals normally
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interpret events by using a schema-based processing style. This is normally
economical in that the individual does not have to rely on all the information present
in order to interpret a particular event. However, once dysfunctional schemas have
been activated they will override the more functional ones, so that the sacrifice of
accuracy for economy of information processing will result in distortion in cognitive
processes with the introduction of negative biases and "thinking errors". In other
words, individuals will use their dysfunctional negative schemas to perceive,
interpret and think about the self, the world and the future. Beck and colleagues (e.g.
1979; 1985) proposed the "content-specificity hypothesis", that is, in depression
dysfunctional schemas will be centred on negative themes of loss and failure,
whereas in anxiety the central themes will be of threat and danger. Consequently,
given the pervasive presence of schemas, anxious and depressed individuals are
expected to show content-specific negative biases at any level of information
processing (i.e. automatic and controlled) for both attentional and mnemonic
processes. More recently, Beck and Clark (1996) proposed a schema-based
information-processing model specific to anxiety. This is still in line with the original
model, but it distinguishes among three stages of information processing to account
for differences in the use of cognitive resources: (a) initial registration of a threat
stimulus (a very rapid and totally automatic recognition of a stimulus); (b) activation
of a cluster of interrelated threat schemas, called "mode" (a number of goal-directed
responses aimed at minimising danger and maximising safety, such as autonomic
arousal, behavioural mobilisation and inhibition, hypervigilance for threat cues and
so on which use much of the individual's attentional resources); and (c) secondary
activation of more elaborative semantic processing (a more controlled processing
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style which involves an appraisal of the situation: the individual will evaluate the
availability and effectiveness of his/her coping resources, that is, he/she will worry
and will look for safety signals).
Bower (1981; 1987) proposed a network theory of cognition and emotion. The
essence of his model is that long-term memory can be seen as an associative
semantic network in which concepts, events and emotions are represented by discrete
units called "nodes". These can be activated by an appropriate external input or
through the activation of adjoining nodes. In the second case, the strength of the
activation will depend on a number of factors, such as the proximity of nodes to each
other, the strength of the initial activation and the time lapse since activation. The
general prediction is that, once activated, emotional nodes (e.g. fear or sadness) will
facilitate mood-congruent information processing (i.e. bias) through activation and
priming of related nodes. This will result in a number of phenomena, such as Mood-
State Dependent memory (MSD), where neutral material is better recalled when
moods at encoding and retrieval are similar; Mood-Congruent memory (MC), where
memory is better for items whose affective content is congruent with mood at
encoding and/or retrieval. Moreover, a similar facilitating mechanism is expected to
bias other cognitive processes, such as free associations, interpretation of events,
perception, and selective attention. Thus, similarly to Beck's model, Bower predicts
MC biases at all levels of information processing.
However, experimental studies of memory and attention in anxiety and depression
conducted during the 1980s showed contrasting results. In fact, if on the one hand
MC attentional and memory biases were found in anxious and depressed individuals
respectively (e.g. MacLeod, Mathews & Tata, 1986; Bradley & Mathews, 1983), on
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the other hand there were failures to find MC attentional biases in depression and
MC explicit memory biases in anxiety (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1986; Mogg, Mathews &
Weinman, 1987). Therefore, contrary to Beck's and Bower's predictions cognitive
biases did not appear to operate at al levels of information processing, but they
seemed to be confined to an attentional level in anxiety states, and to explicit
memory in depression.
In order to account for these discrepancies, Williams et al. (1988) proposed an
information-processing model of anxiety and depression in which each disorder is
associated with different patterns of cognitive biases. This model is based on the
distinction between integration and elaboration put forward by Graf and Mandler
(1984). Integration is seen as an automatic process that takes places when a stimulus
is processed. This involves an automatic activation of the internal mental
representation of the stimulus (e.g. a word), which becomes stronger and more
readily accessible when only some of its components are presented. Williams and
colleagues have also referred to this process as "priming". In contrast, elaboration is
a strategic and controlled process that involves linking and relating the stimulus (e.g.
a word) to other material in memory and which makes it more easily retrievable
because of the newly formed relationships with other words and the greater number
of cues.
Williams et al. (1988) proposed that anxiety is related to biases that reflect
integration, whereas depression is related to biases reflecting elaboration (see Figure
3. 1.). Specifically, anxious people would show a bias in favour of threat stimuli at a
pre-attentive stage of processing, where a presumed Affective Decision Mechanism
(ADM) would be able to assess the affective valence (e.g. threat) of the incoming
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stimulus and also at an attentional level at which stage anxious individuals would
shift their selective attention and allocate more resources towards the location of
threat via a presumed Resource Allocation Mechanism (RAM).
Figure 3. 1. Information processing model of anxiety and depression.







Towards location of threat








Moreover, while the ADM is affected by state anxiety, the operation of the RAM is
influenced by trait anxiety. According to the authors' interaction hypothesis, given
an increase in ADM output (either because of a high threat value of a stimulus or
because of high levels of state anxiety), high trait anxiety individuals will become
more vigilant, whereas low trait anxiety individuals will become more avoidant of
threat.
On the other hand, depressed individuals would show a bias for negative MC bias at
a post-attentive or elaboration stage of information processing. That is, those stimuli
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that have been assigned a high negative affective value by the ADM would be
subjected to greater elaboration at a RAM level, which would enhance MC cues at
retrieval facilitating recall of negative material.
Therefore, Williams and colleagues predicted a double dissociation between the two
disorders: anxiety will have an effect only on the automatic aspects of information
processing (i.e. perception and attention), whereas depression will affect only the
elaborative aspects of information involved with memory processes, such as
encoding and retrieval. This is very much a data-driven model and it seems more
valid at a descriptive level rather than in its explanatory power. In fact, biases are
explained by means of concepts that we have already seen in Bower's (1981; 1987)
network theory, such as activation ofmental representations of stimuli, priming, and
association among related stimuli in long-term memory. More recently Williams et
al. (1997) have updated their model within a connectionist framework, but this
revision retains its core assumptions unchanged.
An alternative model that is mainly based on the concept of "limited cognitive
resources" is Ellis and Ashbrook's (1988) resource allocation model. This model
assumes that the presence of an emotional state, be it positive or negative, will
reduce the likelihood that an individual will allocate attentional resources to the
relevant aspects of a task at hand and will cause impairment. For example, depressed
or anxious individuals will think more about their moods and will tend to allocate
attentional resources to the increased amount of irrelevant thoughts. Consequently,
the individuals' cognitive resources available for the execution of a task will be
reduced causing impairment in their performance. Therefore, it is not the mood state
102
per se that creates problems, but the cognitive consequences of the mood state that
interfere and distract the individual by competing for the limited resources available.
Although this model was created to account for the effects of mood on memory, it
can be used to account for similar mood effects on attention. Furthermore, an implicit
corollary of this model would be the prediction of no or little impairment in anxiety
and depression when the task to be carried out does not necessitate many resources
(i.e. it can be executed automatically).
A related view of depressed mood effects on memory and attention is Hertel's (1994;
Hertel & Rude, 1991) cognitive initiative model. According to this view, depressed
individuals lack appropriate cognitive initiative and motivation necessary to carry out
tasks efficiently. Thus, encouraging or constraining depressed individuals to pay
attention to the current task and therefore to deploy cognitive resources, should
eliminate or minimise performance deficits.
Specific to anxiety, Eysenck and Calvo (1992) proposed the processing efficiency
theory, which states that worry impairs performance of anxious persons by reducing
the storage and processing capacity of the working memory available for a
concurrent task and by incrementing the amount of effort and activities designed to
improve performance. In other words, more than effectiveness (i.e. the quality of
performance), anxiety impairs processing efficiency, that is, performance
effectiveness divided by effort. Moreover, Eysenck (1992; 1997) proposed another
view of anxiety: the hypervigilance theoiy. According to this theory, pre-attentive
and attentional biases constitute a vulnerability factor for GAD, so that such biases
would be more evident in individuals with high state anxiety and anxiety prone
individuals under stress. In addition, Eysenck (1992) argued that, along with specific
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threat hypervigilance, high trait anxiety individuals would show a general
hypervigilance, which is a tendency to attend to any task-irrelevant stimuli and scan
the environment by broadening their attention until a salient stimulus (e.g. threat) has
been detected and narrowing their attention when the salient stimulus is being
processed.
Put together, these last two theories explain cognitive biases at pre-attentive and
attentional levels by advocating vulnerability factors in anxiety and relating to the
basic concept of "limited cognitive resources". They also offer a wider perspective
within which it is possible to take in hand performance impairment in general terms
and not only when it relates to MC biases. However, the focus is placed only on
attentional processes and the theories do not extend their domain to memory issues.
A more recent view of pre-attentive and attentional biases in anxiety has been
developed by Mogg and Bradley (1998; 1999a). Their cognitive-motivational view of
anxiety proposes the presence of two underlying mechanisms similar to Williams et
al.'s (1988; 1997) ADM and RAM (see Figure 3. 2.).
Figure 3. 2. Cognitive-motivational view of anxiety. (Source: Mogg & Bradley,
1998.)
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Preparedness 71
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These are the Valence Evaluation System (VES) and the Goal Engagement System
(GES). The VES is responsible for assessing the threat value of a stimulus but, apart
from the nature of the stimulus itself, the output of this system is influenced by other
factors, such as the situational context, prior learning, biological preparedness and
state anxiety. However, trait anxiety also plays a role here in making an anxiety-
prone individual more sensitive to trivial negative stimuli, which are labelled as
being excessively high in threat value.
The output of the VES feeds into the GES, which determines the amount of
processing resources to be allocated to current goals and stimuli. Consequently, if a
stimulus is evaluated as highly threatening the current goals are interrupted and
resources are allocated towards the threat. In contrast, if the VES appraises a
stimulus as being low in threat value, then the individual will disregard it and will
pursue his/her current activities. The operation of these two mechanisms is seen as
having evolutionary adaptive value in that they allow the individual to be sensitive to
potential threats and automatically draw his/her attention to possible danger.
In addition, Mogg and Bradley (1998; 1999a) argue that the relationship between the
subjective threat value of a stimulus and the amount of bias is not linear (see Figure
3. 3. below). Contrary to Williams et al.'s (1988; 1997) interaction hypothesis, it is
hypothesised that when no threat is perceived there will be no bias; however, when
stimuli are appraised as having mild threat value, attention will be directed away
from the stimuli (i.e. avoidance) and the individual will be able to carry on with
his/her goals and to preserve a positive mood state. This would account for research
findings indicating avoidance of threat stimuli (e.g. words, emotional faces) in low-
anxiety individuals (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, Millar, Bonham-Carter, Fergusson, Jenkins
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& Parr, 1997;-MacLeod et al., 1986; McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; McCabe & Toman,
2000). On the other hand, if the subjective threat value is high (either because of the
objective nature of the stimulus or because of the individual's high trait anxiety),
then attention will be allocated towards the threat.
Figure 3. 3. Hypothetical relationship between attentional bias and the
subjective threat value of stimuli. (Source: Mogg & Bradley,
1998.)
Bias in initial
None Mild Moderate High
Although this model has been developed to explain pre-attentive and attentional
biases in anxiety, the authors suggest that it can also account for differences between
anxiety and depression or mixed anxiety depression. Specifically, Mogg and Bradley
(1998; 1999a) predict that while anxious people will show pre-attentive biases for
external threat stimuli (i.e. negative valence + engagement —> vigilance for
environmental threat), depressed or mixed anxious depressed individuals who have
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low or impaired external goal engagement will not show such bias (i.e. negative
valence + disengagement —» no pre-attentive bias for environmental threat). This
would be consistent with the apathy, disinterest and lack of motivation characteristic
of depression. However, if negative information enters a depressed or MAD
individual's focus of attention then he/she might have more difficulty in disengaging
from it due to their propensity for rumination and their difficulty in distracting
themselves from such material (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Therefore, anxiety would
be characterised by a bias in the initial automatic orienting of attention towards threat
stimuli, whereas depression and MAD would be associated with a bias in the
maintenance of attention towards negative information.
To summarise thus far, we have seen how across the different theoretical approaches
considered here the emphasis has been placed on searching for those factors that
might be responsible for the impairment and biases in information processing found
in depression and anxiety. Early theories such as Beck's and Bower's have looked
for common processes that might explain content-specific or MC biases. However, as
newer evidence surfaced that was inconsistent with these theories, more articulated
models, such as Williams et al.'s, have been put forward. These models have
recognised that different processes may be involved at different levels of information
processing and have tried to identify specific mechanisms that might account for
contrasting results found in anxiety and depression. Each model has concentrated on
particular cognitive aspects, such as motivation, hypervigilance and resource limits,
and these and other factors have been deemed to be responsible for attentional and
mnemonic dysfunctions, which in turn may constitute factors involved in
vulnerability and maintenance of the two disorders.
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Finally, from our review it has become apparent that researchers and theorists have
increasingly associated anxiety and depression with attentional and memory
processes respectively and corresponding models specific to anxiety or depression
have been proposed. Given the heterogeneity of the models on offer it might be more
valuable not to consider them as contrasting views to which to subscribe, but as
alternative approaches to specific aspects of the relationship between cognition and
emotion.
3. 3. Attentional biases in anxiety and depression.
Attentional functioning in anxiety has been widely investigated, both at pre-attentive
and attentional levels, by many researchers in clinical and non-clinical samples (for
reviews see Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; MacLeod, 1999; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994;
Mogg & Bradley, 1999a). At a pre-attentive level, among the variety of techniques
employed, interference paradigms have been extensively used. These paradigms
usually involve presenting subjects with a central task to perform in the presence of
distracting information. By measuring the amount of interference that particular
distracting information creates (i.e. by recruiting selective attention), researchers
have been able to assess specific pre-attentive biases. In the case of anxiety it is
threatening information that typically elicits interference and hence pre-attentive
biases by gaining participants' initial orienting of attention automatically. For
example, using a dichotic listening task in which two different channels of
information are presented simultaneously one to each ear, Mathews and MacLeod
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(1986) found that anxious patients were slower to respond to a dot probe task (the
central task in this case) when the information in the unattended channel was a
threatening word than when it was a neutral word. However, Holender (1986) has
argued that in this paradigm it might be possible for subjects to switch their attention
to the unattended channel and therefore visual masking tasks would be more
effective and suitable paradigms when investigating attentional processes in
situations of restricted awareness. One such task is an emotional adaptation of the
classic Stroop colour-naming task (Stroop, 1938) known as the emotional Stroop task
(e.g. Williams, Mathews & MacLeod, 1996). In the masked variant, subjects are
presented very briefly (usually approximately 14 ms., corresponding to a computer
monitor display refresh rate) with threatening and non-threatening words that are
either printed in different colours or white against different coloured backgrounds.
Immediately after the presentation, a string of random letters or signs masks the
words and subjects are required to name the colour of the stimulus item as quickly as
possible. Both high trait anxiety individuals and GAD patients show higher colour-
naming interference when the words are threatening rather than non-threatening,
compared to controls. Moreover this finding is replicated in both masked and
unmasked versions of the task (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, Millar & White, 1995; MacLeod
& Rutherford, 1992; Mogg, Kentish & Bradley, 1993). Subjects' awareness is
typically checked by assessing their ability to discriminate whether a word or a non-
word was presented before the mask, and whether a word was present or absent
before the mask. Performance on these forced choice tasks reflects an objective
measure of subjects' awareness thresholds (i.e. subjects whose performance reaches
above-chance levels are excluded form analyses), as opposed to subjective measures
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of subjects' awareness threshold, which rely on subjective experience (e.g.
Cheesman & Merikle, 1986).
Another commonly used task is the dot probe task (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1986). In its
masked version, word-pairs are presented briefly (14 ms.) in two different locations
of a computer screen (e.g. top and bottom, or left and right). These are then
immediately masked and followed by a dot probe in the position of one of the masks.
On critical trials one of the word stimuli is neutral and the other is negative. Subjects
are required to press a response key button to indicate the position of the dot probe,
so that their reaction times reflect the extent to which their attention was directed
towards the area around the negative or neutral stimulus. Results show a pre-attentive
bias for negative words in GAD patients compared to controls (Mogg, Bradley &
Williams, 1995). This study included also a supra-threshold condition in which a
similar bias was also found.
Results from emotional Stroop and dot probe tasks also show some interesting
temporal effects of processing in terms of content specificity. In particular it has been
found in many studies that in the sub-threshold condition (i.e. at a pre-attentive level)
the anxious bias is general and refers to any negative stimulus, however, in the supra-
threshold condition (i.e. at an attentional level) GAD patients and high trait anxiety
individuals preferentially attend to stimuli that are of greatest relevance to their
concerns (e.g. MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Mathews & Klug, 1993; Mogg et al.,
1995; Mogg, Mathews & Eysenck, 1992; Mogg, Mathews & Weinman, 1989). These
results suggest that in anxiety there is a pre-attentive bias for negative information,
but also that prior to awareness, the level of semantic analysis of the stimuli is rather
superficial, whereas, the processing of the stimuli at an attentional level goes beyond
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their basic valence (positive vs. negative) assessment and includes their evaluation in
terms of self-reference.
Similar attentional biases have also been observed with other anxiety disorders, such
as social phobia (e.g. Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa & Amir, 1999; Hope, Rapee,
Heimberg & Dombeck, 1990; Mattia, Heimberg & Hope, 1993), specific phobia (e.g.
Lavy, van den Hout & Arntz, 1993; Watts, McKenna, Sharrock & Trezise, 1986),
panic disorder (e.g. Ehlers, Margraf, Davies & Roth, 1988; Lundh, Wikstrom,
Westerlund & Ost, 1999; McNally, Amir, Louro, Lukach, Riemann & Calamari,
1994), OCD (e.g. Foa, Ilai, McCarthy, Shoyer & Murdock, 1993; Lavy, van Oppen
& van den Hout, 1994) and PTSD (e.g. Kaspi, McNally & Amir, 1995; Thrasher,
Dalgleish & Yule, 1994).
Investigations of the time course of attentional biases in anxiety have looked at the
possibility that after their initial orienting to threat anxious individuals may not
maintain their attentional bias (i.e. no subsequent bias), or that they may have greater
difficulty in trying to disengage their attention from threatening stimuli, that is,
maintenance of the bias, as suggested by Beck's (Beck et al., 1985) and Bower's
(1981; 1987) theories, or that they may show a "vigilance-avoidance" pattern (i.e.
initial shift of attention and subsequent disengagement and avoidance). Non-clinical
studies that manipulated the duration of the stimuli, found that high trait anxious
individuals showed greater vigilance for threat words at 100 ms. duration, but only
non-significant trends at 500 ms. and 1500 ms. compared to low trait anxiety
individuals (Mogg, Bradley, de Bono & Painter, 1997). However, for more complex
stimuli high trait anxious individuals showed greater attentional bias for threat faces
than for happy faces at both 500 ms. and 1250 ms. durations (Bradley, Mogg, Falla
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& Hamilton, 1998). On the other hand, Mogg and Bradley (1999a) report a clinical
study that looked at the time course of attentional biases in spider phobics. Compared
to non-phobic individuals, spider phobics showed more vigilance for photographs of
spiders only at 200 ms. but not at 500 ms. and 2000 ms. Similar patterns were
obtained in another recent study of spider phobics in which eye movements were
continuously registered during the 3-second presentation of stimuli (Hermans,
Vansteenwegen & Eelen, 1999). Results showed that, compared to controls, spider
anxious participants looked significantly more at pictures of spiders than of flowers
(i.e. control materials) at the beginning of the stimulus presentation, but subsequently
their gaze shifted more and more away from the threatening materials.
The results form these studies seem to suggest that attentional avoidance strategies
might be associated only with clinical levels of anxiety. However, the extent to
which attention is sustained towards threat may well be a function of both the
stimulus threat value and the anxiety level of the individual.
As for the specific effects of state and trait anxiety on attention, in the absence of
stress and state anxiety, there is no difference in the attentional responses to
threatening words of high and low trait anxious individuals. However, in the
presence of stress and state anxiety only high trait anxious individuals show pre-
attentive and attentional biases for such threat (e.g. MacLeod & Mathews, 1988;
MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). This would appear to support Williams et al.'s (1988;
1997) interaction hypothesis, however as Mogg & Bradley (1998; 1999a) point out,
with regard to the second part of the interaction hypothesis results are not at all
conclusive in that MacLeod and Mathews (1988) found only a non-significant trend
of avoidance in the low trait anxiety group; results which were replicated by Mogg,
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Bradley and Hallowed (1994). Moreover, it is plausible that stimuli other than threat
words or different types of stressors may elicit different effects on attentional biases.
More recently, the dot probe task has been modified to examine anxiety related
attentional biases for human emotional expressions with happy, angry (i.e.
threatening), and neutral faces. These studies have provided further evidence of pre-
attentive and attentional biases in clinical and non-clinical anxiety (e.g. Bradley et
al., 1997; Bradley, et ah, 1998; Bradley, Mogg & Millar, 2000; Bradley, Mogg,
White, Groom & de Bono, 1999; Mogg & Bradley, 1999b; Mogg & Bradley, 1999c;
Mogg, Millar & Bradley, 2000).
In a direct test of the interaction hypothesis versus the cognitive-motivational view,
Mogg, McNamara, Powys, Rawlinson, Seiffer and Bradley (2000) used the probe
detection task including high threat and mild threat pictorial scenes. Results showed
an increase in vigilance with the increase in threat value of the stimuli, not only in
the high trait but also in the low trait anxious individuals. These results provide
support for the cognitive-motivational view of anxiety; however, the study was
carried out with college students and findings are yet to be replicated in a clinical
sample.
Turning our attention to depression, several studies that have used masked versions
of the dot probe and emotional Stroop tasks have failed to find any evidence of pre-
attentive biases (e.g. Bradley et al., 1995; Mathews, Ridgeway & Williamson, 1996;
Mogg et al., 1995; Mogg, Bradley, Williams & Mathews, 1993). This lack of effects
cannot be attributed to methodological problems, such as task sensitivity, because
anxious individuals do show pre-attentive biases under the same conditions. Similar
results were found in a more recent study measuring the initial eye movement of
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GAD and depressed (most of which also showed high levels of generalised anxiety)
patients in response to a dot probe task that used threatening, sad, happy and neutral
emotional faces (Mogg et ah, 2000). While GAD participants tended to shift their
gaze quickly towards threat faces, depressed individuals did not show any biases.
On the other hand, studies assessing attentional biases for supra-threshold stimuli
have found more conflicting results. Several studies have failed to observe any
attentional bias in depression (e.g. Bradley et ah, 1995; MacLeod et ah, 1986;
McCabe & Toman, 2000; Mogg et ah, 1993), whereas, other studies have found
evidence of such bias in depression (e.g. Gotlib & Cane, 1987; Mathews et ah, 1996;
Mogg et ah, 1995; Segal, Gemar, Truchon, Guirguis & Horowitz, 1995), although
some of these used also a priming methodology.
Put together, these findings seem to suggest that depressed individuals do not shift
their initial attention towards negative information automatically, but tend to dwell
on it for longer and have more difficulties disengaging from it, once this has entered
their focus of attention. Consistent with this view are the findings from a non-clinical
study of the time course on attentional biases in depression in which a word dot
probe task was used with variable durations (i.e. 14 ms., 500 ms. and 1000ms.).
Results indicate that induced depressed mood was associated with a bias for
depression relevant words at 500 ms., with a similar trend at 1000 ms; whereas,
naturally occurring dysphoric mood was related to higher vigilance for negative
words at the 1000 ms. duration (Bradley, Mogg & Lee, 1997). More recently,
Compton (2000) reports an experimental investigation showing that negative affect is
associated with a slowness to disengage attention from one focus and the ability to
shift it to a new one.
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Summarising, research findings in attention and emotional disorders seem to point
towards the presence of a strong effect of anxiety on attentional processes. Biases in
anxiety appear to be mainly pre-attentive and involve the initial orienting of
attentional resources towards threatening stimuli. In contrast, the role of attentional
biases in depression is more controversial. These do not appear to be present at a pre-
attentive level of analysis of the environmental stimuli, but may be associated with
later information processing, which involves the maintenance of attention on
negative materials.
3. 4. Mnemonic biases in anxiety and depression.
Anxious and depressed individuals often complain about memory problems, such as
difficulties remembering simple things or their "mind going blank". Memory
impairment constitutes one of the symptomatic manifestations of the two disorders
and has consequently received considerable interest from researchers (e.g. Watts,
1995). It is widely recognised that memory processes in anxiety and depression are
impaired due to - in cognitive terms - diminished processing resources available as a
result of emotional preoccupations (see Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Eysenck & Calvo,
1992; Hertel, 1994, above). Thus, depressed individuals typically show a failure to
allocate processing resources to memory tasks due to their lack of cognitive
initiative, which, coupled with their reduced resources, produces impairment
performance. On the other hand, anxious individuals tend to compensate for their
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reduced amount of processing resources by a more effortful, but less efficient
performance.
Other than investigating memory problems under the light of capacity of the
"cognitive processor", research has also been focussing on other aspects of memory
that may play a role in the development and/or maintenance of the disorders, rather
than being a consequence (e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). Potentially important
factors include memory biases for negatively valenced materials (i.e. MC biases) that
may occur at different levels of information processing, such as explicit and implicit
(see below), and that may permeate the content of anxious and depressed people's
thinking so as to have a detrimental effect on mood.
Typical studies of autobiographical memory present subjects with a word cue and
then ask them to report the first personal memory brought to mind. It has been found
that both anxious and depressed individuals tend to report more negative than
positive memories (e.g. Clark & Teasdale, 1982; Burke & Mathews, 1992).
Additionally, when emotionally valenced word cues are used to elicit memories, both
anxious and depressed individuals show significantly shorter recall latencies for
negative relative to positive memories (e.g. Richards & Whittaker, 1990; Williams &
Broadbent, 1986). These findings seem to reflect an increase in availability of
negative personal memories in anxious and depressed people. However, a limitation
of this approach is that it is difficult to determine whether the individual differences
observed are caused by differences in retrieval processes or simply reflect qualitative
differences in the person's actual past experiences. In order to tease out the effects of
idiosyncratic retrieval processes it is necessary to test memory processes for
materials to which all subjects have equal previous exposure. One method is to
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present participants with lists of words that vary for their emotional valence (e.g.
negative vs. positive) and/or mood congruency (e.g. anxiety-relevant vs. depression-
relevant) and later on, usually in the same experimental session, assess memory for
those stimuli unexpectedly.
This procedure can be used to assess both explicit and/or implicit memory. Explicit
memory refers to conscious recollection of recently presented information. In Graf
and Mandler's (1984) terms this involves an "elaboration" process, which is
"controlled" in nature, as defined above (Schneider et ah, 1984). Explicit memory
tasks are also referred to as "direct" tests of memory and include traditional free
recall, cued recall and recognition tasks.
Implicit memory, on the other hand, refers to the "facilitation or change in task
performance that is attributable to information acquired during a previous study
episode" (Schacter, 1987; p. 501). Implicit memory reflects "integration" and it is
regarded as an "automatic" process (Graf & Mandler, 1984; Schneider et ah, 1984).
This process is assessed "indirectly" in tests that do not involve intentional retrieval
instructions, such as priming effects on lexical decision, word identification, and
word stem or fragment completion tasks.
MC explicit memory biases in depression have been found in several studies and
they constitute a robust phenomenon (e.g. see Blaney, 1986; Dalgleish & Watts,
1990; Matt, Vazquez & Campbell, 1992; Singer & Salovey, 1988 for reviews). In
particular, depressed individuals show a recall bias for negative words that are self-
referent as opposed to negative information in general (e.g. Bradley & Mathews,
1983; Bradley, Mogg & Williams, 1995; Watkins, Mathews, Williamson & Fuller,
1992). These results demonstrate that it is not a general MSD explicit memory bias
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(i.e. biased recall for items that were learned in a mood state that is similar to the
mood state at retrieval) that is relevant to depression, but it is memory for material
that contains specific self-referent items. In addition, MC biases in recall are more
likely to occur when the encoding task requires depressed participants to relate each
stimulus word to themselves (e.g. Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Denny & Hunt, 1992;
Watkins et ah, 1992) or when word stimuli are rated for their emotional valence (e.g.
Hertel, 1994). In fact, if depressed individuals are required to encode words in
relation to other people or in relation to the physical appearance of the stimuli, then a
negative bias at recall is not found (Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Hertel, 1994).
Interestingly, studies of recovered depressed individuals have found that the negative
MC self-referent recall bias shown by currently depressed individuals is much
reduced or eliminated following recovery (Bradley & Mathews, 1988; Dobson &
Shaw, 1987). These findings suggest that the explicit memory biases exhibited by
depressed individuals are state-dependent consequences of depression rather than
antecedent trait vulnerability factors. Nonetheless, these negative self-referent recall
biases may play a consistent role in the maintenance of depressed mood.
In contrast to the fairly consistent pattern of results that have been obtained in
experimental studies of explicit memory in depression, the evidence of an equivalent
anxiety-related explicit memory bias for threatening information has been scarcer
(e.g. Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; MacLeod, 1999).
Despite the findings observed in autobiographical memory tasks that non-clinical
high trait anxious individuals and GAD patients report significantly more negative
past events, and quicker, than positive ones in response to cue words (Burke &
Mathews, 1992; Mayo, 1989; Richards & Whittaker, 1990), it might be the case that
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individuals vulnerable to anxiety may experience an excessive number of negative
events, or that they may experience negative events with excessive intensity (e.g.
physiological hyperarousal). In fact, studies that have investigated the phenomenon
of explicit memory in clinical anxiety under controlled laboratory conditions have
found little or no evidence of any recall bias for threatening materials (e.g. Becker,
Roth, Andrich & Margraf, 1999; Cloitre, Cancienne, Heimberg, Holt & Liebowitz,
1995; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg et al., 1989; Mogg, Gardiner, Stavrou &
Golombok, 1992; Rapee, 1994; Rapee, McCallum, Melville, Ravenscroft & Rodney,
1994).
However, there has been a stronger support of anxiety related explicit memory biases
in panic disorders. Contrary to what is found in other anxiety disorders, several
studies have found evidence that panic disorder patients show a significant bias
towards the recall of threat-related word stimuli (e.g. Becker, Rinck & Margraf,
1994; Becker et ah, 1999; Cloitre & Liebowitz, 1991; Cloitre, Shear, Cancienne &
Zeitlin, 1994; McNally, Foa & Donnell, 1989). These studies seem to show that MC
explicit memory biases may be a peculiarity of panic but not of other anxiety
disorders. Becker et ah, (1999) speculate that these results could be explained by
taking into account the higher autonomic arousal present in patients with panic
disorder. Some indication exists that memory bias for threat-related information
increases with heightened physiological arousal (McNally et ah, 1989) however the
effect reported in this study was only marginal.
Thus, with the exception of panic disorder, anxiety is generally not associated with
biases that facilitate the retrieval of threat-related information as it is assessed with
incidental free recall, cued recall and recognition.
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Studies that have investigated MC implicit memory biases in depression have yielded
conflicting results. Denny and Hunt (1992) and Watkins et al. (1992) used
respectively word fragment completion and word stem completion tasks with
depressed and non-depressed participants, however, both studies found no evidence
of implicit memory bias in depression. Subsequently, Roediger and McDermott
(1992) in their commentary on these studies argued that a plausible reason for these
findings might be that both studies had used "perceptually-driven" implicit memory
tests, that is, the cognitive processes used by participants to complete these tasks are
driven by the perceptual features of the word stimuli (e.g. "Complete the following
with the first word that comes to mind: "Dep " or "D p io "). However,
memory tests, such as free recall that usually produces MC biases, typically rely on
meaningful processing of the stimuli and therefore are "conceptually driven".
Therefore, it was proposed that MC implicit memory biases would be found if
conceptually driven tasks, both at encoding and retrieval phases, were used.
Consequently, a study was devised that used a conceptually driven task in which
after a self-referent study phase of positive negative and neutral words and a 30
second distracter task, depressed and non-depressed participants were asked to
produce one-word associations to cue words (Watkins, Vache, Verney, Muller &
Mathews, 1996). Although the authors claim to have found MC implicit memory
bias in the depressed group, 58% of their subjects (perhaps not surprisingly) had
awareness of the memory aspects of the experiment. Thus, MC memory biases found
in this study could be the result of explicit as much as implicit memory. On the other
hand, also in Watkins et al. (1992) the majority of the participants (some 96%!) were
aware of the memory nature of the task, and yet no MC memory bias was found,
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which suggests that the "perceptual vs. conceptual" distinction may not be the key
solution to the problem.
Some studies have been able to find evidence of MC implicit memory bias in
depression using perceptually driven tasks. Ruiz-Caballero and Gonzalez (1994)
found a MC implicit memory bias for negative compared to positive words in a
group of dysphoric individuals using a word stem completion task. Similar findings
are reported in a non-clinical study where evidence of a MC depression bias on a
repetition-primed lexical decision task was found in the subliminal but not
supraliminal condition (Bradley, Mogg & Williams, 1994). These findings were
confirmed in a clinical study by Bradley et al. (1995) that used a lexical decision task
with sub-threshold and supra-threshold priming and found a MC implicit memory
bias in a clinically depressed group in both conditions for depression-relevant words.
These results were also replicated in a subsequent similar study (Bradley, Mogg &
Millar, 1996).
More recently, a methodical comparison of four different implicit memory tasks was
used with depressed and non-depressed individuals (Watkins, Martin & Stern, 2000).
The authors used two perceptually driven tasks (i.e. word stem completion and word
identification) and two conceptually driven tasks (i.e. free association and word
retrieval) in both match and mismatch perceptual and conceptual encoding
conditions. Results indicated MC implicit memory bias in the depressed group only
in one of the conceptually driven tasks (i.e. word retrieval, which consists in
providing participants with a definition and then ask them to produce a word that fits
the definition), but only in the conceptual encoding condition. Given that, against
prediction, the free association task failed to elicit MC biases, Watkins et al. (2000)
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concluded that although conceptually driven tests might be necessary for
demonstrating MC implicit memory biases in depression, they are not sufficient.
In another recent study with dysphoric students, Scott, Mogg and Bradley (2001)
used both a repetition and a semantic priming lexical decision tasks in order to
investigate further the automaticity of priming effects. A MC implicit memory bias
was found in the semantic priming condition only at a relatively short 56 ms. SOA
(Stimulus Onset Asynchrony, the time between the presentation of the prime and the
presentation of the target) and not for the longer 2000 ms. SOA condition. These
findings provide further evidence that MC memory biases can occur relatively
automatically, although results cannot be generalised to clinical levels of depression.
However a conceptual criticism can be made of Scott et al.'s (2000) as well as
Bradley et al.'s (1994; 1995; 1996) studies that used a sub-threshold priming
condition to investigate implicit memory biases. Under this condition, the authors are
more likely to investigate facilitation effects (or attentional biases) rather than
implicit memory. This is especially true with semantic priming, in that a word is used
to assess facilitation effects on a different target word. In this case, being the target
word a "new" word, by definition any effects found do not reflect implicit "memory"
processes but rather semantic facilitation and activation (e.g. Bower, 1981; 1987).
Bradley and colleagues also criticise Watkins et al. (1996) for claiming to have found
"unconscious" MC implicit memory effects, because the latter have used supra-
threshold primes in their studies. However, we argue that the use of supra-threshold
primes in this case is a legitimate paradigm as long as participants are unaware of
using the knowledge previously acquired while performing the implicit memory task,
a condition that was not satisfied in Watkins et al. (1996).
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Thus, in sub-threshold - repetition or semantic - priming lexical decision paradigms
we are assessing short-lived facilitation or activation effects of different emotionally
toned materials that can influence temporarily a person's decision. In contrast, with
supra-threshold priming we are exposing participants to a controlled set of stimuli
and then, during the test phase, assess how readily individuals use the same
information previously provided when given an implicit memory task. In other
words, it gives us a measure of what type of stimuli materials (e.g. MC) tend to stay
with the person for longer periods of time, are maintained and/or elaborated through
rehearsal and become short or long memory traces which are available for use (e.g.
Baddeley, 1995).
Therefore, despite the inconsistency of results and the variability in methodology
among the investigations reviewed above, depression does appear to be associated
with some levels of automatic memory processes. However, where positive priming
effects were found, depressed or dysphoric participants did show high levels of
anxiety, or anxiety levels were not measured or reported. Consequently, this status of
affairs makes any conclusion rather tentative.
The picture that emerges from studies of MC implicit memory biases in anxiety is
not very dissimilar from the one we have seen for depression, although the majority
of studies confer support for such biases in anxiety (e.g. MacLeod, 1999; MacLeod
& Rutherford, 1998).
Several studies have found evidence of MC implicit memory biases in clinical and
non-clinical anxiety for threat-related materials (e.g. Amir, McNally, Riemann &
Clements, 1996; Cloitre et al., 1994; Lang & Craske, 1997; MacLeod & McLaughlin,
1995; Mathews, Mogg, May & Eysenck, 1989; Richards & French, 1991). These
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studies have included a variety of tasks ranging from visual to auditory tests and
have used both conceptual and perceptual processing at encoding with traditional
perceptually driven tasks. Despite the large body of evidence supporting this
phenomenon, a good number of experimental studies have failed to replicate these
findings with high trait anxiety individuals (Nugent & Mineka, 1994; Russo, Fox &
Bowles, 1999); with GAD patients (Bradley et ah, 1995; Mathews, Mogg, Kentish &
Eysenck, 1995); in panic disorder (Becker et ah, 1994); in PTSD (McNally & Amir,
1996).
These inconsistencies are hard to explain since they cannot easily be attributed to
cognitive differences among types of anxiety disorders or to different methods of
assessments, since positive and null results have been obtained under comparable
conditions with similar clinical and non-clinical groups. Eysenck and Byrne (1994)
advocated for differences in the nature of the encoding tasks used in different studies.
In particular, the authors argued that anxiety would be linked to perceptual MC
implicit memory and therefore it was necessary to use a perceptual encoding task to
match the perceptual nature of the task. Their experiment found support for this
position, in that high trait anxious individuals showed an implicit memory bias for
threat stimuli on a word fragment completion task following a perceptual but not a
conceptual encoding condition. These results highlight the importance of the
encoding procedure used in these experiments, however, they are at odds with the
findings of other studies in which the same word completion task was used with
GAD patients and yielded positive results under conceptual encoding (Mathews et
ah, 1989) and negative results under perceptual encoding condition (Mathews et ah,
1995).
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Once again, given the current level of inconsistency in the literature reviewed it
might appear premature to draw firm conclusions about the presence of MC implicit
memory biases in anxiety. However, there is evidence that anxiety is associated with
threat-related biases on automatic aspects of memory, although the exact conditions
under which this occurs are currently not entirely clear.
3. 5. Summary.
Memory and attention are the two most widely studied cognitive processes. We have
presented alternative theoretical points of view and have reviewed the literature
concerning attentional and mnemonic biases in anxiety and depression.
From the evidence at hand, it appears that anxiety is strongly associated with
automatic processes at pre-attentive and attentional levels, but less so with automatic
memory processes (i.e. implicit memory). As a result, anxious individuals will attend
and allocate resources towards threatening stimuli and may show more sensitivity for
threat-related materials which become automatically more available. However, with
the exception of panic disorder, anxiety is not linked with biases for more controlled
cognitive processes, such as explicit memory; and this might be due to avoidance of
threat following its initial identification.
On the other hand, depression does not seem to be associated with automatic pre-
attentive or attentional biases. The performance of depressed individuals suggests
that mood disorders might be characterised by the inability to disengage attentional
resources from negative materials once they have become the focus of attention. This
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ruminative behaviour might be responsible for the strong MC effects observed in
tests of explicit memory, and the association of depression with implicit memory
biases following initial conceptual encoding.
These findings have important implications in terms of identification of vulnerability
factors, maintenance and treatment of the two disorders.
In conclusion, although there seems to be notable dissociation of automatic and
controlled cognitive processes in anxiety and depression, the emerging picture is not
as clear-cut as some current cognitive models would suggest. The number of
inconsistencies found, especially in studies of implicit memory, is in need of a more
accommodating theoretical framework.
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3. 6. Preliminary investigation.
The experimental work reported here is an investigation carried out by myself in this
Department of Psychiatry, University of Edinburgh, before the commencement of
this PhD research programme. It was submitted as part ofmy undergraduate degree,
but formed the starting point for the PhD. It deals with attentional and mnemonic
processes in mixed anxiety depression and, as a result, it constitutes an integral part
of the aims of the current research programme.
3. 6. 1. Introduction.
The preliminary investigation described below is a comparative study of anxiety,
depression and mixed anxiety depression in a clinical sample. In Chapter 2 we have
seen that the coexistence of anxiety and depressive disorders in clinical settings has
led to controversial debates about their relationship. In the last 25 years, several
studies have used different methods (e.g. biology, treatment response, family history)
in order to determine whether anxiety and depression can be conceptualised as: (a)
distinct disorders, qualitatively different; (b) variations of the same underlying
disorder, quantitatively different; or (c) phenomenologically (qualitatively and
quantitatively) different, when both present, from either pure anxiety or depression
(Katon & Roy-Byrne, 1991; Stahl, 1993; Stavrakaki & Vargo, 1986). This last
conceptual model has found its expression in the 10th edition of the International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-10; World Health Organization, 1990) and in the
appendix of the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) with the
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introduction of the Mixed Anxiety Depressive Disorder (MAD) as a new diagnostic
category. This is a "sub-threshold" diagnostic category reserved for those patients
who suffer from a non-specific pattern of anxious and depressive symptoms that are
not severe enough to justify a diagnosis of an anxiety or depressive disorder. Even if
somehow overcoming the concept of comorbidity, the sub-threshold approach does
not take into account all the cases often encountered in clinical practice in which the
two disorders coexist above threshold (i.e. patients who meet the diagnostic criteria
for both an anxiety and a depressive disorder).
A more comprehensive view of the relationship between anxiety and depression is
offered by dimensional models such as Alloy et al.'s (1990) helplessness-
hopelessness model, Goldberg's (1994; 1996; Goldberg & Huxley, 1992) biosocial
model, and Clark and Watson's (1991) tripartite model. Clark and Watson (1991)
proposed that those patients who only report non-specific symptoms reflecting
general distress, should be diagnosed as mixed anxiety-depression mild (or
moderate). This is equivalent to the diagnostic categories included in the ICD-10 and
DSM-IV. However, according to the authors, those patients who present high levels
of negative affect together with specific symptom clusters reflecting low positive
affect and physiological hyperarousal, should receive a diagnosis of mixed anxiety-
depression severe. This would emphasise the synergistic quality (see point c above)
of a dual diagnosis, compared with the mere additive value recognised by the
comorbid approach.
The present study aims to provide evidence in support of the validity of the
dimensional perspective of anxiety and depression by means of self-report measures
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and experimental tasks, as well as clinical interviews, as necessary components of a
multiple method of assessment (Power, 1991).
This is not to say that the present investigation will attempt to corroborate the
construct validity of either the ICD-10 or DSM-IV MAD sub-threshold diagnostic
categories (corresponding to mixed anxiety-depression mild or moderate as proposed
by Clark and Watson (1991)) or of the suggested diagnosis of mixed anxiety-
depression severe. The main focus of this study is the provision of evidence of
discriminant group validity amongst three clinical groups (depressed only, anxious
only, and mixed). Accordingly, given the dimensional perspective adopted in this
study, we shall not differentiate between sub and supra-threshold patients in the
mixed group. Exploration and comparison of information processing styles in the
three groups of patients will allow us to examine whether mixed anxiety and
depression have an additive (comorbid approach) or a phenomenologically distinct
(dimensional approach) effect on cognitive processes. In other words, we expect the
three groups to differ from each other and to present with qualitatively discrete
cognitive profiles as would be predicted if the basic principle of Gestalt - "a whole is
different from the sum of its parts" - in psychology of perception was applied to
clinical psychology. In particular, we focus on patients' performance in typical
experimental tasks assessing implicit and explicit memory biases, namely, word
identification and free recall.
Williams et al. (1988; 1997) proposed a cognitive model of information processing in
order to account for the different biases in memory and attention found in clinical
anxiety and depression. This model is based on the dissociation between biases
occurring in an automatic way, reflecting in their terminology an integration process,
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and biases involving controlled processes indicating elaboration. Specifically, the
general prediction is that anxious patients would show a pre-attentive/attentional bias
for threatening information at encoding; whilst, a mood-congruent memory bias at
retrieval is expected to be found in depressed patients. It is therefore predicted that
these biases at integration and elaboration processes are to be revealed by implicit
and explicit memory tests respectively.
However, we have seen above that several studies have found an implicit memory
bias for negative information in depression (e.g. Bradley et al., 1995; 1996; Watkins
et ah, 1996; 2000). Whereas, a few experiments have failed to replicate the
relationship between anxiety and implicit memory bias for threatening information
(e.g. Mathews et. ah, 1995; Nugent & Mineka, 1994). It is apparent that this
divergent pattern of results on implicit memory tests in anxiety and depression might
be due to a number of reasons. For instance, the use of different experimental tasks
(perceptual vs. conceptual, involving varying amounts of automatic and strategic
processing), inappropriate selection of stimuli materials, different sample groups
(clinical vs. non-clinical), and, probably most important, failure in forming distinct
experimental groups (i.e. anxious or depressed only, or mixed) (e.g. McNally, 1995;
Roediger & McDermott, 1992; Sanz, 1996).
In summary, contrary to prediction, current evidence shows that implicit memory
biases can be found in both anxiety and depression, whilst, explicit memory tests,
usually free of cued recall, seem to provide a more robust set of findings in support
ofWilliams et al.'s (1988; 1997) model.
In the present study, implicit memory biases were evaluated by means of a word
identification task (with supra-threshold priming) assessing implicit memory for
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depression relevant, anxiety relevant, emotional positive and neutral words. Subjects
were asked to read aloud a list of briefly displayed words, only half of which had
been previously presented. Word identification is an implicit memory test since
conscious attention is not directed to the attempt of remembering past events but it is
absorbed by the reading task (e.g. Hertel, 1994). This test gives a measure of priming
effects inasmuch as previously exposed words are identified more frequently than
new ones.
Although it may be argued that implicit memory performance on this task might be
associated only with perceptual processing of the word stimuli as found in basic
research with neutral materials (see Schacter (1987) for a review), several studies
have used either lexical decision or word identification tasks with emotional
materials and have shown selective improved implicit memory only for some types
of stimuli (e.g. mood-congruent), which is most likely to reflect a conceptual bias
occurring at encoding during the study phase (e.g. Bradley et al., 1995; 1996;
MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995.). Therefore, both perceptual and conceptual types of
processing are probably involved. This is even more bound to be the case when using
word identification, since subjects are not merely asked to discriminate words from
non-words as in a lexical decision task, but are required to read the word stimuli
aloud.
It ought to be mentioned at this point that no test of memory is a pure test of either
integration or elaboration processes. However, word identification, in comparison
with other tasks (e.g. word stem or word fragment completion), represents a more
reliable and uncontaminated measure of implicit memory (e.g. MacLeod &
McLaughlin, 1995).
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An incidental free recall for the priming material was used as an explicit memory test
to assess the mood-congruent biases at the elaboration stage of information
processing (e.g. Denny & Hunt 1992; Elliot & Greene, 1992; Lang & Craske, 1997).
Because there seems to be reasonable evidence for predicting implicit memory biases
in both anxious and depressed groups and explicit memory biases only in the
depressed group, if anxiety and depression are two distinct disorders and a comorbid
approach is preferable to a dimensional perspective, then we would expect to find:
a) only an implicit memory bias for threatening information in the anxious group;
b) implicit and explicit memory biases for MC information in the depressed group;
c) an additive effect (on the self-report measures likewise the experimental tasks) in
the mixed (anxious and depressed) group; that is an implicit memory bias for
depression and anxiety relevant stimuli, and a bias for emotional negative
information on the incidental free recall.
3. 6. 2. Method.
3. 6. 2. 1. Experimental design.
The experimental design consisted of a mixed factorial design (4 x 4 x 2). There was
one between-subjects variable - Group (4: depressed, anxious, mixed, control) - and
two within-subjects variables - Word Type (4: depression relevant, anxiety relevant,
emotional positive, neutral) and Priming (2: primed words, unprimed words).
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3. 6. 2. 2. Participants.
There were four groups of participants: depressed, anxious, mixed anxiety-
depression and normal control subjects. All subjects were between 20 and 64 and
their first language was English. The depressed, anxious and mixed patients were
recruited from the outpatient waiting list of the Royal Edinburgh Hospital. The
selection criteria for the depressed group (n = 18) were: (i) a primary diagnosis of
major depression or dysthymia, in the absence of any anxiety disorder according to
DSM-IV criteria, and (ii) a score of 16 or more on the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987). This group included 11 outpatients with major
depression and 7 with dysthymic disorder. The selection criteria for the anxious
group (n = 18) were: (i) a primary diagnosis of an anxiety disorder, in the absence of
any depressive disorder according to DSM-IV criteria, and (ii) a score of 16 or more
on the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1990). This group included: 5
outpatients with GAD, 3 with GAD and social phobia, 1 with GAD and OCD, 4 with
panic disorder, 3 with panic disorder with agoraphobia, and 2 with panic disorder
with agoraphobia and social phobia. The selection criteria for the mixed group (n =
18) were: (i) a diagnosis of mixed anxiety-depressive disorder (sub-threshold) or a
dual diagnosis of any depressive and anxiety disorder (supra-threshold) according to
DSM-IV criteria, and (ii) a score of 17 or more on the BDI + BAI. This group
included: 2 outpatients with major depression and panic disorder with agoraphobia, 4
with major depression and panic disorder, 3 with major depression and GAD, 1 with
dysthymic disorder and panic disorder with agoraphobia, 1 with dysthymic disorder
and social phobia, 2 with dysthymic disorder and GAD, and 5 with mixed anxiety
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depressive disorder (sub-threshold). The control group consisted of 18 subjects with
(i) no known history of (or current) emotional disorder, and (ii) depression and
anxiety scores below the cut-offs for the other three groups; they were matched to the
other three groups for age and sex.
3. 6. 2. 3. Apparatus and materials.
For the word identification task, there were four types of stimulus words with 32
words of each type (see Appendix 1). There were two types of emotional negative
words: depression relevant (e.g. guilty, hopeless, failure, grief, crying) and anxiety
relevant (e.g. panic, criticism, mistake, urgent, worry). They were selected from lists
of words previously used in studies assessing memory and attentional biases in
anxiety and depression (e.g. Bradley & Mathews, 1983; Mathews et ah, 1989). These
words were originally selected on the basis of three judges' ratings on 0-5 scales
according to their relevance to depression and anxiety. Depression relevant words
received a score of 3 or more for their relevance to depression and less than 3 for
their relevance to anxiety. Words were selected as anxiety relevant if they had
received a score of 3 or more for their relevance to anxiety and less than 3 for their
relevance to depression. Emotional positive (e.g. pleasant, happy, beauty, affection,
charm) and neutral (e.g. paper, stove, garage, umbrella, potato) words were chosen
according to Brown and Ure's (1969) and Rubin and Friendly's (1986) criteria.
Emotional positive words exceeded 5 on a 7-point scale for their emotionality (M =
5.52) and positivity (M = 5.97); whereas neutral words fell below 2 for their
emotionality (M = 1.67) and between 2 and 5 for their positivity (M = 4.17). All 128
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words were then divided into 2 lists (A and B) of 64 words (with 16 words for each
type). List A was used as the priming list and was then mixed with list B to form two
new lists of words (Ai and B^ so that only half of each had been seen previously.
These new two lists were used in the identification task, so that the randomised
presentation of primed and unprimed words was forced to be as balanced as possible.
In addition, 24 more neutral words, subdivided into 6 blocks of 4 words each, were
selected according to the criteria described above. These were used in the initial
phase of the experiment. Finally, all the lists (including sub-lists for each word-type)
were matched for length and frequency determined by Kucera and Francis's (1967)
and Francis and Kucera's (1982) average values, and no statistically significant
differences were found. Stimulus words (in uppercase and white on black
background) were presented by means of the software MEL (Micro Experimental
Laboratory; Schneider, 1988) version 1.0 on an external Compaq 140 14" colour
monitor connected to an AcerNote 760iC 486 DX4/75 portable computer.
3. 6. 2. 4. Procedure.
All patients completed the BDI and the BAI one week prior to the test session,
except for the normal control subjects who were administered the inventories on the
same day as the experimental tasks.
The word identification task was divided into three phases. Each part was preceded
by instructions which were rephrased by the experimenter. During the first phase,
subjects were asked to read aloud a list of words presented one at a time at the centre
of the screen. Instructions emphasised the brief exposure of the stimuli, the presence
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of the mask and of the fixation cross at the centre of the screen. In addition, subjects
were invited to guess all the words presented even if they were not sure or did not
believe they had actually seen a word, since it did not matter if their answers were
right or wrong. This list of words was comprised of the 24 neutral words which were
presented in a fixed order at the centre of the screen in six blocks of 4 words. For
each block, the first word was presented for 133msec, the second for 100msec, the
third for 67msec and the fourth for 50msec. Each word was preceded by a fixation
cross at the centre of the screen for 1 sec, and then replaced by a mask, which was a
string of symbols matched for length with the word, for 33msec. The stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA) was 16msec, and the inter-trial interval (ITI), during which the
screen was blank, was 3sec (i.e. fixation cross -> stimulus word -» mask —> reading).
As the subjects read aloud the words, the experimenter checked the accuracy of their
answers by viewing simultaneously the same words on the Notebook's screen until
the accuracy of the response was recorded, considering as correct responses only the
exact reading of the words. The outcome of this part of the experiment was used to
set up the exposure duration of the stimulus words for the third part of the task (i.e.
the actual identification task) according to the subject's reading threshold. If the
correct answers were at least 3 out of 6 (i.e. 50%) for the words with exposure
duration of 133msec, 100msec, 67msec or 50msec, then the following exposure
durations were assigned: 100msec, 67msec, 50msec or 33msec respectively. By
doing so, a facilitating practice effect was balanced by reducing the exposure
duration to a time that allowed participants to identify 30 to 50% of new words.
During the second phase, list A (16 words of each type) was presented in a random
order as the primes. Subjects were asked to pay attention to the words appearing one
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at a time for 6 seconds at the centre of the screen, and to rate them for their
emotionality on a 5 point scale (1 = not at all, 2 = a little bit, 3 = moderately, 4 =
quite a bit, 5 = very) appearing at the top of the screen after each word. The rating
scale remained on the screen until the subject pressed the selected key on the
keyboard. Then, the next word appeared, preceded by a fixation cross for lsec.
In the third phase lists Ai and Bi were used. For each subject the list presentation
order (AiBi or BjAi) and the stimulus presentation order within each list were
randomised. Words were presented as in the first phase of the experiment, except for
the exposure duration which was constant and adjusted according to each subject's
reading threshold in order to avoid floor or ceiling effects. The instructions informed
the subjects that because of the greater number of words, there was a short break
halfway through. Before the presentation of the lists, 6 neutral words (chosen from
the 24 neutral words shown during the first part) were used as practice words.
Immediately after the end of the word identification task, the explicit memory test for
the priming list A took place. Subjects were asked to write down all the words they
remembered in order to avoid false negatives (words not reported because falsely not
attributed to the rating task). For the incidental free recall 5 minutes were allowed.
This task was presented after the implicit memory test, because it is not clear how
transient the phenomenon of priming might be in word identification (Schacter,
1987). The word identification task might have reminded participants of otherwise
unretrievable words, but, on the other hand, recalled words might have facilitated
their identification. Moreover, an immediate free recall would have produced a
recency effect, which was avoided by the randomised presentation of words during
the identification task.
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After they had finished, participants completed the following questionnaires: BDI
and BAI (normal controls only), the Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire
(MASQ; Watson et ah, 1995a; 1995b), and the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire-
Revised Short Scale (EPQ-R Short Scale; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991).
Finally, the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders - Research
Version (SCID-I; First, Gibbon, Spitzer & Williams, 1996) was carried out.
3. 6. 3. Results.
3. 6. 3. 1. Subject characteristics.
The four groups did not differ significantly in sex ratio or age (see Table 3. 2.
below). The control group obtained significantly lower scores than the three clinical
groups on all the measures except in the specific anxiety MASQ sub-scale AA
(Anxious Arousal), where it did not differ significantly from the depressed group.
The depressed and the mixed groups, compared to the anxious group, had
significantly higher scores in the BDI and in the MASQ sub-scale AD (Anhedonic
Depression). The anxious and the mixed groups obtained significantly higher scores
in the two anxiety MASQ sub-scales N-SA (Non-Specific Anxiety) and AA
(Anxious Arousal) compared to the depressed group. Thus, on self-report measures,
the mixed group shows a comorbid additive effect, scoring highly in all the specific
and non-specific anxiety and depression scales.
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Table 3. 2. Participant characteristics.
Group
Depressed Anxious Mixed Control A(3,68) P
Sex M/F 10/8 11/7 8/10 8/10
Age 43.11 36.67 34.50 38.00 2.14 ns
BDI 25.67a 14.78b 26.83a 3.44c 40.37 <0.001
BAI 16.83a 24.50a 24.67a 3.44b 17.08 <0.001
MASQ
GD 46.39a 42.78a 51.06a 23.50b 24.78 <0.001
N-SA 23.67a 32.17b 31.72b 15.17C 20.44 <0.001
AA 24.78a 38.67b 39.22b 19.17a 14.93 <0.001
N-SD 38.39a 30.003 38.89a 17.39b 19.98 <0.001
AD 86.003 66.78b 84.063 46.44° 34.05 <0.001
EPQ-R - Short Scale
N lO.lT 10.33a 10.78a 4.1 lb 63.45 <0.001
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; MASQ =
Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; GD = General Disturbance; N-SA =
Non-Specific Anxiety; AA = Anxious Arousal; N-SD = Non-Specific Depression;
AD = Anhedonic Depression; EPQ-R - Short Scale = Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire-Revised Short Scale; N = Neuroticism. Within a row, means with
different supra-scripted letters differ significantly from each other (P < 0.05).
3. 6. 3. 2. Word identification task.
The implicit memory test utilised in this study used supra-threshold primes with
conceptual encoding (i.e. an emotional rating of the four types of words) and was
conceived to test attentional and not pre-attentive biases. The latter have been
verified only indirectly by calculating (for each group and for each word type) the
number of unprimed words subjects were able to read correctly during the main
identification task. In other words, the number of correctly identified new words,
appearing on the screen for the first time, gives us a measure of pre-attentive biases.
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For both word identification and free recall, boxplots revealed some outliers
randomly distributed across the conditions (2.43%). These were dealt with through
winsorization, by substituting each outlier with the nearest non-outlier value of the
corresponding distribution (Winer, 1971).
An overall 4x4x2 repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the primed
vs. unprimed identified words was carried out with Group (depressed, anxious,
mixed, control) as a between-subjects variable, and Word Type (depression relevant,
anxiety relevant, emotional positive, neutral) and Priming (primed words vs.
unprimed words) as within-subjects variables. Significant main effects of Group
F(3,68) = 3.88, p < 0.01, Word Type F(3,66) = 19.00, p < 0.001, and Priming
F(l,68) = 1301.77, p < 0.001 were found, with a higher number of primed words
being identified compared to the unprimed ones. Also the interactions Group x Word
Type F(9,194) = 3.55, p < 0.001, Group x Priming F(3,68) = 12.39, p < 0.001, Word
Type x Priming F(3,66) = 6.06, p < 0.001, and Group x Word Type x Priming
F(9,194) = 3.15, p < 0.001 were significant. However, in order to understand the
sources of variation and the nature of the biases occurring at different stages of
information processing more in depth, separate ANOVAs were computed for primed
and unprimed words, as well as for priming effects. The percentages of words
correctly identified in each condition are shown in Table 3.3. below.
140
Table 3. 3. Mean percentages of unprimed and primed words correctly
identified by each group in each condition. (Standard deviations
in parentheses.)
Priming Group Word type
Depression Anxiety Positive Neutral
Unprimed
Depressed 38.19 34.03 29.17 29.17
(10.91) (4.51) (13.22) (11.14)
Anxious 28.82 37.85 38.19 34.03
(11.57) (11.24) (14.20) (10.11)
Mixed 37.15 39.24 45.14 33.68
(20.05) (16.85) (17.88) (14.87)
Control 46.88 45.49 55.90 51.04
(21.89) (24.24) (25.77) (22.30)
Primed
Depressed 64.58 58.33 76.39 51.74
(11.94) (14.54) (9.72) (12.46)
Anxious 67.71 77.08 74.65 70.49
(11.19) (10.50) (8.43) (11.70)
Mixed 65.28 69.79 69.44 52.43
(21.57) (16.64) (19.28) (22.29)
Control 72.92 73.96 81.94 72.57
(21.11) (21.89) (14.20) (23.20)
(a) Primed words. The results of a 4 x 4 repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA) with Group (depressed, anxious, mixed, control) as a between-subjects
variable, and Word Type (depression relevant, anxiety relevant, emotional positive,
neutral) as a within-subjects variable showed significant main effects of Group
F(3,68) = 3.44, p < 0.02, Word Type F(3,66) = 22.16, p < 0.001 and interaction of
Group x Word Type F(9,194) = 4.77, p < 0.001. Additional ANOVAs with planned
orthogonal contrasts emphasised the major differences within the four groups. A
significant effect ofWord Type was found in the depressed group F(3,15) = 21A\,p
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< 0.001. Orthogonal contrasts showed that the depressed patients were able to
identify a significantly higher number of positive words compared to the other three
word types, with the number of depression relevant words being also significantly
higher than the number of neutral words. The significant Word Type effect found in
the anxious group F(3,15) = 4.17, p < 0.02 was due to the patients being able to
identify more anxiety relevant and positive words than depression relevant words,
with the number of anxiety relevant words being also significantly higher than the
number of neutral words. The mixed group identified a number of neutral words
significantly lower compared to the other three word types F(l,17) = 25.52, p <
0.001. To estimate between-groups effects, one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
with Scheffe's post hoc analyses (significance level :p< 0 .05) were carried out for
each word type. These analyses showed a significantly higher number of anxiety
relevant words being identified by the anxious group compared to the depressed
group, and a significantly higher number of neutral words being identified by the
anxious and the control groups compared to the depressed and mixed groups.
(b) Unprimed words. The same statistical tests used to analyse the results described
in the previous sub-section (a) were replicated for this set of data. This represents the
indirect measure of bias at a pre-attentive stage. Significant main effects of Group
F(3,68) = 5.38, p < 0.002, Word Type F(3,66) = 3.40, p < 0.02 and interaction of
Group x Word Type .F(9,194) = 3.14, p < 0.001 were found. Moreover, within-
groups analyses indicated a main effect ofWord Type in the anxious group F(3,15) =
3.14, p < 0.05, where planned contrasts showed a number of depression relevant
words identified significantly lower than the other three word types. The mixed
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group identified more positive words compared to the other three types of words
F(l,17) = 25.04, p < 0.001. Between-groups analyses showed that the control
subjects identified a higher number of words compared to the anxious group in the
depression relevant words condition, compared to the depressed and anxious groups
in the positive words condition, and compared to the three clinical groups in the
neutral words condition (p < 0.05). The relative ease shown by the control subjects in
identifying new words was possibly due to the clinical groups' resource-limited
performance in a data-limited task (Holender, 1986).
(c) Priming effect. Priming effects were obtained (for each subject and for each word
type) by subtracting the percentage of unprimed words from the percentage of
primed words correctly read. Priming scores were then analysed in the same way as
the primed and unprimed words. The results indicated significant main effects of
Group F(3,68) = 12.39, p < 0.001, Word Type F(3,66) = 6.06, p < 0.001 and
interaction of Group x Word Type F(9,194) = 3.15, p < 0.001. Figure 3. 4. below,
shows the magnitude of priming effects for all the groups in each experimental
condition. Within-groups analyses revealed constant priming effects for the four
word types in the anxious, mixed and control groups, but not in the depressed group,
whose priming score for emotional positive words was significantly higher compared
to the other three word types F(l,17) = 51.55,/? < 0.001.
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Figure 3. 4. .Mean priming scores in percentages for each group and word
type (DEP = depression relevant; ANX = anxiety relevant; POS
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Between-groups analyses indicated that anxious patients obtained a significantly
higher priming score for the depression relevant and neutral words in comparison
with the other three groups, and for the anxious relevant words compared only to the
depressed patients. Finally, for the emotional positive words, a significantly larger
priming effect was found in the depressed group compared to the mixed and control
subjects (p < 0.05).
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3. 6. 3. 3. Incidental free recall.
The 24 neutral words used in the first part of the identification task and the unprimed
set of words were excluded from statistical analyses. A repeated measures 4x4
ANOVA was conducted with Group (depressed, anxious, mixed, control) as a
between-subject variable, and Word Type (depression relevant, anxiety relevant,
emotional positive, neutral) as a within-subject variable. The percentages of words
recalled in each condition are shown in Table 3. 4.
Table 3. 4. Mean percentages of primed words recalled by each group in
each condition. (Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Group Word type
Depression Anxiety Positive Neutral
Depressed 22.57 17.71 20.49 13.89
(4.86) (10.11) (10.68) (7.60)
Anxious 19.10 22.92 26.04 27.08
(4.53) (10.50) (8.64) (13.56)
Mixed 20.14 30.21 19.79 25.00
(11.25) (14.10) (10.56) (17.68)
Control 17.71 25.00 28.82 28.47
(14.42) (10.93) (10.75) (12.90)
There was no significant main effect of Group F(3,68) = 2.32, ns, but significant
main effects of Word Type F(3,66) = 4.08, p < 0.01 and of the interaction between
Group and Word Type F(9,194) = 5.37, p < 0.001 were found. Separate ANOVAs
with planned orthogonal contrasts emphasised significant differences within-groups.
A significant main effect of Word Type was found in the depressed group F(3,15) =
7.18, p < 0.003, who recalled significantly more depression relevant and positive
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words than neutral ones, with a percentage of depression relevant words being also
significantly higher than the percentage of anxiety relevant words. No significant
biases were found in the anxious group /^(S, 15) = 2.32, ns, for any word type. The
mixed group recalled more anxiety relevant words than depression relevant and
positive ones F(l,17) = 19.61, p < 0.001; whilst the control subjects showed a
significant effect of Word Type F(3,15) = 8.09, p < 0.002 with more positive and
neutral words than depression relevant words recalled. The between-groups analyses
indicated that the depressed group recalled a lower number of anxiety relevant words
in comparison with the mixed group and of neutral words compared to the anxious
and control groups {p < 0.05).
3. 6. 4. Discussion.
The results of the present study support the main hypothesis that patients with mixed
anxiety depression differ quantitatively and qualitatively from patients with pure
anxiety or depression only. Comparing the scores obtained by the three groups of
patients in the self-report measures, mixed patients scored as highly as the anxious
patients on the anxiety measures, and as highly as the depressed patients on the
depression measures. Moreover, the three clinical groups' scores did not differ in the
non-specific scales: GD, N-SD, N (and N-SA in the anxious and mixed patients).
At first glance, these results seem to indicate that patients with mixed anxiety-
depression are "equal to the sum of the worst parts" of the other two groups of
patients. However, this additive effect, which would strengthen the comorbid
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approach to emotional disorders, is not supported by the results obtained from the
implicit and explicit memory tests.
3. 6. 4. 1. Implicit memory test.
The performance of the depressed group in the word identification task showed a
large priming effect for emotional positive words which was significantly greater
compared to the mixed patients and controls. This indicates that emotional positive
information had a larger activation strength, or was paid more attention to, or was
more processed (none of them are mutually exclusive) than other types of material,
even the depression relevant items. The unequivocal accuracy of this emotional
positive bias can be verified by looking at the depressed group's performance for
primed and unprimed words separately. A high number of correctly identified
unprimed words of any word type would reduce priming effects for those word
types, since the difference between the percentages of primed and unprimed words
read correctly by the subjects would be drastically reduced. In this study, the
depressed group did not show any significant pre-attentive bias for any unprimed
word type. However, in addition to an overall positive bias, also a mood congruent
bias for depression relevant words compared to neutral material was found in the
primed condition. Taken together, these results seem to confirm current literature on
implicit memory and attentional biases, in that depression appears to facilitate the
maintenance of attention (and not its automatic initial shift) to negative information
once patients have focussed on it. This results in a greater difficulty in disengaging
from negative material (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 1999a).
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As shown in Figure 3. 4., an overall significantly higher priming effect was found in
the anxious group in comparison with the other three groups (except for the mixed
and control groups in the anxious relevant words condition, and the depressed
patients in the positive words condition). This finding suggests that anxious patients
pay generally more attention to any kind of information coming from the external
environment than depressed or mixed patients. A good fit to these data is offered by
Eysenck's (1992; 1997) hypervigilance theory, which predicts a general
hypervigilance in anxious subjects, who are incline to attend to any task-irrelevant
stimuli presented, with broad attention prior to the detection of a salient (e.g.
threatening or task-relevant) stimulus. Once detected, there should be, according to
Eysenck, a narrowing of attention, which in our case did not take place. One reason
for this could be that the emotional rating task contained 16 threatening stimuli
presented randomly together with 48 other "less salient" stimuli, so that anxious
patients might have been bound to keep their attention broadened all the time during
the performance of the task. However, separate analyses of primed and unprimed
words revealed a consistency in the pattern shown by the anxious group, with more
anxiety relevant, positive and neutral (at a pre-attentive stage only) words correctly
identified than depression relevant ones. These results cannot be entirely explained
by Williams et al.'s (1988; 1997) model, because their model predicts pre-
attentive/attentional biases only for mood congruent material (i.e. threatening
information) in clinical anxiety.
Opposite results to the ones just reviewed can be observed in the mixed group.
Surprisingly, no implicit memory bias and no difference from the control group in
the amount of priming effect for any word type was found in patients with mixed
148
anxiety depression. Eysenck (1992; 1997) suggested that depressed individuals are
characterised by their passive disengagement from the external environment (e.g.
psychomotor retardation or low motivation); whereas, anxious individuals are
characterised by their active engagement with the external environment, reflected in
their high distractibility and hypervigilance towards any kind of stimuli. In this
sense, we speculate that mixed anxiety-depression might have an adaptive function,
that is, to protect patients from a highly passive or an overactive engagement with the
environment in which they live, maintaining a more adequate level of interest.
Obviously, such hypothesised adaptation mechanism would be a dysfunctional one,
for it causes the development of a further disorder (i.e. anxiety or depression).
Moreover, unlike the control subjects who did not present any significant biases for
any primed or unprimed word type, the mixed group exhibited a different pattern,
with an overall higher number of positive unprimed words and a lower number of
neutral primed words correctly identified. This suggests a passage from an emotional
positive bias at a pre-attentive stage to a more comprehensive (positive and negative)
emotional bias at an attentional stage of processing. The presence of a positive bias
in this group, as well as the depressed and anxious groups is not atypical. In anxiety,
this could be accounted for by studies which demonstrated that anxious patients were
slowed by both positive and negative words, in comparison to neutral words, on an
emotional Stroop task (Martin, Williams & Clark, 1991; Mathews & Klug, 1993).
The authors argued that this may be because both word types, whether negative or
positive, are highly related to likely personal concerns. For studies showing positive
priming effects or positive completion of sentence stems in depression see Power,
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Cameron & Dalgleish, (1996) and Teasdale, Taylor, Cooper, Hayhurst & Paykel,
(1995).
Summing up the discussion so far, the implicit memory test shows different cognitive
patterns in the three clinical groups. The only indication of an additive effect in the
mixed group comes from their performance for the primed material, where a bias for
depression, anxiety relevant and positive words was found. However, the anxious
group differed significantly from both the depressed and mixed groups in the
percentage of primed neutral words correctly identified. The mixed group showed
also a distinct pattern for the unprimed material with a unique bias for positive
information. Therefore, we suggest that anxiety and depression together constitute
something different from the mere sum of the two disorders.
3. 6. 4. 2. Explicit memory test.
Different patterns for the three clinical groups were found also in the incidental free
recall. The analyses based on the primed words data set indicated an explicit memory
bias for anxiety relevant material in the mixed group. The number of anxiety relevant
words recalled was significantly higher in comparison with the depressed group,
which could reflect a dysfunctional feature of the above-mentioned postulated
adaptive mechanism. Interestingly, no significant difference was found among the
percentages of depression, anxiety relevant and positive primed words correctly
identified by the mixed patients, suggesting impairment at retrieval for depression
relevant and positive information in this group.
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A similar "impairment" in the retrieval of positive material previously identified was
found in the depressed group. In fact, although a higher number of positive compared
to neutral words was recalled, this group had previously identified more positive
words than any other word type. However, consistent with previous literature (e.g.
Bradley et ah, 1995; Watkins et ah, 1992) the depressed patients were able to recall
more depression relevant than neutral words, showing a mood congruent and content
specificity bias, in that a higher number of depression over anxiety relevant words
was also found.
In line with previous findings, in the explicit memory task, the anxious group did not
show any of the biases exhibited in the identification task, as no significant
difference of Word Type was found (e.g. Bradley et ah, 1995; Lang & Craske, 1997;
MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995; Williams et ah, 1988; 1997).
Finally, it is noteworthy that no significant difference between the anxious and mixed
groups was found in the explicit memory test.
Overall, these results testify to the value of Clark and Watson's (1991) tripartite
model in distinguishing between specific and common factors in clinical anxiety and
depression. The most interesting result of this research was the distinctive cognitive
pattern found in patients with mixed anxiety-depression. Beyond any interpretation
and theoretical speculations, it seems clear that the presence of both depression and
anxiety symptoms changes significantly the profile of implicit and explicit memory
biases of "purely" anxious or depressed patients providing evidence of discriminant
group validity amongst the three clinical groups.
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Some studies have recently included a mixed anxious depressed group in their
comparative examination of information processing with other groups. One non¬
clinical study compared performance of high anxiety and high depression group (i.e.
mixed) with a high anxiety and low depression group (i.e. anxious only) and a low
anxiety and low depression group (i.e. control) on explicit and implicit memory tasks
(Lang & Craske, 1997). Stimuli materials included physically threatening, socially
threatening and neutral words. No differences were found among the three groups on
the incidental free recall, however, both anxious and mixed groups used more
physically threatening primed words when completing the word stem task compared
to controls. These results are consistent with the ones found in our study where our
anxious and mixed clinical groups also identified a greater number of anxiety
relevant words compared to neutral ones. We also found evidence of a positive bias
in both groups and a bias for depression relevant primed words in the mixed group,
but Lang and Craske's (1997) study did not include emotionally positive or
depression relevant materials. Moreover, the fact that the presence of depression in
their non-clinical mixed group did not change the pattern of results observed in the
anxious group is interpreted by the authors as supporting the view that information
processing styles are "additive". This appears to be a gross misinterpretation of their
results because, firstly, they did not include a high depression low anxiety group (i.e.
depressed) and secondly, they did not present their participants with a more complete
range of emotional word stimuli (i.e. depression relevant and positive).
Another study used a dot probe task to assess attentional biases in children and
adolescent clinical anxiety and mixed anxiety depression (Taghavi, Neshat-Doost,
Moradi, Yule & Dalgleish, 1999). Word stimuli comprised physical threat, social
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threat, depression related and neutral words. Results showed that, relative to controls,
the anxious group exhibited an attentional bias towards threat related information,
whereas, the mixed anxious depressed group did not show any biases towards threat
or depression related items, relative to controls. The pattern of results obtained in the
mixed group in this study is consistent with our findings, in that our mixed group did
not differ from the control group in terms of priming effect and did not show any
biases for emotionally toned materials. This lends more support to the idea that the
presence of depression may moderate the overactive engagement with the
environment shown by the anxious group.
One limitation in the present investigation lies in the fact that the primed list of
words was always list A. However extreme care was taken in order to make the two
lists of stimuli as equivalent as possible (see Appendix 1.). A reassuring sign in this
direction is the fact that this study replicates major findings in the current literature
assessing implicit memory biases in anxiety and depression. Thus, if for some
unknown reason the two lists of words were not equivalent, the possible confound
must have been either minimal or negligible.
Another limitation derives from the dimensional perspective adopted in our study.
We did not differentiate between sub-threshold (« = 5) and supra-threshold (n = 13)
diagnoses in the mixed group. Although their cognitive patterns did not seem to
differ in the two tasks carried out, this might be a restriction to the generalisation of
our findings to both diagnostic taxonomies proposed by Clark and Watson (1991),
namely: mixed anxiety-depression mild and severe. Consequently, further
investigation is needed to test the possibility that the two mixed sub-groups might not
behave homogeneously.
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3. 7. Summary and conclusions.
In this Chapter we have addressed the issue of attentional and mnemonic processes in
anxiety and depression. The study of the functioning of such cognitive processes has
dominated the scene of cognitive experimental clinical psychology in the last two
decades. Until recently, empirical research and resultant theoretical models have
concentrated on the identification of specific cognitive patterns for anxiety and
depression in isolation. To a large extent the ongoing debate concerning the overlap
between the two disorders has been overlooked by experimental clinical
psychologists who have progressed in their work with some degree of "denial and
segregation" from the evidence gained in clinical practice. However, once "the last
millisecond race" was concluded, researchers have started to look back in order to
search for possible causes that might explain the many inconsistencies found. One of
the most plausible sources of confound (together with others mentioned above)
points towards the lack of well defined experimental clinical groups. Often, it has
been the case that nominally "pure" depressed groups had high levels of anxiety or
included individuals with mixed anxiety depression which almost certainly will have
had an effect on the overall group's performance on memory and attentional tasks.
The present investigation tried to overcome some of the limitations posed by
previous studies with the inclusion of a mixed group in the experimental design. This
has yielded some very promising results with the identification of three distinct
cognitive profiles for anxious, depressed, and mixed anxious depressed outpatients
on the implicit and explicit tasks employed in this study.
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The mixed group in particular showed no priming effect for any type of information,
and its performance did not differ from that of control participants. This seems to
suggest that depression might have a mitigating effect on the hypervigilance
exhibited by the anxious group, which might bring attentional engagement levels
down to a more adequate degree. On the other hand, the mixed group showed a bias
for anxiety relevant stimuli on the incidental free recall, which shows that more
controlled cognitive processes in this group are permeated with preoccupation.
This represents only one of the first attempts to clarify the relationship between
anxiety, depression, mixed states, and automatic and controlled cognitive processes.
In the next experimental Chapter we will extend our investigation of mixed anxiety




A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE: PROSPECTIVE COGNITIONS.
"I never think of the future. It comes soon enough."
(Albert Einstein)
4. 1. Introduction.
Cognitive theories of anxiety and depression highlight the importance of prospective
cognitions in the development and maintenance of emotional disorders. For example,
Beck's (Beck et ah, 1979; 1985) schema models view anxiety as characterised by an
"anxiogenic cognitive triad" consisting of a view of self as vulnerable, the world as
threatening and the future as unpredictable, whereas depression is characterised by
the presence of a "depressogenic cognitive triad" comprising a negative view of self,
the world and the future. Abramson et al. (1989) have revised the reformulated
helplessness theory of depression in terms of hopelessness, stating that the
expectancy that negative outcomes will occur and that positive outcomes will not
occur plays a major role in the development of hopelessness depression. On the other
hand, worry (or anxious apprehension) rather than hopelessness has been pointed at
as being responsible for the generalised future expectancy of negative outcomes
observed in anxiety (Barlow, 1988; Mathews, 1990). However, despite the important
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role played in theories of anxiety and depression, the study of cognitions relating to
the future has been somewhat neglected compared to the study of other cognitive
processes, such as attention and memory.
In this Chapter we will address the issue of overlap between anxiety and depression
from the point of view of future-directed thinking. In order to evaluate similarities
and differences among anxiety, depression, and mixed anxiety depression we will
present two experimental studies of prospective cognitions involving the three
clinical groups. This will allow us to test for cognitive pattern specificity in the
mixed group compared to anxious or depressed only, and provide further evidence of
discriminant group validity in another important aspect of cognitive functioning.
However, before the presentation of the empirical work we shall review some of the
relevant literature in this field of study.
4. 2. Review of relevant research.
4. 2. 1. General processes and mechanisms of prospective cognitions.
The most prominent account regarding the processes and mechanisms behind the
way people anticipate future outcomes originates from the early work ofTversky and
Kahneman (1973). The authors proposed that people use what they termed
availability heuristic when making judgements about the frequency or the probability
that an event will happen. Specifically, people will judge the likelihood of a future
event according to how easily they can recall an example of a similar event from
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long-term memory or imagine it happening. Thus, the easier it is to bring relevant
instances to mind or construct a scenario leading to the event happening, the more
likely an event is deemed to be. The second mechanism, relating to the construction
of a scenario, will be used to estimate the probability of real-life, unique or
uncommon events happening. This second mechanism was later recognised to reflect
a distinct process and was renamed simulation heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky,
1982). In the absence of a database of similar past experiences in long-term memory,
the construction of a mental scenario will involve a set of causal explanations leading
to the occurrence of a particular event. Again, the easier the production of such
causal explanations the higher the likelihood of the event outcome will be judged.
The availability heuristic is susceptible to the criticism of tautology, in that
availability is used to explain elevated subjective probabilities, which in turn is
invoked as evidence of increased availability, thus creating a circular argument.
However, there is some empirical evidence that supports its memory-based aspect.
For example, Osberg and Shrauger (1986) found that the most common method used
by college students to make subjective predictions about the probability of
occurrence of various events was to use the frequency with which a similar event had
happened to them in the past. MacLeod and Campbell (1992) also evaluated the
validity of the availability heuristic. In their experiment, participants were asked to
retrieve specific memories for general common pleasant and unpleasant events and
then rate the likelihood of experiencing similar events in the following 6 months.
Results showed a negative correlation between recall latency for past events and the
perceived future probability of similar events. Moreover, when the Velten (1968)
mood-induction procedure was used to manipulate experimentally the relative
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accessibility of memories of positive and negative events, the perceived future
probabilities of similar events also changed as predicted by the availability heuristic
account. That is, increases in recall latencies resulting from the mood manipulations
were related to reductions in perceived probability, and vice versa. However, since in
both studies it was not checked whether subjects were actually retrieving specific
instances from long-term memory, it is possible that what was being used to make
predictions was a more general impression memory, that is a pre-computed index of
how frequently certain events had happened in the past.
More recently, also some clinical investigations have shown the relationship between
retrospective and prospective cognitions. In a series of experiments carried out with
suicidal patients Williams, Ellis, Tyers, Healy, Rose and MacLeod (1996) found that,
when asked to recall specific past events and generate specific future events in
response to cues, suicidal patients recalled past events and generated future events
that were more general compared to controls. Moreover, the specificity level for past
and future events was significantly correlated for both groups. Further experiments
carried out within the same study found that experimental induction of a generic
retrieval style reduced the specificity of future anticipation. These results were
interpreted as in support of the view that the same intermediate descriptions used to
search autobiographical memory are also used to generate possible future events.
MacLeod, Tata, Kentish and Jacobsen (1997c) used an adaptation of the verbal
fluency task (e.g. Lezak, 1995) - described in more details below - to investigate
parallel processes between autobiographical memory and future anticipation in
depressed and anxious patients. Participants were asked to generate future and recall
past events (positive and negative) in response to different timeframe cues. Results
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yielded almost identical patterns for anticipation of future experiences and recall of
past events. Specifically, anxious patients anticipated and remembered more negative
events than controls, whilst depressed patients anticipated and recalled fewer positive
events relative to controls. Similar results have been replicated in a study with
depressed patients (Cropley, MacLeod & Tata, 2000). Recently, MacLeod and
Salaminiou (2001) have reported a study carried out with depressed inpatients which
seems to suggest that the reduced anticipation of positive events in depression arises
from a difficulty in accessing mental representations of such experiences.
Thus, there is evidence from both clinical and non-clinical studies that the
availability heuristic offers a valid explanatory power for the phenomenon. People
appear to use their memories of what happened in the past to predict what will
happen in the future, but it is not clear what exact intermediate processes are
entailed.
On the other hand, a number of other studies provide evidence that anticipation of
future events is also based on simulation heuristic processes, rather than simply on
retrieval of relevant past events. For example, Buehler, Griffin and Ross (1994)
investigated the phenomenon of "planning fallacy", that is believing that one's own
project will be completed on time despite being aware of plentiful contrary evidence
with similar projects. Using a think-aloud procedure, the authors found that subjects
focused primarily on future scenarios rather than on past experience when predicting
their completion times. Moreover, participants attributed their past prediction failures
to external, transient, and specific factors discounting their relevance for predicting
future outcomes. However, the optimistic bias was eliminated for subjects instructed
to connect relevant past experiences with their predictions.
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Other studies have been able to influence judgements by manipulating the
accessibility of causal explanations. Using the 1984 U.S. presidential debate (Reagan
vs. Mondale), Levi and Pryor (1987) found that subjects who had been asked to
generate reasons for why a candidate would win, estimated that particular candidate
as being more likely to win. However, simple imagery of a candidate winning did not
influence predictions, showing that causal thinking is more important in future
judgements than simply bringing a mental picture to mind. Hoch (1985) also found
that the over-optimistic probability judgements of graduate business students
concerning the results of their job search efforts 9 months away (e.g. starting salary)
could be normalised by asking participants to provide con reasons for the positive
outcomes. Similarly, clinical studies have shown that by asking mood-disturbed
individuals to generate counter-explanations for hypothetical future negative events,
reduces their increased pessimism (e.g. MacLeod & Tarbuck, 1994; MacLeod,
Williams & Bakerian, 1991). Further support for the idea that causal explanations
play an important role in future expectancy derives from studies that have found that
both normal and clinical samples report events as being more likely to happen if they
can provide more pro reasons than con reasons (e.g. MacLeod, 1994; MacLeod, Tata,
Kentish, Carroll & Hunter, 1997b). In another study, dysphoric individuals have been
found to provide more con relative to pro reasons for the probability of negative
events happening, and more pro relative to con reasons for negative events.
Moreover, relative to the control group, dysphoric participants provided more
internal and global reasons for why positive events would not happen and for why
negative events would happen (Byrne & MacLeod, 1997).
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Hence, there seems to be enough evidence to support the use of both the availability
and the simulation heuristics in prospective cognitions. Given some puzzling
findings, such as the ones reported by Buehler et al. (1994) in which past relevant
events were discounted, future research will need to clarify further the circumstances
under which the use of one heuristic rather than the other is given precedence.
4. 2. 2. Prospective cognitions in anxiety and depression.
One of the most common ways of investigating future-directed thinking is by
presenting individuals with a range of future oriented positive and negative sentences
expressing possible life events, and by asking subjects to judge the probability that
those events might happen to them in the future (usually within a certain timeframe)
by using a Likert-type scale. This task, known as subjective probability judgement
task (SPJT), has been used in various experiments that have examined the extent to
which anxious and depressed individuals differ in their judgements compared to
controls (e.g. MacLeod, 1999).
Several clinical and non-clinical studies have found that high trait anxious
individuals, dysphoric students, and anxious and depressed patients show an increase
in probability judgements for negative events compared to controls (e.g. Butler &
Mathews, 1983; 1987; MacLeod et al., 1991; 1997b; MacLeod & Cropley, 1995;
Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985). Moreover, anxiety and depression have been found
to be associated with a lower expectancy for positive events (e.g. MacLeod et al.,
1997b; MacLeod & Cropley, 1995; Pyszczynski, Holt & Greenberg, 1987), although
these findings have not always been replicated (e.g. Butler & Mathews, 1983;
162
Pietromonaco & Markus, 1985). Therefore, it would appear that when using the
SPJT to assess future expectancy, both depressed and anxious individuals show a
higher perceived likelihood for negative events and a lower expectancy for positive
events (although this last result has proved to be more inconsistent). Inconsistencies
found in the probability judgements for positive events could be partially explained
by the fact that different studies have used different items and slightly different
versions of the SPJT. For example a variant of this procedure requires subjects to
provide "yes/no" answers to indicate whether or not a number of positive and
negative events are likely to happen to them (e.g. Andersen, Spielman & Bargh,
1992; Dunning & Story, 1991).
Moreover, given the high levels of overlap and co-occurrence of anxiety and
depression in the same individuals, it is likely that inconsistent results are due to
failure in forming distinct experimental clinical and non-clinical groups, a problem
common to other areas of experimental cognitive clinical psychology, such as
attention and memory. In an attempt to address the issue of anxiety-depression
overlap in prospective cognitions, MacLeod, Byrne and Valentine (1996) used the
SPJT within the positive affect (PA) / negative affect (NA) framework (Watson et
al., 1988) to assess the extent to which specific cognitions concerning the future
could be explained by this two-dimensional model of affect. Consistent with this
view, factor analyses revealed one factor consisting of PA, positive expectancies and
negative loadings from hopelessness and depression measures; whereas, NA,
anxiety, worry, negative expectancies and depression loaded onto a separate factor.
Thus, NA, which is postulated to be a common dimension for both anxiety and
depression, is strongly correlated with the anticipation of negative events; while PA,
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which is negatively related only to depression, is correlated with the anticipation of
positive events. Similar results were also obtained in another study that looked at the
specificity of attributional styles for positive and negative events (Ahrens & Haaga,
1993).
Finally, a recent study carried out with clinically depressed participants replicated a
decreased expectancy for positive events in depression but also highlighted the fact
the depressed individuals showed relatively greater automaticity in their future event
predictions (measured by "yes/no" responses to presented life events), as indicated
by the fact that a concurrent attentional load (irrelevant task) caused only a smaller
increase in response latency compared to controls (Andersen & Limpert, 2001). This
has been interpreted as evidence that depressed individuals use a future-event schema
that can be applied in an automatic fashion when making predictions about future
events.
Another common method for estimating prospective cognitions in anxiety and
depression is the personal future task (PFT). The PFT requires subjects to generate
possible future experiences that might occur within 3 time periods (e.g. the next
week, including today; the next year; the next 5 to 10 years). Participants are given 1
minute for each timeframe to generate as many events as possible. This task includes
2 conditions: one where participants are asked to think of future positive events (i.e.
things they are looking forward to or that they would enjoy) and one where they are
asked to think of future negative events (i.e. things they are not looking forward to or
that they are worried about). The total number of events in each condition gives a
measure of anticipation of future positive and negative events (e.g. MacLeod, 1999).
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This task has been used in studies that have assessed future-directed thinking in
parasuicides. Results have shown that relative to controls, both depressed and non-
depressed parasuicides generate a smaller number of future positive events but a
comparable number of negative items (MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee & Mitchell, 1997a;
MacLeod, Rose & Williams, 1993; MacLeod, Tata, Evans, Tyrer, Schmidt,
Davidson, Thornton & Catalan, 1998). However, these findings have not been
replicated in a recent study that assessed future-directed thinking in parasuicides,
although the authors raise the possibility that this might be the result of their hospital
control group being admitted for serious physical problems as opposed to minor
physical complaints as in the studies reported above (O'Connor, Connery & Cheyne,
2000).
The same paradigm was used in a study with high anxiety and low depression (i.e.
anxious), high anxiety and high depression (i.e. mixed), and low anxiety and low
depression (i.e. controls) college students (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996). Results
showed that, relative to controls, anxious participants anticipated more negative
experiences, whereas, the mixed group showed both an increase in anticipated
negative experiences and a reduced anticipation of positive experiences. Comparable
results derive from a clinical study with anxious and depressed patients (MacLeod et
ah, 1997c). In this study anxious individuals generated more negative future events
but not fewer positive events, whilst depressed patients generated fewer future
positive events but not more negative events. Similar results have recently been
replicated in a study that used future-directed imagery (i.e. assessed speed, vividness
and detailedness of mental images formed following the presentation of positive and
negative future event cues) with a student sample (Stober, 2000). In particular,
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anxiety was correlated with enhanced imagery for negative future events, whilst
depression correlated only with reduced imagery for positive events.
Put together, these results suggest that when a PFT is used to assess prospective
cognitions anxiety is associated with an increase in negative expectancy, depression
is associated with a decrease of positive expectancy, and mixed anxiety depression is
associated with both an increase in negative anticipation and a lack of positive
anticipation.
4. 3. Summary and hypotheses.
The literature reviewed so far suggests that prospective cognitions in anxiety and
depression are characterised by distinctive mental processes that lead to an altered
perception of the likelihood of future events. Specific mechanisms have been
postulated that may guide individuals in their probability judgements about future
life events, namely, the availability heuristic (i.e. recall of relevant memories) and
the simulation heuristic (i.e. simulation of future possibilities). Evidence for the
validity of both these mental processes exists but research in anxiety and depression
has been inconclusive as to which processes and under which circumstances are used
to make specific predictions regarding future positive and negative events. Equally
inconclusive have been some research findings that have shown a depressive
increased expectancy for negative events and an anxiety reduced expectancy for
positive events. Different stimuli materials and procedures as well as the co¬
occurrence of anxiety and depression in the same individuals have been held
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responsible for these inconsistent findings. All of these are valid points and several
researchers have indicated very similar issues when investigating attentional and
mnemonic processes in anxiety and depression (e.g. McNally, 1995; Roediger &
McDermott, 1992; Sanz, 1996). However, another more general point that emerges
regards the methodology adopted in the research reported above. Experimental
studies have shown that when a SPJT is used to explore future-directed thinking,
both anxiety and depression are associated with higher probability judgements for
future negative events and lower probability judgements for positive events, although
findings for this last aspect are less conclusive. On the other hand, when a PFT is
employed, research has shown that depression is associated only with a reduction of
positive anticipation, anxiety is associated only with an increase in negative
anticipation, and (non-clinical) mixed anxiety depression is associated with both a
reduced anticipation for positive events and an increased anticipation for negative
events (see Figure 4. 1. below).
Without the need of much speculation, it would appear that the two tasks are
probably examining the same expectancy phenomenon from different angles, or at
least they are making use of separate mechanisms and tapping into distinct mental
processes that are utilised to make prediction in different ways.
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Figure 4. 1. 'Expectancy of future positive and negative life events in
depressed, anxious and mixed anxious depressed individuals,













The PFT, in the form described above, seems to produce a spurious measure of
expectancy and its result seems to reflect mainly a measure of hope and worry.
Subjects are instructed to report either future events that are known as being very
likely to happen (i.e. already planned) "...things that you know are going to

















you would enjoy if they happened..." (i.e. subject's hopes and wishes) or, in the
negative condition, "...things that you are not looking forward to, or things that you
worry about..." (i.e. subject's concerns and worries). Thus, depressed subjects show
a reduction in positive hopes (i.e. increased hopelessness) and anxious individuals
show an increase in negative worries. Compatible with this view are the results from
the factor analysis reported by MacLeod et al. (1996). As seen above, measures of
hopelessness and generation of positive events loaded both onto the PA factor,
whereas both measures of worry and generation of negative events loaded onto the
NA factor. If this was the case then subjects are more likely to use the availability
heuristic when reporting future life events that "they know" are going to happen, and
they would be more prone to use the simulation heuristic when imagining "all the
good things and the bad things that may be".
On the other hand, the SPJT is a more direct measure of expectancy, in that subjects
are requested to judge the probability that a given set of presented events will or will
not happen to them in the future. In this case subjects are likely to use a mixture of
the availability and simulation heuristics, that is, they might recall relevant memories
(if available) and then simulate the possibility that a particular event might happen
(or happen again) in the future. Another possibility is that participants might use a
"feeling heuristic" (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), which refers to a simplifying judgement
method. According to the authors, when making evaluative judgements, individuals
often do not use effortful analytic strategies, such as in this case recalling relevant
events and then make a summary of similar instances before making a judgement,
but rather use their momentary affective states in making judgments. In other words,
subjects will base their evaluative judgement on the answer they give to the question
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"How do I feel about this event?". Siemer and Reisenzein (1998) found that this type
of heuristic is more likely to be used under conditions of reduced processing
capacity, induced by time pressure and competing task demands, which tallies with
the findings reported above about depressed participants applying future-event
schemas automatically when making "yes/no" predictions about future events under
conditions of concurrent attentional load (Andersen & Limpert, 2001). According to
Forgas (1995; 1999) retrieval of relevant information (in this case availability
heuristic) will be more likely to occur when people engage in substantive and
elaborative processing, whereas the feeling heuristic will be used whenever subjects
are not motivated or able to engage in extensive processing and so simplify the task
by relying on limited information and using whatever shortcuts are available to them.
Consequently, conditions of personal motivation and processing capacity will be
influencing factors in the type of processing method an individual will adopt.
Therefore, the seemingly inconsistent results obtained in anxiety and depression
appear to be caused by a number of factors: overlap and co-occurrence of anxiety
and depression, different sample groups (clinical vs. non-clinical), utilisation of
different stimuli materials, employment of different tasks (SPJT vs. PFT), variations
of these tasks, and the resulting type/s of heuristic/s used by participants.
With the following experimental investigation we shall endeavour to overcome some
of the above limitations, first of which the overlap of anxiety and depression, since
this is the main focus of our research programme. As we have done in the previous
experiment on attention and memory, we will attempt to identify specific processing
patterns concerning prospective cognitions in three clinical groups of depressed,
anxious, and mixed anxious depressed outpatients. A question of interest is whether
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anxiety, depression and mixed anxiety depression are related differentially to altered
expectancies for future positive and negative events. It is expected that the mixed
group will show a distinct profile compared to the other two clinical groups as well
as a control group, and that patterns in results for the four groups may change as a
consequence of a different methodology being employed to measure prospective
cognitions.
In the present study two experiments will be carried out each employing a different
task, namely PFT and SPJT. This procedure will allow us to carry out a direct
comparison between the two methods and to test the hypothesis that in the same
clinical and control groups different results about seemingly identical mental
processes can be yielded depending on the experimental task used.
The first experiment will make use of an extended and modified version of the PFT.
As for the canonical version of this task, participants will be asked to generate
positive and negative possible personal future life events. However, following the
generation task, participants will also be asked to give probability ratings for each of
the self-generated events to indicate how likely those events are to happen in the
future on a 10-point Likert scale. This will provide us with two measures: an
"availability" measure (i.e. the number of life events generated under each
condition), and a probability judgement measure (i.e. subjective estimates of the
likelihood that each event generated will happen). Previously, MacLeod et al. (1998)
have asked probability judgements of generated events to a group of high-risk
parasuicides, but these were used to obtain composite scores of number of generated
events, probability judgements and pleasure ratings for the same events. In contrast,
we shall treat each measure as separate. The PFT will also be slightly modified in
171
order to make it a simpler and more unified task. Specifically, instead of providing
participants with three different timeframes (i.e. the next week, including today; the
next year; the next 5 to 10 years) and assigning 1 minute for the completion of each
sub-condition, a single timeframe (i.e. next year) will be used with a time limit of 3
minutes to complete each condition. Previous research has shown that no difference
is found in the number of events generated in the three timeframes (e.g. MacLeod et
ah, 1997a; 1998; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996), so in order to simplify the task and
render it less fragmented and repetitive, "the next year" timeframe was chosen here
as a "round and whole" time unit.
Consistent with previous literature (summarised in Figure 4. 1.) it was hypothesised
that compared to the control group:
a) the depressed group would generate less positive future events but an equal
number of negative events;
b) the anxious group would generate more negative future events but an equal
number of positive events;
c) the mixed group would generate both more negative future events and less
positive events (although these results have previously been found only in a high
anxiety and high depression non-clinical student group, therefore the present
study represents an extension of this paradigm to a clinical sample).
As for the probability judgement measure the hypotheses are more tentative in that
the literature reviewed reports results of probability judgements only when a SPJT
was employed and (apparently) only with "purely" depressed or "purely" anxious
groups. Therefore, it was cautiously expected that both depressed and anxious groups
would judge negative events as being more likely to happen. No specific hypothesis
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was formulated regarding the probability judgements of positive events since the
literature presents contrasting results. Similarly, although one might expect a higher
future expectancy for negative events and a lower expectancy for positive events in
the mixed group, any explicit hypothesis would be rather provisional since no
previous study has investigated subjective probability judgements on a PFT in a
clinical mixed anxious depressed group.
The second experiment will make use of an extended and modified version of the
SPJT. Participants will be presented with sets of positive and negative sentences
expressing possible future life events and will be requested to make subjective
probability judgements on a 10-point Likert scale regarding the likelihood that each
event will happen to them in the next year. However, since this paradigm gives us the
opportunity to experimentally manipulate the materials presented, negative stimuli
will be distinguished for their relevance to either anxiety or to depression, which
allows for the content-specificity hypothesis to be also tested. Moreover, emotional
priming will be introduced to investigate the potentially interacting effect of different
types of information received prior to the production of future self-relevant
expectancies. Using the emotional priming paradigm with clinically depressed
subjects, Power et al. (1996) have demonstrated that "key decisions in relation to the
self-concept are influenced moment-to-moment by small but significant changes in
the emotional valence of relevant input". In the present experiment emotional
positive (i.e. happy), emotional negative (i.e. sad and fearful), and neutral faces will
be used both subliminally and supraliminally to examine possible emotional priming
effects occurring at pre-attentive and attentional levels of information processing.
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Finally, response latencies for each probability judgement in each of the
experimental conditions will be also recorded.
In accordance with the theoretical background set in this and in previous Chapters it
was hypothesised that compared to the control group:
a) the depressed group would show an increased negative (depression relevant)
expectancy (mediated by the NA component) and reduced positive expectancy
(PA component);
b) the anxious group would show only an increased negative (anxiety relevant)
expectancy (NA + PH components);
c) the mixed group would show both an increased negative (depression and anxiety
relevant) expectancy (NA + PH components) and reduced positive expectancy
(PA component). This last hypothesis is entirely based on theoretical grounds
since no known study to date has investigated prospective cognitions in a mixed
anxious depressed group using the SPJT.
Moreover, distinctive emotional priming effects and response latencies on the SPJT
are expected to be found in the four groups depending on the priming condition
(subliminal vs. supraliminal) and prime type (sad, fearful, happy, neutral).
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4. 4. Experiment I: the personal future task (PFT).
4. 4. 1. Method.
4. 4. 1. 1. Experimental design.
The experimental design consisted of a mixed factorial design (2 x 4). There was one
within-subjects variable - Event (2: positive, negative) - and one between-subjects
variable - Group (4: depressed, anxious, mixed, control). The dependent variables
were the number of events generated and future probability judgements for each of
the two conditions.
4. 4. 1. 2. Participants.
There were four groups of participants: depressed, anxious, mixed anxious depressed
and normal control. All subjects were between 18 and 55 years old. The depressed,
anxious and mixed groups were recruited from the outpatient waiting list of the
Psychology Department, Royal Edinburgh Hospital. The waiting list was screened at
regular intervals and a total of 228 outpatients were identified as possible cases on
the basis of the referrers' letters. These were contacted and invited to take part in this
study. Of the original 228 outpatients, 50 attended the research session who also met
inclusion criteria for this study. Another 11 outpatients did not meet inclusion
criteria. The inclusion/exclusion criteria for these three clinical groups have been
articulated in detail in Chapter 1 (Sections 1. 2. 2. and 1. 3. 2.) and Chapter 2
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(Section 2. 4. 1.). In brief, depressed outpatients met diagnostic criteria for either a
Major Depressive Episode and/or Dysthymic Disorder; anxious outpatients met
diagnostic criteria for GAD with or without a concomitant diagnosis of Panic
Disorder, Agoraphobia or Social Phobia; and the mixed anxious depressed
outpatients met either the DSM-IV-TR research criteria for sub-threshold MAD (see
Chapter 2, Table 2. 1.) or full criteria for both an anxiety and a depressive disorder as
described in Chapter 1.
The depressed group (n = 15) included 2 outpatients with major depression (MD); 2
with MD and dysthymic disorder (DD); 3 with MD and sub-threshold GAD; 1 with
MD and sub-threshold GAD and social phobia (SP); 2 with MD, DD and sub¬
threshold GAD; 2 with MD, DD and sub-threshold GAD and SP; 2 with MD, DD
and sub-threshold GAD and panic disorder (PD); and 1 with MD, DD and sub¬
threshold PD and OCD.
The anxious group (« = 15) included: 6 outpatients with GAD; 1 with GAD and SP;
1 with GAD, SP and sub-threshold PD; 1 with GAD and PD with agoraphobia (AP);
1 with GAD and sub-threshold PD with AP; 1 with GAD, PD with AP and sub¬
threshold OCD; 1 with GAD, PD and sub-threshold OCD; 1 with GAD, AP and sub¬
threshold PD; 1 with GAD and sub-threshold DD; and 1 with GAD, PD, SP and sub¬
threshold MD.
At this point it is noticeable that only 2 anxious outpatients had concurrent sub¬
threshold depressive symptoms, against 11 depressed outpatients with simultaneous
sub-threshold anxiety symptoms. This, although on a small scale, reflects well one of
the features of overlap, namely that it is far more common to encounter a "pure" case
of anxiety than it is to come across a "pure" case of depression.
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The mixed group (n = 20) included: 4 outpatients with MD and GAD; 2 with MD,
DD and GAD; 3 with MD, GAD and PD with AP; 1 with MD, DD, GAD, PD with
AP and SP; 1 with MD, GAD, PD with AP and SP; 1 with MD, DD, GAD and PD; 1
with MD, DD, GAD and SP; 1 with MD, DD, GAD, SP and AP; 1 with MD, PD
with AP and SP; 1 with MD, GAD, PD with AP, SP and OCD; 1 with MD, GAD and
sub-threshold SP; 1 with DD, GAD and sub-threshold MD and PD; 1 with MD, DD,
GAD and sub-threshold PD; and 1 with mixed anxiety depressive disorder (MAD,
sub-threshold).
Three more points worth of note are: a) the common overlap between MD and DD
both in the depressed and the mixed groups; b) the frequent overlap among the
anxiety disorders in the anxious and mixed groups; c) the widespread overlap
between anxiety and depression in the depressed and mixed groups with GAD being
the anxiety disorder more frequently associated with depression.
The control group consisted of 20 participants with no known history of (or current)
emotional disorder who were matched to the other three groups for age and gender.
These included university and hospital employees and students, and acquaintances.
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4. 4. 1. 3. Apparatus and materials.
Questionnaires. The following self-report questionnaires were used and
administered in the given order (see Appendix 2.).
Measures of symptoms severity:
• Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996). This is
probably the most widely used instrument utilised to evaluate the severity of
depressive symptoms in adults. In this version, it consists of 21 self-report items
developed to assess symptoms corresponding to the DSM-IV criteria for major
depressive disorder.
• State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983). This is a very
common instrument used both in clinical practice and research to state and trait
anxiety as defined in Chapter 1. In its "Form Y" used in this research, it consists
of two separate self-report scales. The state anxiety scale contains 20 statements
that assess how the respondent feels "right now, at this moment". The trait
anxiety scale is composed of 20 items that evaluate how the respondent
"generally feels".
• Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson et ah, 1995a;
1995b). This instrument has been described in details in Chapter 2. It is a 90-item
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self-report measure that has been specifically developed to distinguish between
common and specific symptoms of anxiety and depression.
Measures of cognitive attitudes:
• Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, Weissman, Lester & Trexler, 1974). This
is a scale designed to quantify hopelessness. It consists of 20 true-false items that
measure the generalised negative expectancy about one's own future.
• Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger & Borkovec,
1990). This is a 16-item self-report scale assessing trait worry.
• Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Power, Katz, McGuffin, Duggan, Lam &
Beck, 1994). In its 24-item version used in this study, this scale is used to assess
the global level of dysfunctional attitudes and content-specificity dysfunctionality
in relation to its three sub-scales of Achievement, Dependency and Self-Control.
• Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965). This is a 10-item
measure global self-esteem. Each item is scored on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from -2 (Disagree strongly) to +2 (Strongly agree), so that the maximum
negative (or lowest) self-esteem score is -20 and the maximum positive (or
highest) self-esteem score is +20.
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Measure of emotions:
• Basic Emotions Scale (BES; Power, submitted). This is a newly constructed scale
that measures current state (i.e. during the last week) and trait (i.e. in general)
experience of the basic emotions (anger, sadness, disgust, fear and happiness), as
well as the impact and coping methods used with each emotion. Each part of the
scale contains 30 items: the five basic emotions and an additional five emotion
terms related to each of the basic emotions drawn from linguistic analyses of
Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989).
Experimental tasks. The following tasks were employed in this study in the given
order.
Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (MHVS; Raven, 1965). This is a standardised vocabulary
task used to provide an index of the general level of education a person has attained.
The "Form I Senior" used in this study consists of 33 multiple choice vocabulary
items (see Appendix 3.). Thirty-three words, increasing in difficulty, are presented.
Under each word are placed groups of six words. The subject's task is to underline
the word among the six which is a synonym of the word above.
Verbal Fluency Task (FAS-Test; e.g. Lezak, 1995). This is a common
neuropsychological task used to test the spontaneous production of words beginning
with a given letter. In this study the most commonly used letters F, A, and S were
used and subjects were given 1 minute to produce as many words they could think of
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beginning with each letter. The score is the sum of all admissible words for the three
letters. Inadmissible words are proper nouns, wrong words, variations and
repetitions, and these are not counted as correct.
Personal Future Task (PFT; e.g. MacLeod et al., 1993). This task is modelled on the
FAS-Test and has been described in detail above. As already mentioned, in this study
a modified and extended version of the PFT was especially devised. Participants
were asked to generate as many personal future events as possible and to provide the
experimenter with a brief description of each event. There were two conditions:
positive and negative. In the positive condition participants were instructed to:
"Think about positive things happening to you in the next 12 months (next year)
starting from today. Future positive experiences, things you are looking forward to,
things that you would enjoy. These can be trivial or important things, and they can be
things that you know are going to happen or things that you think may reasonably
happen. Try to think of as many positive things as you can, until I tell you to stop."
Likewise, in the negative condition participants were instructed to:
"Think about negative things happening to you in the next 12 months (next year)
starting from today. Future negative experiences, things you are not looking forward
to, things that you worry about. These can be trivial or important things, and they can
be things that you know are going to happen or things that you think may reasonably
happen. Try to think of as many negative things as you can, until I tell you to stop."
The time limit for each condition was set to 3 minutes and, after each condition,
participants were asked to rate each generated event on a 10-point Likert scale (1 = It
will not happen, 10 = It will definitely happen) for probability that those events
would or would not happen to them in the next year.
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An audiocassette recorder was used to record the FAS-Test and the PFT as well as a
stopwatch in order to measure the time limit accurately.
4. 4. 1. 4. Procedure.
Participants were tested in individual sessions. Upon arrival participants were given
the opportunity to ask questions about the research study and for the outpatients to
ask questions regarding their future psychological treatment. Then, after a consent
form was signed, participants were administered the self-report measures described
above. These were given one at the time and in the same order, and the experimenter
rephrased the instructions of each questionnaire in order to ensure that participants
were clear about the correct way to fill them in. Afterwards, the three experimental
tasks were executed in the order given above. The MF1VS was administered in its
"paper-and-pencil" form. Participants were asked to chose and underline a word for
each of the 33 items. They were encouraged to answer each item even though they
were unsure of what the correct answer was, as it was emphasised that it did not
matter if their answers were right or wrong. The FAS-Test was then used to assess
verbal fluency levels. The three letters, F, A, and S were given one at a time and in
the same order for 1 minute each, and responses were recorded both manually, by the
experimenter, and with an audiotape recorder, so that participants could produce
words as fast as they could without having to wait for the manual transcription.
These first two tasks served as control tasks and they were used here to control for
potential differences in the level of education (MFIVS) and verbal fluency (FAS-
Test) among the groups, as these would inevitably affect results in the PFT.
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Finally, the PFT as described above was administered in counterbalanced order, so
that half of the subjects in each group received the positive condition first followed
by the negative condition and the other half was given the two conditions in the
reverse order.
At this point, the tasks used for Experiment II were employed with the same
participants, but these will be described later on in this Chapter for the sake of
clarity.
In the end, participants were debriefed and the Structured Clinical Interview for
DSM-IV Axis I Disorders - Research Version (SCID-I; First et al., 1996) was used
to ascertain the participants' diagnostic clinical status.
4. 4. 2. Results.
4. 4. 2. 1. Subject characteristics.
The four groups did not differ significantly in age or gender ratio (see Table 4. 1.
below). In general, the control group obtained significantly lower scores than the
three clinical groups on all the clinical self-report measures (i.e. BDI-II, STAI,
MASQ, BHS, PSWQ, DAS, Self-Esteem, and BES), except for the DAS-Self-
Control subscale where no group differences were found, and the subscale
"Happiness" (trait and state) of the BES where, as expected, controls gained higher
scores. Overall, as expected, the mixed group appears to be the most severely
affected of the three clinical groups due to the co-presence (above-threshold) of at
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At the other end of the clinical spectrum the anxious group reported the least
emotional disturbance (although still significantly higher relative to the control
group), reflecting the lower degree of overlap with depression, and the depressed
group lay somewhere in between the two.
Of interest are the scores obtained by the three clinical groups on the specific anxiety
or depression subscales (see Table 4. 1.). The mixed group scored significantly
higher that the depressed group on the specific anxiety MASQ subscale AA
(Anxious Arousal), with an intermediate score reported by the anxious group who
did not differ significantly form either of them. The other specific MASQ subscale
AD (Anhedonic Depression) revealed significantly higher scores for the depressed
and mixed groups compared to the anxious participants. Similarly, the depressed and
mixed groups obtained higher scores on the N-SD (Non-Specific Depression) MASQ
subscale, BDI-II, BHS, "Sadness" BES subscale (state and trait) and lower self-
esteem compared to the anxious group. On the other hand, the mixed and depressed
participants reported also higher levels of trait anxiety compared to the anxious
group, but it was the mixed outpatients who showed higher anxiety levels overall,
scoring higher then the other two groups on state anxiety and N-SA (Non-Specific
Anxiety) on MASQ.
Thus, self-report measures confirm the picture emerged from the definition of the
groups following the structured clinical interviews. We have been able to identify
and allocate outpatients to three relatively distinct clinical groups: a) a fairly "pure"
anxious group, which shows moderate levels of depression but secondary to the
anxiety disorder as revealed by both the clinical interview and the relative specificity
exhibited on the self-report measures; b) a depressed group that shows higher levels
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of overlap (as expected) than the ones seen in the anxious group as revealed by the
scores obtained on the self-report measures and the clinical interview, but who still
maintains depression as its clinical predominance; c) a mixed group that shares
similar or higher levels of depression compared to the depressed and anxious groups
and also shows as high as or higher levels of anxiety compared to the other to clinical
groups. Again, as seen in the previous experimental investigation, results from self-
report measures show a comorbid additive effect of mixed anxiety depression in
terms of symptoms severity. However, these findings are hardly surprising given the
fact that the mixed group is the only one of the three clinical groups to meet DSM-
IV-TR supra-threshold inclusion criteria for at least one mood and one anxiety
disorder. The symptomatic or diagnostic level of analysis is, however, rather limited
and superficial and we shall try to provide also evidence of qualitative differences
among the groups of participants as measured by their performance on the cognitive
tasks described below.
No significant differences among the four groups were found on the vocabulary and
verbal fluency tasks which indicates that we do not need to control for these factors
as they are not likely to have any significant effect on the subjects' performance on
the main experimental task.
4. 4. 2. 2. Personal future task (PFT).
A summary of the main PFT results (mean and standard deviation) of generation and
probability judgement of future positive and negative events for the four groups is
reported below on Table 4. 2.
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Table 4. 2. PFT. Mean number of generated events and mean probability
judgements for each group in the positive and negative
conditions. (Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Group
Depressed Anxious Mixed Control
Events generated
Positive 7.27 (3.43) 9.33 (3.06) 7.95 (3.76) 11.30 (3.56)
Negative 9.27(3.31) 7.73 (2.58) 9.75 (3.88) 8.40 (4.22)
Probability Judgements
Positive 5.82 (1.88) 7.46 (1.22) 6.27(1.54) 7.68 (1.65)
Negative 5.87 (1.40) 4.90(1.19) 6.41 (1.78) 4.51 (2.07)
The results of a 2 x 4 ANOVA with Event (number of positive vs. negative events
generated) as a within-subjects factor and Group (depressed, anxious, mixed, and
control) as a between-subjects factor showed a significant interaction of Event x
Group F(3,66) = 9.00, p < 0.001 (see Figure 4. 2. below). Separate one-way
ANOVAs were therefore calculated for positive and negative events to examine the
source of the interaction. Contrary to predictions, between-group analyses showed no
significant differences in the number of negative events generated by the four groups
F(3,66) = 1.05, ns. However, a significant main effect of Event was found for the
positive events F(3,66) = 4.76, p < 0.01, with Scheffe's post hoc analyses indicating
that both depressed and mixed groups generated fewer future positive events
compared to controls as hypothesised (p < 0.05). Within-group analyses revealed that
both the anxious and control groups generated more positive than negative future
events t(14) = 2.60,/? < .05 and t(19) = 3.81,/? < .001 respectively; the mixed group
generated more negative than positive future events /(19) = 2.17,/? < .01, whereas the
depressed group only showed a non-significant trend towards the same direction with
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the generation of fewer positive compared to negative future events t(14) = 1.87, p <
.08.
Figure 4. 2. PFT. Mean number of positive vs. negative events generated by
each group.
Group
A small number of outpatients (1 depressed, 3 anxious, and 4 mixed) did not
complete the probability judgments on the PFT so that for this part of the analyses
the number of subjects for the four groups is as follows: depressed (« = 14), anxious
(n = 12), mixed (n — 16) and controls (n = 20). In order to assess the patterns of
probability judgements in the four groups another 2x4 ANOVA was run with
Probability (judgement of positive vs. negative future events) as a within-subjects
factor and Group (depressed, anxious, mixed, and control) as a between-subjects
factor. Results indicated the presence of a significant main effect of Probability
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F(l,58) = 26.22, p < 0.001 and a more interesting significant interaction of
Probability x Group F(3,58) = 11.10, p < 0.001 (see Figure 4. 3. below).
Figure 4. 3. PFT. Mean probability judgements of generated positive vs.
negative events for each group.
Group
Between-group analyses showed a main effect Probability in the positive condition
F(3,58) = 4.98, p < 0.01 with Scheffe's post hoc analyses revealing that the
depressed group estimated positive events as being less likely to happen compared to
the control group {p < 0.05). Similarly, a significant main effect of Probability was
also found in the negative condition F(3,58) = 4.34, p < 0.01, but this time post hoc
analyses indicated that the mixed group reported negative events as being more
likely to happen relative to controls {p < 0.05). Results from the within-group
analyses showed that both depressed and mixed groups estimated the likelihood of
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future positive and negative generated events as equal t(13) = 0.08, ns and ?(15) =
0.24, ns, respectively. On the other hand, both anxious and control participants
indicated that positive events were more likely to happen than negative ones t(l 1) =
5.65, p < .001 and t(19) = 7.37, p < .001, respectively.
4. 4. 3. Discussion.
All together, the performance of the four groups on the PFT shows a mixture of
expected and novel findings. The first part of the PFT relating to the generation of
future positive and negative personal life events confirms only in part some of the
previous literature on prospective cognitions. As predicted, participants in the
depressed group generated a fewer number of future positive events, but not a higher
number of negative events compared to the control group. This result replicates a
general finding of several previous studies carried out with depressed and non-
depressed parasuicides (MacLeod et ah, 1993; 1997a; 1998), with depressed patients
(MacLeod et ah, 1997c), and with dysphoric high depression students (MacLeod &
Byrne, 1996; Stober, 2000). The replication of this well-established finding also
suggests that the modification brought to the task (i.e. probe for a single timeframe
but for a longer duration) is a legitimate amendment and it does not alter the
construct validity of the PFT. Conversely, results did not confirm previous findings
regarding the association between anxiety and the generation of a larger number of
future negative events. In this study anxious participants did not differ significantly
from the control (but also depressed and mixed) group in the number of generated
negative events. In fact, Table 4. 2. shows that the anxious group reported relatively
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less negative events than the other three groups. Two previous studies that have used
the PFT have found a positive relationship between anxiety and generation of
negative events. One of them (MacLeod & Byrne, 1996) was carried out with a non¬
clinical sample of high anxiety students, and the second one (MacLeod et al., 1997c)
included only panic disorder patients in their anxious group. Therefore, if on the one
side our results may conceivably differ from results obtained in a non-clinical
sample, on the other side the apparent inconsistency with MacLeod et al.'s (1997c)
clinical finding may be due to the discrepancy in the sample characteristics.
Specifically, MacLeod et al. (1997c) excluded one GAD participant from their
anxious group to maintain group homogeneity (all PD patients). In contrast, GAD
outpatients, only four of whom met also full DSM-IV-TR criteria for panic disorder,
formed our group. Consequently, it is possible that an increased generation of future
negative events may be a peculiarity of panic disorder in the same way that only
panic disorder patients have been found to show an explicit memory bias for mood-
congruent materials (e.g. Becker et al., 1994; 1999; Cloitre & Liebowitz, 1991;
Cloitre et al., 1994; McNally et al., 1989), but not other anxiety groups. In line with
previous literature on attention and memory biases reviewed in Chapter 3, it is
proposed that our anxious sample showed a higher level of avoidance compared to
the non-clinical sample in MacLeod and Byrne (1996) and to the panic disorder
sample in MacLeod et al. (1997c), or that simply there is no evidence of negative
generation bias in a predominantly GAD sample. This might be a sign that, as
suggested above, the availability heuristic and the simulation heuristic may both be
involved in the generation of possible future events, in order to generate planned
events and events the individual hopes for or dreads respectively. Given that only
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panic disorder patients seem to have a facilitated recall of threat-related information,
it is plausible that the basis for the availability heuristics (i.e. recall of relevant
events) may have been missing. Alternatively, we may be witnessing a case of
"vigilance-avoidance" strategy (i.e. initial shift of attention and subsequent
disengagement and avoidance) associated only with clinical levels of anxiety (e.g.
Mogg & Bradley, 1999a). If this was the case, then the basis for the simulation
heuristics (i.e. simulation of future possibilities, a process that requires sustained
attention) may have been missing instead.
Table 4. 2. shows that the mixed group generated a slightly higher number of
negative events compared to the other three groups, but not enough to reach
significance levels. In contrast, this clinical group did report fewer positive events
relative to controls, as hypothesised. The only other experimental investigation that
has looked at future-directed thinking in a mixed group using the PFT found both an
increase in negative expectancy and a decrease in positive expectancy (MacLeod &
Byrne, 1996). However, as mentioned above the authors used a dysphoric sample of
high anxiety and high depression students, therefore once again it is possible that an
increase in negative expectancy may be a feature of non-clinical MAD but not of
clinical levels of mixed anxiety depression. Thus, the current study represents an
extension of the use of this paradigm to a clinical mixed sample.
Another important extension regards the introduction of a measure of probability
judgements in connection with the self-generated life events. Participants were asked
to rate each of the generated events on a 10-point scale to test the extent to which
they believed that the events reported would actually happen within the same
timeframe. Therefore, while the first measure (i.e. generation of events) may
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represent an evaluation of personal expectancy in terms of hopes and worries, this
second measure (i.e. probability judgements) may reflect a more "rational"
judgement driven by cognition and not merely by affectivity. Although it might be
argued that the mechanisms involved in such exercise may be similar to the ones
implicated in the SPJT (assessed in Experiment II), it was expected that PFT
probability judgements would yield different findings as a result of the idiosyncratic
self-reference that only personally generated life events can possess. For this reason
only tentative hypotheses, "borrowed" and deducted from SPJT literature, were
formulated with regards to the expected probability judgements in the four groups. In
line with this prediction, our results confirmed the hypotheses provisionally put
forward only in part. In the negative condition, the mixed group gave significantly
higher probability judgements for self-generated events relative to the control group,
whereas in the positive condition, the depressed group judged the likelihood that
generated positive events might actually happen as significantly lower to the one
reported by controls. However, in the depressed and mixed groups there is no
correspondence between generation of positive and negative events and probability
judgements of the same events. In fact, within-group analyses showed that the
depressed and mixed participants gave equivalent ratings to both negative and
positive events (see Figure 4. 3.). These findings suggest that what one hopes for or
worries about does not necessarily correspond to what is actually expected to happen
(cf. Garcia-Marques & Hamilton, 1996). In fact, although depressed and mixed
outpatients hold a bleaker view of the future, in that they can think of more bad than
good things, when making judgements at a more "rational" level they appear to show
a more fair-minded attitude in that the probability that positive and negative events
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might happen is deemed to be equal. Consequently, as proposed above, participants
are likely to use different mechanisms in the two parts of the task. They are more
likely to use the simulation heuristic in the generation ofpossible life events, but they
are more likely to use the availability heuristic when having to give ratings to
"materialised" hopes and worries in a more controlled fashion.
On the other hand, anxious and control groups estimated the likelihood that positive
events might happen as significantly higher than the probability that negative self-
referent events may occur. Once again these findings seem to go in the opposite
direction to what was expected in the anxious group, and support the view that
anxious participants might be using cognitive avoidance as a means of mood-
regulation (e.g. Bonanno, 2001; Thompson, 1994). However, failure to replicate the
association between anxiety and high negative expectancy in this second part of the
task might well be due to differences in construct validity between the PFT
probability judgements and the SPJT ratings, in that they might be tapping into
distinct mental processes.
Generally speaking, the depressed and mixed groups behaved similarly and so did
the anxious and the control groups. Specifically, both the depressed and the mixed
groups generated more negative than positive events, but judged the likelihood of
them happening as equal, whereas the anxious and control groups generated more
positive than negative vents, and rated the former as more likely to happen.
However, there are differences between depressed and mixed participants both in the
number of events generated and their probability judgements. The mixed group
generated significantly less positive than negative future events, whereas for the
depressed participants this within-group difference reflected only a non-significant
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trend. In the probability judgement measure, the two groups differed in their relation
to the control group, namely the depressed group had lower expectancy for positive
events, whereas the mixed group reported higher expectancy for negative events
relative to controls. On the other hand, the similarities between the anxious and
control groups are to be minimised by two important factors. First, the performance
of the anxious group could not be distinguished statistically from the performance of
the other two clinical groups. Secondly, the mechanisms or mental processes behind
the anxious participants' behaviour in these future-oriented tasks are likely to differ
from those of the control group's because of their clinical status and the use of
avoidance strategy.
To conclude, this experiment extends the use of the PFT to a clinical mixed anxious
depressed group and presents a direct group comparison with anxious or depressed
only and control participants. Moreover, with the extension of the PFT to include
probability judgements we were able to explore the differential involvement of
mechanisms and processes in the different phases of the task. Similarities and
differences have emerged among the groups that emphasise once again the
importance of distinguishing between common and unique components of anxiety
and depression when examining cognitive patterns in the three clinical groups.
These, so far distinct, profiles will be investigated further in the next experiment,
where the same groups will be compared on a different measure of future-directed
thinking: the subjective probability judgement task.
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4. 5. Experiment II: the subjective probability judgement task (SPJT).
The main purpose of this second experiment was to examine the role of content-
specificity and of pre-attentive/attentional emotional priming on future-directed
thinking. It also provided a direct task comparison (with the PFT) ofmechanisms and
processes involved in prospective cognitions in anxiety, depression and mixed
anxiety depression relative to a normal control sample.
4. 5. 1. Method.
4. 5. 1. 1. Experimental design.
The experimental design consisted of a mixed factorial design (3x4x2x4). There
were three within-subjects variables - Event (3: depression relevant, anxiety
relevant, positive); Prime (4: sad, fear, happy, neutral); Condition (2: subliminal,
supraliminal) - and one between-subjects variable - Group (4: depressed, anxious,
mixed, control). The dependent variables were the future probability judgements and
the reaction times for each of the twenty-four conditions.
4. 5. 1. 2. Participants.
The same participants who took part in Experiment I composed also the four
experimental groups for the current experiment. Elence, we had a depressed group (n
= 15), an anxious group (n = 15), a mixed anxious depressed group {n = 20), and a
199
control group (n = 20). Details of the outpatients' clinical status and the control
participants can be found earlier in this Chapter (Section 4. 4. 1. 2.).
4. 5. 1. 3. Apparatus and materials.
Questionnaires. Since Experiment I and II took place during a single experimental
session, the same self-report questionnaires were used to gain measures of symptoms
severity and cognitive attitudes (see Appendix 2.). To recapitulate the following
instruments were administered in the given order: Beck Depression Inventory-II
(BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996); State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al.,
1983); Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson et al., 1995a;
1995b); Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck et al., 1974); Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et al., 1990); Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS;
Power et al., 1994); Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965); Basic
Emotions Scale (BES; Power, submitted).
Experimental tasks. Apart from the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale (MHVS; Raven,
1965) described above (see Appendix 3.), which was used as a control task for both
Experiment I and II, the following tasks were employed in the present study in the
given order.
Subject-Paced Reading Task (SPRT; e.g. Mitchell, 1984). This is a task designed to
record participants' reading times. Subjects are presented with a brief passage that
appears at the centre of a computer screen one sentence at the time and are instructed
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to press a keyboard key (the "+" sign on the numeric pad) as soon as they have read
(silently) each sentence to move onto the next one, and to continue to do so until the
end of the passage. Each "+" keystroke is used to record individual reaction times for
each of the passage's sentences. The final reading speed for each subject is given by
the average of all the reading times recorded during the task. The passage used in this
experiment was a brief extract from tourist information material describing the city
of Edinburgh (see Appendix 4.) and was composed of 110 words divided into 15
short sentences. In this study, the SPRT was compiled by using the experiment
generator package MEL (Micro Experimental Laboratory) Professional Version 2.01
(Schneider, 1995).
Subjective Probability Judgement Task (SPJT; e.g. MacLeod et al., 1996). An outline
of this task has already been given above. In its original version, it consists in
presenting participants with a number of future oriented positive and/or negative
sentences expressing possible life events, and by asking subjects to indicate the
likelihood that those events might happen to them in the future (typically within a
certain timeframe) by using a Likert-type scale. In this study the SPJT has been
modified in several ways. Firstly, we distinguished among three types of event
stimuli: depression relevant, anxiety relevant, and positive future events. A
considerable number of possible future events were pooled together using materials
developed in previous published experimental studies (e.g. MacLeod et ah, 1991;
1996; Power & Brewin, 1990; Power et ah, 1996) and appositely constructing future
life events that would potentially satisfy the specificity requirements necessary for
the present investigation. Five independent clinical psychologists then judged all of
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the available events along three 7-point scales (1 = not at all; 7 = extremely):
depression relevant, anxiety relevant, and positive.
A number of events were discarded because they were not discriminative enough
between anxiety and depression. For example, sentences such as "You will lose your
job" or "You will be evicted" relate equally well to anxiety and depression, since the
unfortunate protagonist of such life events would have to cope with an important loss
and address the consequences of an uncertain future at the same time. This shows
two important points: a) the overlap of anxiety and depression can partially be
accounted for by the intrinsic overlapping nature of many adverse life events; b) the
resulting difficulty in trying to disentangle the two dimensions and the importance of
an appropriate selection of stimuli materials in anxiety and depression research.
Consequently, following the independent judges' ratings we were able to identify 72
(24 of each type) sentences descriptive of depression relevant, anxiety relevant, and
positive life events. In order to make the three sets equivalent in terms of life
domains covered, each set of 24 events contained 5 work / financial related events, 5
social / relationships events, and 10 self / personal events (see Table 4. 3. below).
The depression relevant events set included life events that gained a mean value of 6
or above in the depression scale, 4.40 or less in the anxiety scale, and 1.40 or less in
the positive scale. Similarly, the anxiety relevant events set included life events that
had mean ratings of > 6 in the anxiety scale, < 4.40 in the depression scale, and <
1.40 in the positive scale (except one event "You will be asked to perform a difficult
task" obtained a mean positive rating of 3.40, but this was still deemed to be an
acceptable value since it fell below the mid point of the scale). Finally, positive
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events included sentences that were judged low in the depression (< 2.20) and
anxiety (< 2.40) scales and high (> 6.20) on the positive scale.
Table 4. 3. List of events and mean descriptive values for each set.
Depression relevant events
Work / Financial 1. You will fail to get the job you want.
2. Your work won't be valued.
3. You will feel isolated at work.
4. You won't receive a promotion you worked for.
5. You will ruin a prized possession.
Social / Relationships 6. A close friend will move away.
7. Your best friend will die.
8. A steady relationship will end.
9. People will think you are a failure.
10.You will have a serious disagreement with a good friend.
Self / Personal 11 .You will feel inferior.
12.You will feel rejected.
13.You will be disappointed.
14.You will become tired and lethargic.
15.You will be very lonely.
16.Things won't work out as you had hoped.
17.You will regret a major decision.
18.You will lose something very important.
19.All your efforts will be worthless.
20.You will be let down.
21.You will always be unlucky.
22.You will fail to achieve an important goal.
23 .Your days will be dull and gloomy.







power (Dep - Anx)
Frequency Length
6.68 3.50 1.08 3.18 3716 8.88
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Table 4. 3. List of events and mean descriptive values for each set
(continued /).
Anxiety relevant events
Work / Financial 1. Your job will be under threat.
2. You won't be able to keep up with work.
3. You will feel under pressure.
4. Your house will be broken in to.
5. You will worry about possible financial problems.
Social / Relationships 6. You will appear stupid.
7. An accident will occur to a loved one.
8. People will act hostile towards you.
9. Everyone will notice how anxious you are.
10.You will be unable to express yourself in social
situations.
Self / Personal 11 .You will be nervous.
12.You will be afraid.
13.You will feel out of control.
14.Your life will be in danger.
15.You will be mugged.
16.You will have a serious accident.
17.You will be asked to perform a difficult task.
18.You will be followed by a stranger at night.
19.You won't have enough time to meet urgent deadlines.
20.You won't be able to handle an emergency situation.
21.You will witness a car crash.
22.You will be waiting for the test results of a suspected
serious illness.
23.You will receive threatening phone calls.







power (Dep - Anx)
Frequency Length
3.48 6.65 1.16 3.18 3866.75 9.96
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Table 4. 3. List of events and mean descriptive values for each set
(continued ii).
Positive events
Work / Financial 1. You will get a good job.
2. You will do well in your work.
3. Your work will be praised.
4. You will have a pay rise.
5. You will win an unexpected prize.
Social / Relationships 6. You will have good times with friends.
7. Someone close will recover from illness.
8. Things will go well with your partner.
9. You will get on well with your family.
10.You will make a new good friend.
Self / Personal 1 l.You will feel happy.
12.You will feel confident.
13.You will be fit and healthy.
14.You will be enthusiastic about things.
15.You will be pleased with yourself.
16.You will achieve a lifelong goal.
17.You will have lots of interesting things to do.
18.You will have a good birthday party.
19.You will receive a very good present from a friend.
20.You will be able to relax and enjoy your weekends.
21.Luck will be on your side.
22.You will receive a compliment.
23.You will have a nice holiday.







power (Dep - Anx)
Frequency Length
1.23 1.27 6.68 N/A 3989.33 8.88
205
Moreover, the three sets of events were also matched for length and frequency
according to Francis and Kucera's (1982) values (see bottom of Table 4. 3. for the
descriptive mean values for each set of events). In addition to the experimental
stimuli, a smaller set of 16 relatively neutral events was generated for use as practice
trials at the beginning of the task (see Table 4. 4. below).
Table 4. 4. List of events used as practice trials for the SPJT.
Practice events
1. You will take a train to London.
2. You will cook a delicious dinner.
3. You will redecorate your house.
4. You will buy tickets for the theatre.
5. You will go swimming.
6. Your favourite TV program will stop.
7. You will go and see your GP.
8. You will get hiccups.
9. You will read a good book.
10.You will play a musical instrument.
1 l.You will go to church on Sundays.
12.You will go for a long walk.
13.You will ride a motorcycle.
14.You will lend something to a neighbour.
15.You will wash your car.
16.You will mow the lawn in your garden.
The second modification of the SPTJ consisted in the introduction of emotional
primes. Photographs of sad, fearful, happy and neutral faces were taken from
standardised material (Ekman & Friesen, 1976) and used as primes in the subliminal
and supraliminal conditions (see Appendix 5. for examples of faces shown). A total
of 72 photographs were selected to prime each of the experimental trials. Of these,
206
36 were photographs of female and 36 photographs of male faces, and each set of 36
consisted of 9 photographs for each of the 4 prime types (i.e. 9 sad, 9 fearful, 9
happy, and 9 neutral faces). In addition, 16 more photographs were selected as
primes for the practice trials. Of these, 8 were male and 8 were female faces, and
each set of 8 consisted of 2 photographs for each of the 4 prime types (i.e. 2 sad, 2
fearful, 2 happy, and 2 neutral faces).
Both events and primes were mounted on 35mm slides and presented with three slide
projectors (Kodak Ektagraphic III BR Projector). One of these served to present a
fixation cross (a white "+" on black background); a second one (working in
synchrony with the first) was used to present the primes and included a Kodak extra
bright lamp module to allow the preservation of the stimuli features presented
subliminally. The third one was used to show the target events. Each of the three
slide projectors was fitted with mechanical shutters. The first two projectors were
mounted with Lafayette Instrument shutters (42011NO/SH 322471, and
42011NC/SH 322471 respectively) and the third one with a Melles Griot (04 IES
001) shutter. Projectors and shutters were connected to tachistoscopes. A Lafayette
Instrument Constant Illumination Tachistoscope (Model 271-42011*C) controlled
the first two, and a Lafayette Instrument Automatic Projection Tachistoscope (Model
271-41010A*C) controlled the third one. The first of these tachistoscopes was set to
control shutter times for the subliminal (5 ms) and supraliminal (2 sec) conditions.
Since precise timing is crucial in research that uses very short duration of stimuli
display the accuracy of the subliminal 5 ms exposure time was checked, both for the
Lafayette Instrument (42011NC/SH 322471) and the Melles Griot (04 IES 001)
shutters, by subjecting them to initial calibration testing while being connected to the
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Lafayette Instrument Constant Illumination Tachistoscope. These were carried out by
using the PST Refresh Detector connected to the PST Serial Response Box
(Psychology Software Tools) placed directly in front on the shutters in low lighting
conditions. This is a photo transistor able to detect accurately (down to 3.5 ms) the
refresh rate of a computer monitor. The calibration testing revealed that the Lafayette
Instrument, but not the Melles Griot, shutter produced satisfactory results, hence the
reason for using it in combination with the Kodak extra bright lamp module for the
presentation of subliminal primes.
Slides were projected onto a 150 (w) x 100 (h) cm white projection screen positioned
at approximately 200 cm in front of the projectors. The size of the projected fixation
cross was 4x4 cm, whereas the size of the projected events and primes was 55 x 37
cm. The primes were projected vertically (i.e. portrait orientation) and the events
were projected horizontally (i.e. landscape orientation). Fixation cross, primes and
events were all centred in relation to each other and the screen.
The SPJT experiment was also compiled with MEL Professional Version 2.01. The
computer program was used to coordinate the tachistoscopic presentation of the
stimuli and the recording of the participants' responses. The tachistoscopes, which
controlled the projectors and shutters, interfaced with the PC (RM - Pentium III,
800MHz) via a National Instruments Data Acquisition Card (NI-DAQ Lab-PC+),
which was used as an output channel for signals to the projectors. The input channel
(i.e. the collection of the participants' reaction times) was composed of a microphone
(Anchor CollarMic 1000) connected to the PST Serial Response Box Voice Key via
an EMO System E720 Phantom Supply. Subjective probability judgements were
recorded with an audiotape recorder and logged on at a later stage.
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4. 5. 1. 4. Procedure.
After obtaining written consent, participants were asked to fill in the self-report
measures listed above and to take part in the PFT experiment reported above.
Subsequently, the SPRT and the SPJT were carry out in the given order. The SPRT
was used as a control task for the SPJT because, given the nature of the latter (i.e.
subjects are required to read sentences silently before emitting probability ratings),
any group differences in reading speed would invariably affect reaction times. For
this task participants were requested to sit in from of a computer at a comfortable
distance from the monitor (normally about 50 cm) and to read the instructions that
were presented on the display:
"A short passage will be presented, one phrase at a time, the centre of the screen.
Your task is to read each phrase of the passage in your head (not aloud). As soon as
you have read one phrase, press the '+' key at the right far side of the keyboard so
that the next phrase of the passage will come up. Continue pressing the '+' key as
soon as you have read each phrase until the end of the passage. Please ask if you are
not sure ofwhat to do or if you have any questions."
The experimenter, who rephrased the instructions, emphasised that this was not a
memory task, that participants would not be required to answer any questions about
the passage and that they were asked to read it normally as they would read any other
text. This was done in order to avoid that people read each phrase several times in an
attempt to study or memorise the content of the passage and by so doing
compromised reaction times accuracy. The first time the "+" key was pressed a
fixation cross appeared at the centre of the screen in the location where the text
would subsequently appear every time the same key was pressed. This first keystroke
also produced a reaction time, but it was discarded from analyses.
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Once the SPRT was completed, participants were introduced to the SPJT. They were
informed that they would be presented a sets of slides containing sentences
expressing possible future positive and negative life events, one at the time, and that
their task was to read each sentence silently and then judge the probability that each
event would happen to them in the next year starting from today. They were also
informed that before the presentation of each event, a face would be shown and that
during half of the task the faces would be displayed for 2 seconds, while during the
other half of the task the faces would be flashed up very quickly, so that they might
not be able to see them, but it would not matter. Participants were also instructed to
look at the fixation cross which would be in the position where the events and the
faces would be shown, and that since a microphone would be used to allow the
automatic advancement of the slide trays every time they had rated each event, it was
of capital importance that they read the sentences silently and that only reported a
number from 1 to 10 (1 = It will not happen, 10 = It will definitely happen) aloud
once they had decided. They were then given the opportunity to ask questions before
the voice key calibration was carried out. Subjects were told that it was necessary to
adjust the microphone sensitivity to the level of their voice. Another MEL compiled
program was used for this purpose. Participants were asked to read a series of single
words (e.g. fish, one, this, water) that appeared at the centre of the screen one at the
time. This task was repeated if necessary until a satisfactory voice detection rate was
achieved. Then, participants were invited to sit in front of the projection screen at a
distance of approximately 160cm, at which point the lighting of the room was
restricted to the emission of light from a black background computer monitor,
projectors lamps and a residual amount of natural light coming through inside the
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room. This combination created the optimal lighting conditions for this task, in that
the room needs to be dark enough to permit a good vision of stimuli presented with
slide projectors, but not completely dark since this would not allow appropriate
retinal habituation to occur as the presentation of the stimuli (i.e. emission of light)
would alternate to complete darkness (e.g. Guyton, 1986). At this point, in order to
allow habituation a few minutes were spent during which the instructions for the
main task were rephrased and participants were informed that their responses would
be audio recorded.
Events and primes were inserted into slide trays in randomised fixed order. There
were 4 different randomised fixed orders so that each event was preceded once by
each of the 4 primes. The use of these 4 randomised orders was counterbalanced
across participants in each group and each participant was presented the same primes
and events twice, in 2 different orders (one for each condition). The order of
condition was also counterbalanced across participants in each of the four groups, so
that in each group approximately half of the participants would receive the
subliminal condition followed by the supraliminal condition, and the other half
would receive the two conditions in reverse order. Each condition consisted of 8
practice trials followed by 72 experimental trials. In the subliminal condition the
sequence of each trial was as follows. Given the synchronicity of the two projectors
connected to the Constant Illumination Tachistoscope, a fixation cross was shown at
all times except during the exposure of the primes. This served to keep the
participants' gaze focused onto the central area of the projection screen and, given
the fact that sentences were presented in black ink on white background, it did not
interfere with the presentation of the event slides, on the contrary aided accuracy of
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reaction times in that participants read the sentences beginning from the same
starting point. The fixation cross was present for 5 seconds before the presentation of
each trial (i.e. the Inter-Trial-Interval, ITI was 5 sec). Then the prime slide was
shown for 5 ms and immediately replaced and masked by the appearance of the
target event slide. Thus, the SOA (stimulus onset asynchrony) was 5 ms. The target
event remained displayed until participants uttered a number from 1 to 10 to indicate
their probability rating, at which point only the fixation cross remained and slide
trays were automatically activated to move forward.
With this procedure it was possible to obtain an effective metacontrast masking of
the primes. In fact, following Francis' (1997) recommendations our masking had the
following features: a) a positive small SOA; b) a mask that is more luminous than the
prime; c) short duration of the prime; d) no spatial distance between the prime and
the mask (i.e. mask superimposed to the prime); e) long duration of the mask; and f)
a broken rather than a continuous or uniform contour of the mask.
After the initial 8 practice trials, participants were again invited to raise any
questions or problems, before the experimental trials were started. The supraliminal
condition was analogous to the one just described except that the primes were
displayed for 2 seconds before the target events. Thus, the SOA was 2 sec while the
ITI remained constant at 5 sec., and the 72 experimental trials were preceded by 8
practice trials. Between the first and the second condition there was a short break
during which the slide trays were changed and participants were reminded briefly
about the difference in the duration of the display of the faces for the following
condition (i.e. either shorter or longer). Once the SPJT was completed participants
were debriefed and then administered the SCID-I (First et al., 1996).
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4. 5. 2. Result's.
4. 5. 2. 1. Subject characteristics.
Most of the information regarding the groups' details and scores on the self-report
measure and control tasks are reported on Table 4. 1. and described in Section 4. 4. 2.
1. above. Here we will report results obtained by the four groups on the last on the
control tasks used specifically for Experiment II (see Table 4. 5.).
Table 4. 5. Group performance on the subject-paced reading task (SPRT).


















F(3, 66) = 2.22 .09
Between-group analyses showed that although the control participants were slightly
faster at reading the passage, there was no significant difference among the four
groups in their performance on the SPRT, consequently this factor was not
considered further.
4. 5. 2. 2. Subjective probability judgement task (SPJT).
Probability judgements. Descriptive statistics summarising the performance of the
four groups on the SPJT are reported on Table 4. 6.
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This Table gives means and standard deviations of the probability judgements
yielded by the four groups in each experimental condition. An overall 3x4x2x4
mixed ANOVA was carried out for the probability judgements data with Event
(depression relevant, anxiety relevant, positive), Prime (sad, fear, happy, neutral),
and Condition (subliminal vs. supraliminal) as within-subjects factors and Group
(depressed, anxious, mixed, control) as the between-subjects variables. Results
revealed significant main effects of Event F(2,65) = 15.32, p < 0.001 and Group
F(3,66) = 4.58, p < 0.01, significant 2-way interactions of Event x Group /7(6,132) =
15.14, p < 0.001 and Prime x Group F(9,198) = 2.99, p < 0.01, and a significant 3-
way interaction of Condition x Event x Prime F(6, 61) = 3.45, p < 0.01. In order to
clarify the source of these interactions, within and between-group analyses were then
performed. A general 3x4x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Event, Prime and
Condition as within-subjects variables was carried out within the depressed group
(see Figure 4. 4. below). This showed significant main effects of Condition F(l,14) =
4.89,/? < 0.05 and Event F(2,13) = 11.56, p < 0.001. Then, separate 2x4 repeated
measures ANOVAs with Condition and Prime as within-subjects factors were
computed for each event type, with the intention of identifying the experimental
conditions in which the depressed group performed differently as a result of
subliminal vs. supraliminal primes. No significant main effects or interactions were
found when depression relevant or positive events were taken into account. However,
a significant main effect of Condition F(l,14) = 5.08, p < 0.05 and interaction of
Condition x Prime F(3,12) = 7.69, p < O.Olwere found when anxiety relevant events
were considered.
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Paired samples T-tests carried out between subliminal vs. supraliminal conditions for
each prime type revealed a significant difference for the "fear" prime conditions
t(14) = 3.94, p < .001 indicating higher probability judgements for supraliminal
"fear" relative to subliminal "fear" primes in the depressed group. Finally, no
significant effect of Prime was found for each condition and event type considered
separately. Afterwards, separate 2x3 repeated measures ANOVAs with Condition
and Event as within-subjects variables were computed for each prime type, in order
to explore the main effect of Event in more details. When "sad" primes were
considered, a significant main effect of Event was found F(2,13) = 6.08, p < 0.01,
and orthogonal planned contrasts indicated that the depressed group reported higher
expectancy for depression relevant than positive events F(l,14) = 7.41, p < 0.05 in
the subliminal condition, and compared to both anxious relevant and positive events
F(l,14) = 8.04, p < 0.01 in the supraliminal condition. When "fear" primes were
taken into account, a significant interaction of Condition x Event F(2,13) = 5.77, p <
0.05 was found. Planned contrasts revealed that the depressed group reported higher
probability judgements for depression relevant compared to anxiety relevant events
F(l,14) = 5.65, p < 0.05 in the subliminal condition, and compared to the positive
events F(l,14) = 9.52, p < 0.01 in the subliminal condition. A main effect of Event
was also found in the "happy" prime condition F(2,13) = 12.21, p < 0.001 with
contrasts showing that the depressed group gave higher ratings for depression
relevant than anxiety relevant and positive events in the subliminal condition F(l,14)
= 10.61, p < 0.01, but only compared to positive events in the supraliminal condition
F(l,14) = 11.74, p < 0.01. Similar effects were also found for the "neutral" prime
condition with a main effect of Event F(2,13) = 6.60, p < 0.01 and contrasts showing
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higher expectancy ratings for depression relevant than anxiety relevant and positive
events both in the subliminal F(l,14) = 11.68, p < 0.01 and supraliminal F(l,14) =
9.87, p < 0.01 conditions.
A similar procedure was adopted with the anxious group (see Figure 4. 5. below). An
overall 3*4x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Event, Prime and Condition as
within-subjects variables revealed main effects of Event F(2,13) = 7.02, p < 0.01 and
Prime F(3,12) = 7.61, p < 0.01. Then, 2*4 repeated measures ANOVAs with
Condition and Prime as within-subjects factors were carried out separately for each
event type. These however, did not indicate any significant effects for any type of
event. No significant effects of Prime were also found for each condition and each
event type. Separate 2*3 repeated measures ANOVAs with Condition and Event as
within-subjects variables, computed for each prime type, revealed a main effect of
Event for "sad" prime F(2,13) = 8.33, p < 0.01. Orthogonal planned contrasts
showed that the anxious group rated as positive events as being more likely to
happen compared to depression relevant events F(l,14) = 12.75, p < 0.01 in the
subliminal condition and compared to both depression and anxiety relevant events
/r( 1,14) = 9.07, p < 0.01 in the supraliminal condition. When the "fear" prime was
considered, a significant main effect of Event F(2,13) = 7.99, p < 0.01 and a
significant interaction of Condition x Event F(2,13) = 6.50, p < 0.01 were found.
Planned contrasts indicated that positive events were judged as being more likely
compared to depression and anxiety relevant events F(l,14) = 17.87,/? < 0.001 in the
subliminal condition and compared to the depression relevant events F(l,14) = 6.00,
p < 0.05 in the supraliminal condition.
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Also when "happy" and "neutral" primes were taken into account significant main
effects of Event were found F(2,13) = 5.79, p < 0.05 and F(2,13) = 4.92, p < 0.05
respectively. Moreover, for the two prime types, contrasts revealed equivalent effects
of higher expectancy for positive events compared to depression relevant events in
the subliminal condition F(l,14) = 5.39, p < 0.05 and F(l,14) = 4.80, p < 0.05
respectively, and higher expectancy of positive events than depression and anxiety
relevant events in the supraliminal condition F(l,14) = 9.57, p < 0.01 and F(l,14) =
12.00,p < 0.01 respectively.
A general 3><4x2 repeated measures ANOVA within the mixed group with Event,
Prime and Condition as within-subjects variables revealed a main effect of Event
F(2,18) = 8.54, p < 0.01 (see Figure 4. 6. below). Separate 2x4 repeated measures
ANOVAs with Condition and Prime as within-subjects factors were carried out for
each event type. These revealed no significant effects of any of the variables, and
neither did the separate ANOVAs carried out to look for possible effects of Prime for
each Condition and each Event. However, the 2x3 repeated measures ANOVAs
with Condition and Event as within-subjects variables, computed for each prime
type, found main effects of Event for the "sad" F(2,18) = 7.27, p < 0.01, ""fear"
F(2,18) = 5.09, p < 0.05, "happy" F(2,18) = 7.04, p < 0.01, and "neutral" primes
F(2,18) = 6.15, p < 0.01; and also a main effect of Condition for "happy" prime
F(l,19) = 4.81, p < 0.05. Specifically, for "sad" prime the mixed group gave higher
probability judgements for depression relevant compared to positive events F(l,19) =
11.52, p < 0.01 in the subliminal condition and for both depression and anxiety
relevant compared to positive events /^( 1,19) = 9.19, p < 0.01 in the supraliminal
condition.
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In the "fear" prime condition the mixed group reported higher ratings for both
depression and anxiety relevant events compared to positive events in both
subliminal F(l,19) = 7.67, p < 0.01 and supraliminal F(l,19) = 9.22, p < 0.01
conditions. Similarly, in the "happy" prime condition higher probability ratings were
given for depression relevant and anxiety relevant events compared to positive events
both in the subliminal F(l,19) = 12.13, p < 0.01 and supraliminal F(l,19) = 10.35,/?
< 0.01 conditions. Moreover, in the supraliminal condition the mixed group reported
the depression relevant events as being also more likely to happen compared to the
anxious relevant ones F(l,19) = 4.69, p < 0.05. Finally, for "neutral" primes the
mixed group showed higher expectancy for depression relevant compared to both
anxiety relevant and positive events in both subliminal F(l,19) = 11.51, p < 0.01 and
supraliminal F(l,19) = 10.12,/? < 0.01 conditions.
A 3 x 4 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Event, Prime and Condition as within-
subjects variables was carried out also within the control group (see Figure 4. 7.
below). This indicated a main effect of Event F(2,18) = 70.33, p < 0.001 and a
significant 3-way interaction of Condition x Event x Prime F(6, 14) = 3.92, p < 0.05.
In order to clarify the nature of this interaction, three separate 2x4 repeated
measures ANOVAs with Condition and Prime as within-subjects factors were carried
out for each event type. These revealed only the presence of a main effect of Prime
for the positive events /r(3,17) = 4.50, p < 0.05. However, when separate repeated
measures ANOVAs were carried out to look for specific effects of Prime for each
Condition and each Event, only a main effect of Prime for anxiety relevant events in
the supraliminal condition was found F(3,17) = 4.71,/? < 0.05.
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Orthogonal planned contrasts revealed that in the supraliminal condition the control
group judged anxiety events as being more likely to happen when preceded by "fear"
primes compared to "sad" F(l,19) = 8.08, p < 0.01 and "neutral" primes ,F(1,19) =
5.47, p < 0.05 and, unexpectedly, also when preceded by "happy" compared to
"neutral" primes F(l,19) = 5.68, p < 0.05. In this group, 2><3 repeated measures
ANOVAs with Condition and Event as within-subjects variables, computed for each
prime type, found main effects of Event for the "sad" F(2,18) = 55.97, p < 0.001,
""fear" F(2,18) = 51.42, p < 0.001, "happy" F(2,18) = 64.20, p < 0.001, and
"neutral" primes F(2,18) = 78.80, p < 0.001. Planned contrasts revealed that in the
"sad" prime condition controls had higher expectancy for positive compared to
depression and anxiety relevant events both in the subliminal F(l,19) = 69.34, p <
0.001 and supraliminal conditions F(l,19) = 98.43,p < 0.001. Similarly, in the "fear"
condition higher probability ratings were given for positive compared to depression
and anxiety relevant events both in the subliminal F(l,19) = 68.77, p < 0.001 and
supraliminal conditions /r( 1,19) = 121.60, p < 0.001. In addition, in the "fear"
supraliminal condition also the anxiety relevant events were rated as being more
likely to happen relative to depression relevant one F(l,19) = 6.52, p < 0.05. Finally,
in both "happy" and "neutral" prime conditions control subjects showed again higher
expectancy for positive compared to depression and anxiety relevant events in the
subliminal F( 1,19) = 119.88,p < 0.001 andF(l,19)= 107.77,/? < 0.001 respectively,
and supraliminal conditions F(l,19) = 70.18, p < 0.001 and /^( 1,19) = 128.24, p <
0.001 respectively.
Between-group comparisons on the twenty-four experimental conditions were
carried out with one-way ANOVAs and Scheffe's post hoc (p < 0.05) multiple
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comparisons. Taking the depression relevant events into account, significant main
effects of Group were found for "sad" prime in the subliminal F(3,66) = 19.38, p <
0.001 and supraliminal F(3,66) = 17.95, p < 0.001 conditions (see Figure 4. 8.
below). Post hoc analyses revealed that in the subliminal condition the control group
judged depression events as less likely to happen compared to the three clinical
groups, and the anxious group reported lower ratings compared to the mixed group.
In the supraliminal condition the depressed and mixed groups gave higher ratings
compared to both anxious and control groups. For the "fear" prime condition
significant main effects of Group were also found in the subliminal F(3,66) = 14.58,
p < 0.001 and supraliminal F{3,66) = 24.56, p < 0.001 conditions. Post hoc analyses
showed that in the subliminal condition depressed and mixed groups had higher
expectancies for depression relevant events compared to controls, and the mixed
group reported higher ratings compared also to the anxious group. In the supraliminal
condition again the depressed and mixed groups gave higher expectancy ratings
compared to both anxious and control groups. In the "happy" prime condition
significant main effects of Group were obtained in the subliminal F(3,66) = 16.70,p
< 0.001 and supraliminal F(3,66) = 15.31, p < 0.001 conditions. Scheffe's
comparisons indicated that in the subliminal condition depressed and mixed
participants judged depression events as more likely to happen compared to anxious
and control participants. Whereas, in the supraliminal condition the control group
had lower expectancy compared to depressed and mixed groups, and anxious
reported lower ratings relative to the mixed group. Finally, also in the "neutral"
prime condition significant main effects of Group were found in the subliminal
F(3,66) = 22.06, p < 0.001 and supraliminal F(3,66) = 22.56, p < 0.001 conditions.
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Figure 4. 8. SPJT. Between-group comparisons for depression relevant
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Multiple contrasts highlighted than control participants reported lower expectancy of
depression events compared to the three clinical groups and the anxious group had
lower ratings relative to the mixed group in both the subliminal and supraliminal
conditions.
Taking the anxiety relevant events into account, significant main effects of Group
were found in the "sad" prime subliminal F(3,66) = 8.09, p < 0.001 and supraliminal
F(3,66) = 12.16, p < 0.001 conditions (see Figure 4. 9. below). Group comparisons
revealed that in the subliminal condition anxious and mixed groups had higher
expectancy ratings for anxiety relevant events compared to controls. In the
supraliminal condition the control group reported lower expectancy compared to the
three clinical groups. Also for the "fear" prime main effects were found in the
subliminal F(3,66) = 8.96, p < 0.001 and supraliminal F(3,66) = 7.03, p < 0.001
conditions. Post hoc tests showed that in the subliminal condition the mixed group
gave higher ratings compared to the other three groups, whereas, in the supraliminal
condition depressed and mixed participants reported higher probability judgements
compared to controls. In the "happy" prime condition significant main effects of
Group were obtained both in the subliminal F(3,66) = 10.94, p < 0.001 and
supraliminal F(3,66) = 4.54, p < 0.01 conditions. Scheffe's comparisons indicated
that in the subliminal condition depressed and mixed participants gave higher ratings
compared to controls, but in the supraliminal condition only the mixed group gave
higher probability ratings compared to controls. When the "neutral" prime condition
was considered, main effects of Group were obtained in the subliminal F(3,66) =
6.35, p < 0.001 and supraliminal F(3,66) = 7.03,p < 0.001 conditions.
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Specifically, in the subliminal condition controls reported lower ratings compared to
the three clinical groups, whereas, in the supraliminal condition this difference was
only limited to the depressed and mixed groups.
Finally, considering the positive events, main effects of Group were found in the
"sad" subliminal F(3,66) = 14.43, p < 0.001 and supraliminal F(3,66) = 17.31, p <
0.001 conditions (see Figure 4. 10. below). Post hoc analyses revealed that anxious
and control participants rated positive events as being more likely to happen
compared to the depressed and mixed groups both in the subliminal and supraliminal
conditions. For "fear" prime main effects of Group were obtained in the subliminal
F(3,66) = 13.60,p < 0.001 and supraliminal A(3,66) = 16.31 ,p < 0.001 conditions.
Multiple comparisons indicated that in the subliminal condition the control group
reported higher ratings compared to depressed and mixed groups, and the anxious
group had higher expectancy compared to the mixed group. However, in the
supraliminal condition the three clinical groups had lower ratings compared to the
control group. Also in the "happy" prime condition main effects of Group were
obtained in both the subliminal F(3,66) = 18.51,/? < 0.001 and supraliminal F{3,66)
= 20.01, p < 0.001 conditions. Scheffe's tests indicated that the control group had
higher expectancy ratings relative to the three clinical groups in the subliminal
condition, but only compared to the depressed and mixed groups in the supraliminal
condition, where the anxious group reported higher probability judgements compared
to the mixed group. Finally, for "neutral" prime main effects were found in the
subliminal F(3,66) = 19.36, p < 0.001 and supraliminal F(3,66) = 20.24, p < 0.001
conditions.
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Further group comparisons revealed that anxious and control participants reported
higher probability ratings compared to the depressed and mixed groups in the
subliminal and supraliminal conditions, but in the latter, the control group had higher
ratings also compared to the anxious group.
Reaction times. Table 4. 7. contains descriptive statistics (means and standard
deviations) summarising data regarding the time latencies yielded by the four groups
in each of the twenty-four experimental conditions. An overall 3x4x2x4 mixed
ANOVA was carried out for the reaction times data with Event (depression relevant,
anxiety relevant, positive), Prime (sad, fear, happy, neutral), and Condition
(subliminal vs. supraliminal) as within-subjects factors and Group (depressed,
anxious, mixed, control) as the between-subjects variables. Results indicated the
presence of a main effect of Event F(2,65) = 19.11, p < 0.001, and significant
interactions of Event x Group F(6,132) = 2.16,p< 0.05 and Event x Prime .F(6,61) =
3.39, p < 0.01. Again, as it was done above with the probability judgements, within
and between-group analyses were then performed in order to clarify the source of
these interactions. A general 3x4x2 repeated measures ANOVA with Event, Prime
and Condition as within-subjects variables was carried out within the depressed
group (see Figure 4. 11. below). This showed main effects of Event ,F(2,13) = 5.39, p
< 0.05 and Prime F(3,12) = 5.08, p < 0.05. Then, 2x4 repeated measures ANOVAs
with Condition and Prime as within-subjects factors were carried out separately for
each event type. These revealed a main effect of Prime F(3,12) = 3.68, p < 0.05 only
for the depression relevant events.
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Separate repeated measures ANOVAs were carried out for the subliminal and
supraliminal conditions for the depression events in order to look at the effect of
Prime in more details. Results showed a main effect of Prime only in the subliminal
condition F(3,12) = 3.51, p < 0.05 with planned contrasts indicating that depressed
participants were slower at judging depression relevant events that were preceded by
"sad" primes compared to "neutral" primes F(l,14) = 6.13, p < 0.05. Afterwards,
separate 2x3 repeated measures ANOVAs with Condition and Event as within-
subjects variables were computed for each prime type, in order to explore the main
effect of Event in more details. A significant effect of Event was found only in the
"sad" prime condition F(2,13) = 6.99, p < 0.01, and orthogonal planned contrasts
showed that depressed outpatients were significantly slower when judging depression
relevant compared to anxiety relevant and positive events preceded by subliminal but
not supraliminal "sad" primes F(l,14) = 10.67,p < 0.01.
A similar procedure was used for the analyses carried out within the anxious group
(see Figure 4. 12. below). The overall 3 x 4 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with
Event, Prime and Condition as within-subjects variables showed only a main effect
of Event F(2,13) = 6.97, p < 0.01. No significant effects were found when separate 2
x 4 repeated measures ANOVAs with Condition and Prime as within-subjects factors
were carried out for each event type, or for each condition. However, 2x3 repeated
measures ANOVAs with Condition and Event as within-subjects variables were
computed for each prime type and these showed a main effect of Event for "sad"
F(2,13) = 5.40, p < 0.05, "happy" F(2,13) = 6.55, p < 0.01, and "neutral" primes
.F(2,13) = 4.32,/? < 0.05.
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Orthogonal contrasts highlighted that these effects were present only in subliminal
conditions, and in particular anxious patients were significantly faster at rating
anxiety relevant than depression relevant events in the "sad" prime condition F(l,14)
= 8.05, p < 0.01; they were also faster at rating positive relative to depression and
anxiety relevant events in the "happy" prime condition F(l,14) = 13.09, p < 0.01;
and faster at rating positive events in the "neutral" prime condition but only
compared to depression relevant events F(l,14) = 9.64,p < 0.01.
In the mixed group the general 3 x 4 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Event,
Prime and Condition as within-subjects variables did not show any significant effects
(see Figure 4. 13. below). However, when separate 2x4 repeated measures
ANOVAs with Condition and Prime as within-subjects factors were carried out for
each event type, a main effect of Prime emerged for the anxiety relevant events
F(3,17) = 3.34,p < 0.05, although this was not followed by any significant difference
among different prime types in either the subliminal or supraliminal conditions.
Finally, 2x3 repeated measures ANOVAs with Condition and Event as within-
subjects variables were computed for each prime type and these showed a main
effect of Event only in the "sad" prime condition A(2,18) = 5.12, p < 0.05 Planned
contrasts revealed that the mixed group was significantly faster when rating anxiety
compared to depression relevant events in the supraliminal condition F(l,19) = 8.40,
p<0.01.
A main effect of Event A(2,18) = 11.21, p < 0.001 was found when a 3 M x 2
repeated measures ANOVA with Event, Prime and Condition as within-subjects
variables was carried out for the control group (see Figure 4. 14. below).
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No significant effects were found when separate 2 x 4 repeated measures ANOVAs
with Condition and Prime as within-subjects factors were carried out for each event
type, or for each condition. The only significant main effect of Event was found in
the "happy" prime condition F(2,18) = 8.54, p < 0.01 when separate 2x3 repeated
measures ANOVAs with Condition and Event as within-subjects variables were
carried out for each prime type. Orthogonal contrasts showed that the control group
was significantly slower when judging depression relevant compared to positive
events in both the subliminal F(l,19) = 9.50, p < 0.01 and supraliminal F(l,19) =
7.74, p < 0.01 conditions when these were preceded by "happy" primes.
No significant difference was found when between-group analyses were performed,
which was probably due to the high standard deviations values present in each cell
(see Table 4. 7. above).
4. 5. 2. 3. Results summary.
To summarise the results obtained in this experiment, the depressed group gave
higher expectancy ratings for depression relevant compared to anxiety relevant and
positive events in both subliminal and supraliminal priming conditions. Generally,
the anxious group reported higher probability judgements for negative (depression
and anxiety relevant) events and lower ratings for positive events, compared to
controls, but not in all experimental conditions. Finally, as hypothesised, the mixed
group judged both negative (depression and anxiety relevant) events as being more
likely to happen and positive events as being less likely to happen. These results will
be discussed in detail in the next Section.
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4. 5. 3. Discussion.
The experimental hypotheses set out earlier on in this Chapter regarding the
performance of the four groups in the SPJT have been mostly confirmed.
Specifically, the depressed group was hypothesised to reveal an increased negative
expectancy for depression relevant events (mediated by its NA component) and a
reduced expectancy for positive events (mediated by its PA component). Both of
these predictions were confirmed, in that depressed participants gave higher
probability judgements for depression relevant events and lower probability ratings
for positive events compared to controls. These findings replicate previous studies
carried out with clinical and non-clinical samples (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1997b;
MacLeod & Cropley, 1995; Pyszczynski et ah, 1987) while strengthening the more
inconsistent finding of the relationship between depression and reduced positive
expectancy in this task. In addition, we also provide evidence of content specificity
since, in most experimental conditions, the depressed group reported higher
probability judgements for depression relevant compared to anxiety relevant events.
Therefore, in general depressed patients reported higher expectancy for depression
relevant compared to anxiety relevant and positive events in both subliminal and
supraliminal priming conditions. No significant within-group effect of prime type
was found for judgements, however, analyses of reaction times revealed than
although primes were unable to affect ratings they were able to affect response
latencies. In particular, depressed individuals were significantly slower at deciding
the likelihood of depression relevant events when they were preceded by "sad"
(subliminal) primes compared to when similar events followed "neutral" primes.
242
Moreover, this effect was specific to depression relevant events, in that in this
condition they were significantly slower compared to equivalent "sad" (subliminal)
priming conditions for anxiety relevant and positive events. From a general look at
Figure 4. 11. it is easy to observe a unique pattern of reaction times in this group.
Explicitly, depressed outpatients were slowed down by supraliminal primes
compared to subliminal ones in all conditions. Although these differences did not
reach statistical significance probably due to the large variation in reaction times,
they show that depressed individuals tend to dwell more on information that has
entered their focus of attention as suggested by Mogg and Bradley (1998; 1999a).
Consistent with this view is also an interesting effect of Condition (subliminal vs.
supraliminal) found in this group when judging the likelihood of anxiety relevant
events. In particular, these were rated as being more likely to happen when preceded
by supraliminal "fear" primes than when preceded by subliminal "fear" primes.
Therefore, depressed individuals were able to perceive relevant subliminally
presented primes, as shown by the slowing-down effect of "sad" primes, but these
pre-attentive processes were unable to influence their judgements in the way that
supraliminal (attentional) primes could. In line with this interpretation, between-
group analyses revealed that depressed patients also reported higher probability
judgements, compared to the anxious group, for depression relevant events in the
"sad" and "fear" supraliminal conditions. Similarly, depressed participants had
higher expectancy for anxiety relevant events compared to controls mostly in the
supraliminal priming conditions except for "happy" primes.
Results obtained from the anxious group partially confirm our initial hypotheses. It
was predicted that anxious patients would show an increased negative expectancy for
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anxiety relevant events, mediated by their NA and PH components. Within-group
analyses revealed that anxious individuals expected more positive than depression
relevant events to happen in all of the priming conditions. Moreover and more
interestingly, they gave lower expectancy ratings for anxiety relevant compared to
positive events only in supraliminal priming conditions except for "fear" primes,
where lower ratings were given in the subliminal condition only. As indicated by the
significant interaction ofCondition (subliminal vs. supraliminal) by Event type found
for "fear" primes, anxious patients show a specific pre-attentive/attentional
avoidance pattern. In particular, they indicated that anxiety relevant events were less
likely to happen, relative to positive events, when they were preceded by salient
"fear" subliminal primes (showing automatic pre-attentive avoidance), but when less
salient non-threatening primes were presented that did not require an initial shift of
attention towards threat, then avoidance occurred at a later attentional stage (i.e.
following the supraliminal presentation of "sad", "happy" and "neutral" primes).
This shows that anxious people are hypervigilant towards threatening information,
which can be automatically and selectively detected (e.g. Bradley et al., 1998; 1999;
2000) and acted upon (i.e. avoidance). However, when a longer exposure of primes
(2 seconds) was used in the supraliminal condition, anxious patients were unable to
avoid the priming effect of "fear" emotional stimuli, which resulted in higher
probability judgements. This effect provides an important key also when interpreting
the results found in the second part (probability judgements) of Experiment I, in
which the same anxious group reported higher expectancy for positive relative to
negative events. Specifically, it indicates the specific conditions under which
avoidance is or is not likely to occur. Explicitly, cognitive avoidance in anxious
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individuals can be prevented under conditions of constraint attention and coercive
controlled processing. Consequently, while in Experiment I avoidance took place as
a consequence of non-constraining experimental conditions, in this study avoidance
was possible under all supraliminal priming conditions except "fear". An analogous
elimination of "attentional deficits" under conditions of focused or constrained
attention has been shown in experiments with depressed individuals (Hertel, 1994;
Hertel & Rude, 1991), however here the lack of motivation and cognitive initiative
typical of depressive task performance was the issue, as opposed to anxious
avoidance behaviour.
The effects of pre-attentive vigilance for "fear" primes in the anxious group can be
also observed from analyses of reaction latencies. In particular, anxious patients were
slower at providing ratings for depression relevant events in the "sad" (compared to
anxiety relevant events), "happy" and "neutral" (compared to positive events) prime
conditions, but this relative slowness for depression relevant events vanished when
"fear" primes were presented, in which case hastier decisions were taken showing
increased autonomic activation in this group. Between-group comparisons show that
anxious participants are particularly able to avoid, that is to say, judge depression and
anxiety relevant events less likely to happen, when these events are preceded by
"fear" and "happy" primes, as indicated by no statistical differences from the control
group in these conditions. This state of affairs suggests that the avoidance
mechanism is not only one that "runs away" from threat, but also one that "pulls
towards" to positive aspects of the stimuli, as seen also in Experiment I. Evidence
that anxiety is associated with positive as well as negative attentional biases for
emotional faces derives from an experiment carried out with GAD patients that used
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a dot probe task paradigm (Bradley et al., 1999). In this experiment, anxious
participants showed enhanced vigilance for both threatening and happy emotional
faces.
Generally, compared to controls, the anxious group reported higher expectancy
ratings for negative (depression and anxiety relevant) events, which confirms
previous literature findings (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1991; 1997b). However, "given the
chance to avoid" with the presentation of "fear" and "happy" primes, anxious
participants did not differ from controls in their judgements. Similarly, a decrease in
positive expectancy in the anxious group was observed only in some of the
experimental conditions, so that their probability ratings for positive events lie
somewhere in between that ones reported by the controls and those reported by
depressed and mixed patients. Against prediction, no specificity for anxiety relative
to depression relevant events was shown, but this could be due to two factors: a) our
group was prevalently composed by GAD patients and PH specificity may be more
strongly related to panic disorder patients; b) anxiety event materials were not
specifically related to physical threat but they were of a more general nature.
Therefore, our findings confirm our initial hypotheses only partially.
In contrast, the predictions made regarding the performance of the mixed group were
fully confirmed by our study. Compared to controls, mixed anxious depressed
patients judged both negative (depression and anxiety relevant) events as being more
likely to happen and positive events as being less likely to happen, thus showing high
levels of NA and PH, and low levels of PA. However, within-group analyses show
the presence of some specificity for depression relevant compared to anxiety relevant
events particularly for "neutral" (subliminal and supraliminal) and "happy"
246
supraliminal primes. This suggests that while a higher expectancy for depression
relevant events is more widespread and occurs under all conditions, the reported
higher expectancy for anxiety relevant events is more variable and its magnitude is
more subject to moment-to-moment appraisal of the current situation, with higher
ratings yielded under negative ("sad" and "fear") emotional priming conditions. To
confirm the strong expectancy for depression relevant events is also the finding that
the mixed group provided significantly higher ratings for this event type compared to
the anxious group under all experimental conditions. Moreover, mixed participants
exhibited a particularly high negative expectancy for anxiety relevant events under
the subliminal "fear" priming condition, differing significantly from the other three
groups. Lastly, noteworthy is the fact that the mixed group reported lower positive
expectancy also compared to the anxious group in most conditions except for
subliminal "happy" and supraliminal "fear" priming conditions.
Analyses of reaction times data indicate that the mixed group was particularly fast at
judging anxiety relevant events, especially so relative to depression relevant events
in the "sad" supraliminal priming condition. A more general observation is the
reverse pattern of reaction times obtained by the mixed group compared to the one
seen in the depressed group, with relatively longer latencies for subliminal primes
across all conditions, although as for the depressed group no statistical difference
was found probably because of the large group variance in reaction times.
The results for this group are novel in that, to the best of our knowledge, no previous
experimental study has tested a mixed anxious depressed clinical or non-clinical
sample on a SPJT. We also extended this task to include event specificity and several
emotional priming conditions. The results obtained show that the mixed group differs
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in important ways from the other two clinical groups. Compared to the depressed
outpatients, the mixed group reported higher expectancy for anxiety relevant events,
particularly when subliminal "fear" primes were utilised, suggesting that contrary to
depressed individuals, this group is affected by pre-attentive mechanisms in the
production of probability judgements and not merely in response latency variations.
Moreover, as outlined above, distinct patterns of reaction times appear to distinguish
these two groups, with the mixed group appearing generally faster. Relative to the
anxious participants, the mixed group reported a general increase in depression
relevant events expectancy and a decrease in positive events expectancy, but also and
more importantly, it did not use avoidance strategies as indicated by the particularly
high expectancy for anxiety relevant events in the subliminal "fear" priming
condition. This finding tallies with the results obtained in the explicit memory task
reported in Chapter three, where within-group analyses showed that the mixed group
but not anxiety patients recalled an increased number of anxiety relevant words,
indicating that contrary to what is typically found in anxiety disorders, mixed anxiety
depression is not characterised by avoidance.
Finally, as expected our control sample reported higher probability judgements for
positive events and low ratings for negative events, replicating the results found in
Experiment I. However, some more interesting and atypical effects were also found
in the control group's performance. Specifically, there was a remarkable effect of
supraliminal "fear" prime, which resulted in increased probability judgements for
anxiety relevant events in this group. This underlines the important influence of
specific emotional information on subsequent self-referent judgements as outlined by
Power et al. (1996). Moreover, controls appeared to be slowed down when judging
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the likelihood of depression relevant events, and significantly so when receiving
incongruent (i.e. "happy") emotional information both subliminally and
supraliminally.
Earlier in this Chapter it was hypothesised that the two tasks were likely to elicit
different results because of key differences in the materials subject to judgement. The
PFT can be distinguished for the personal nature and relevance of the self-generated
events, whereas the SPJT presents participants with a set of experimentally
controlled events, which may or may not be relevant to the person judging them. In
addition, the two tasks, in the versions used here, differ considerably in terms of
experimental settings. The PFT judgement task is carried out without time limits or
other particular constraints and in a relatively normal setting (i.e. there is no use of
electronic apparatus apart form a tape recorder and both experimenter and subject sit
in a room lit by daylight, with the former writing down the subjects' ratings).
Conversely, the SPJT is carried out in less naturalistic conditions: the room lighting
is minimal; the experiment is controlled by computer and involves a great deal of
electronic equipment including tachistoscopes and millisecond exposure of stimuli;
subjects wear a CollarMic around their neck and their responses automatically
activate the movement of the slide projectors while they give judgements on a large
number of possible life events. Put together, these factors are likely to influence in
divergent ways the choice of the mechanisms and processes used by participants to
execute the two tasks. We have argued above that participants might be making use
of elaborative processes such as the availability heuristic when performing on the
PFT probability judgements, which involve controlled retrieval of relevant
information. On the other hand, Siemer and Reisenzein (1998) found that under
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conditions of reduced processing capacity, induced by time pressure and competing
task demands, participants are more likely to make use of a "feeling heuristic''''
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In other words they will simplify the task by basing their
judgements on the answer they give to the question "How do I feel about this
event?". Indeed this seemed to be the process used by many participants who
voluntarily commented on the strategy they had used during the task completion.
Consequently, in the SPJT we did not observe equivalent probability judgements for
positive and negative life events found in Experiment I in the depressed and mixed
groups, and we found different expectancy ratings also within the anxious and
control groups depending on the experimental conditions.
Therefore to summarise, our hypotheses were fully confirmed for the depressed
group who showed greater expectancy for depression relevant events and lower
expectancy for positive events. Results obtained for this group also showed that
depressed patients can be generally influenced by pre-attentive emotional
information but they are more likely to be affected by attentional information
processing of relevant emotional stimuli. In contrast, anxiety patients did not show
the predicted specificity in terms of expectancy of negative events, reporting high
(non-specific) expectancy of negative life events and lower expectancy for positive
events only in some experimental conditions. The specificity in this group emerged
as a result of pre-attentional hypervigilance for "fear" stimuli. A distinct pattern of
avoidance behaviour emerged in this group, which was particularly facilitated by the
presence of "fear" and "happy" primes. Moreover it was possible to eliminate
avoidance of threat stimuli processing in anxious participants under specific
conditions of focused attention. Finally, the mixed group also confirmed our
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hypotheses by presenting higher expectancy for both types of negative events and
lower probability judgements for positive events. Moreover, both subliminal (pre-
attentive level) and supraliminal (attentional level) relevant emotional information
influenced expectancy ratings in this group. Thus, the mixed group differed
quantitatively but also, and more importantly, qualitatively from the depressed and
anxious groups respectively, in that pre-attentive attentional processes affect its
expectancy ratings, but no use of avoidance strategies were apparent under these
testing conditions, which provides further evidence of discriminant group validity for
the mixed anxiety depression group.
4. 6. Summary and conclusions.
In this Chapter we have compared the performance of depressed, anxious, mixed
anxious depressed outpatients, and normal controls on tasks measuring future-
directed thinking. We have dealt with the issue of prospective cognitions in anxiety
and depression in some detail and have modified and extended experimental
paradigms that would enable us to address apparent inconsistencies present in the
current literature; to widen the existing knowledge in this relatively unexplored area
of cognition and emotion; and to provide an experimental platform on which a
comparative study of mixed anxiety depression could be carried out.
Results from Experiments I and II show that the direction of future expectancy for
positive and negative life events varies considerably depending on a number of
factors. We have seen that the main factor responsible for this variability lies in the
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differential use of mechanisms and strategic processes by participants depending on
the nature of the task at hand. Moreover, we have shown that concurrent pre-attentive
and attentional processing of emotional information has a substantial influence on
probability judgements. In particular, the extent of their magnitude in one or the
opposite direction can be facilitated or inhibited according to the specific self-
reference of the emotional primes and the condition under which these primes are
perceived (subliminally vs. supraliminally). Finally, the particular circumstances
under which these effects occur and the resulting cognitive processes used are
specific for each of the groups examined here. Consequently, consistent with our
hypothesis, an individual cognitive pattern has been identified for the mixed anxious
depressed outpatients also in future-directed thinking, strengthening the position that
this group differs not only quantitatively but also qualitatively from anxiety or
depression.
In the next Chapter we will look at some issues that are directly related to
prospective cognitions, such as the accuracy of predicted life events, as well as some
associated questions regarding autobiographical memory biases for previous




WHEN THE PAST MEETS THE FUTURE:
AN INVESTIGATION OF ACCURACY OF PREDICTION,
REALITY MONITORING AND
PERCEPTION OF CONSISTENCY AND CHANGE.
"Because I know that time is always time
and place is always and only place
and what is actual is actual only for one time
and only for one place"
(T. S. Eliot, "Ash-Wednesday")
5. 1 Introduction.
In the previous two Chapters we have addressed issues related to attentional,
mnemonic and prospective cognitive processes. We have used the terms present,
past, and future respectively to stress the temporal orientation of each of these
processes in relation to one's perspective. Although these three dimensions have
been depicted as in temporal antithesis with each other, from a more functional point
of view, such distinction is of course artificial since individuals are inclined to make
use of their past in the selection of future goals and plans and therefore bridge the
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past and the future together (e.g. Karniol & Ross, 1996). The resulting synthesis is
set to guide individuals in their present behaviour.
In the present Chapter we will concentrate on this bridging process and will report an
empirical follow-up investigation that attempts to explore some of the features that
characterise the way in which the individual's perspective functions in linking past,
present, and future. We shall start by examining the accuracy of prediction of life
events in psychopathology, which is directly related to the issue of prospective
cognitions in general, and to future probability judgements in particular, both
addressed in the previous Chapter. We will then turn to some other questions
regarding reality monitoring - i.e. the capacity to distinguish between internally
generated events from externally presented events - and the individual's perception
of consistency and change over time - i.e. memory and memory biases for previous
mental states and attitudes - both of which are specific aspects related to
autobiographical memory. However, before the presentation of the research report
we shall review some relevant literature that covers key concepts for each of these
three areas of study.
5. 2. Review of relevant research and experimental hypotheses.
There is evidence to suggest that people are generally overconfident in predicting
their own behaviour (Vallone, Griffin, Lin & Ross, 1990) and the behaviour of other
people (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic & Ross, 1990), although self-predictions tend
to be more accurate compared to judgements of knowledgeable others (Shrauger,
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Ram, Greninger & Mariano, 1996). In a study that took valence of events into
account, Pulford and Colman (1996) asked a normal student sample to predict
whether or not they would experience a set of positive and negative life events over
the next week and also to rate their confidence in their predictions. Results gathered a
week later indicated that students were generally overconfident, but also that this
overconfidence was greater for positive compared to negative outcome events.
However, the phenomenon of overconfidence is not only confined to the normal
population. In fact, in a study that compared mildly depressed students with non-
depressed peers, Dunning and Story (1991) found that both groups of participants
exhibited overconfidence by overestimating the probability that their predictions
about occurrence would be accurate. However, mildly depressed individuals were
less accurate in their predictions in that, although they had made more pessimistic
predictions, follow-up showed that they had actually overpredicted the occurrence of
positive events and underpredicted negative events. Comparable results derive from a
study that compared dysphoric and non-dysphoric students in their accuracy of
prediction (Kap?i & Cramer, 1998). Results indicated that, relative to controls,
dysphorics were more accurate when predicting negative life events they would
experience, but less accurate for negative events they would not experience.
Moreover, non-dysphorics were found to be more realistic about positive life events
that they would not experience. Using a similar sample, Shrauger, Mariano and
Walter (1998) found that dysphoria was unrelated to overall accuracy, but also that
dysphorics tended to be more accurate in making pessimistic predictions, whereas
non-dysphorics were more accurate when making optimistic predictions. Another
study that looked at the correspondence of recall, prediction, and accuracy for
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positive and negative life events in a dysphoric and non-dysphoric student sample,
found that normal controls recalled, predicted and later reported more positive than
negative events; whereas, dysphoric participants recalled, predicted and later
reported an equivalent amount of negative and positive events (Dowse & McClure,
1996).
In the case of anxiety there is considerable literature showing the phenomenon of
overprediction of fear in this population, that is, anxious individuals tend to
overestimate how frightened they will be when faced by fear-provoking situations
(e.g. see Rachman, 1994; Marks & De Silva, 1994, for reviews). However, the only
literature that explicitly refers to the accuracy of prediction of life events in anxiety,
regards the accuracy of predicted performance in test-anxiety. Results suggest that
highly test-anxious subjects show greater levels of accuracy compared to non-
anxious peers (Lusk, 1981), but also that, although predicting poorer performance,
anxious students still tend to be overoptimistic (Spence, Duric & Roeder, 1996), even
if self-evaluation or appraisal of personal performance has been found to enhance
accuracy levels in the anxious but not in the non-anxious group.
Therefore, although not many experimental investigations have addressed the issue
of accuracy of prediction of life events in normal subjects and in anxiety and
depression, all in all it would appear that normal subjects tend to be overoptimistic
and generally more accurate in their predictions; mild levels of depression or
dysphoria are related to a more pessimistic point of view and generally lower
accuracy levels (although slightly higher for negative compared to positive life
events); whereas, anxiety is associated to relatively accurate predictions especially if
preceded by self-appraisal.
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Turning to the issue of reality monitoring, this process refers to the ability to
discriminate between memories of internally generated information and memories of
externally derived information and represents a special case of the broader domain of
source monitoring, which refers to those processes involved in making attributions
about the origins of memories, knowledge and beliefs (e.g. Johnson, Kounios &
Reeder, 1994). Other aspects of source monitoring include internal source
monitoring (e.g. the ability to discriminate between memories of what one said and
what one merely thought) and external source monitoring (e.g. the ability to
discriminate between statements that were made by person X and statements that
were made by person Y) (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993). It is generally
found that internal-external source monitoring is more efficient than either internal-
internal or external-external source monitoring and that all types of source
monitoring decisions are based on certain characteristics of the memories being
judged, such as perceptual, contextual, and affective information, strength
(familiarity) of memories, amount of cognitive operations that were established
during encoding of the memory traces (e.g. Bink, Marsh & Hicks, 1999; Buehler &
Ross, 1993; Hicks & Marsh, 1999; Hoffman, 1997; Johnson et al., 1993). Thus, the
more distinct and the greater the amount of the above characteristics, the more
accurate reality monitoring decisions will be (e.g. Henkel, Franklin & Johnson, 2000;
Kahan, 1996; Kahan, Mohsen, Tandez & McDonald, 1999).
The study of reality monitoring in psychopathology has mainly concentrated on the
impairment found in schizophrenia in discriminating actual experiences from
imagined ones. Several studies have repeatedly shown reality monitoring failure in
schizophrenics (e.g. Brebion, Smith, Gorman & Xavier, 1996; 1997; Brebion,
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Xavier, David, Malaspina, Sharif & Gorman, 2000). However, little or no research
has been conducted in anxiety and depressive disorders. For instance, a deficit in
source monitoring has recently been found in PTSD and non-PTSD traumatised
individuals, compared to controls (Zoellner, Foa, Brigidi & Przeworski, 2000). A
limited number of other studies have investigated reality monitoring in obsessive-
compulsive disorder patients but findings have been inconsistent. For example,
McNally and Kohlbeck (1993) found no evidence of reality monitoring deficit in
OCD participants, although they tended to be less confident in their memories
relative to controls, suggesting that OCD might be associated with deficits in
memory confidence rather than memory deficits per se. However, in a later study,
Ecker and Engelkamp (1995) found that OCD checkers showed a specific motor
memory deficit, that is, the inability to distinguish actual motor performance from
imagined motor performance. More recently, Merckelbach and Wessel (2000) found
no evidence to suggest that OCD patients in general or checkers in particular suffer
from poor reality monitoring ofmemory for action. The authors investigated the role
of dissociation as a possible mediating factor, but again found no significant
relationship between levels of dissociation and reality monitoring performance
although OCD patients did report higher dissociation and this was negatively
correlated with confidence ratings. Dissociation, as measured by the Dissociative
Experiences Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) has been closely associated
with reality monitoring. In particular, DES has been thought to measure individual
differences of difficulties in reality monitoring, so that individuals with high levels of
dissociation are hypothesised to be prone to reality monitoring deficits (e.g. Hyman
& Pentland, 1996). The association between reality monitoring and dissociation has
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been investigated in undergraduate student samples. Some studies have found that
dissociative tendencies in college students have reality monitoring deficiencies at
their core (e.g. Kunzendorf & Karpen, 1997; Wilkinson & Hyman, 1998; Winograd,
Peluso & Glover, 1998), whereas some other studies have found no evidence of such
association (e.g. Van den Hout, Merckelbach & Pool, 1996; Koppenhaver, Kumar &
Pekala, 1997). Finally, a more recent study also found that DES scores were not
related to reality monitoring failures, but these scores were significantly associated
with positive response biases on a life events inventory (Merckelbach, Muris,
Horselenberg & Stougie, 2000). Therefore, there seems to be very little evidence of
reality monitoring problems in anxiety and a general scarcity of investigations of
such deficits in depressive disorders, whilst evidence of its presumed association
with levels of dissociation has been so far mixed.
The last aspect of autobiographical memory relevant to this Chapter concerns
memory for previous attitudes and mental states. There exists ample empirical and
theoretical evidence that suggests that remembering personal events and beliefs is a
creative process and that people reconstruct their memories for previous attitudes
based on their current perspective, goals, knowledge and attitudes, and on their
implicit theories of stability and change, that is to say, their belief concerning
whether or not they have changed over time (e.g. Conway, 1996; Hyman & Loftus,
1998; Karniol & Ross, 1996; Levine, 1997; Levine, Prohaska, Burgess, Rice &
Laulhere, 2001; McFarland, Ross & Giltrow, 1992; Robinson, 1996). People's
implicit theories regarding consistency and change may be accurate and lead to
recollections of current attitudes that correspond relatively well with their previous
views, however, systematic memory biases may arise when the theory used does not
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reflect the actilal degree of change that has occurred over time. Specifically, people
tend to overestimate their stability and similarity between their past and present
states if they adopt an implicit theory of consistency in the face of actual change and,
conversely, they can exaggerate the amount of change over time if they adopt an
implicit theory of change in a context in which they have actually remained relatively
stable or little change has occurred (e.g. Ross, 1989). Moreover, there is evidence to
suggest that people tend to view their past, present and future in qualitatively
different ways. In particular, individuals are inclined to give their pasts mixed
reviews, being particularly critical for personally important attributes (e.g. self-
confidence, coping skills), whereas their views of current and future selves are
evaluated more favourably (e.g. Ross & Newby-Clark, 1998; Wilson & Ross, 2001).
A theory of temporal self-appraisal, according to which these results are interpreted,
has been recently put forward (Ross & Wilson, 2000). This theory proposes that
individuals tend to evaluate their past selves in a way that makes them feel good
about themselves at present and about their future prospects. Consequently, despite
the absence of actual improvement people seem to be inclined to present their current
selves in a better light than they do with their previous selves. Particularly relevant
for the present study are some investigations that have examined memory biases for
previous emotional states. In these studies, individuals are typically asked to recall
their emotional states either when they were anticipating or when they were coping
with a negative life event, and their reports are then compared to their actual previous
ratings. Using this prospective paradigm, depressed psychiatric inpatients have been
found to overestimate the intensity of their past depression (Schrader, Davis,
Stefanovic & Christie, 1990); chronic pain patients overestimated their pre-treatment
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levels of anxiety and depression as well as pain (Bryant, 1993); blood donors
exaggerated the intensity of their pre-donation anxiety (Breckler, 1994); and students
recalled being more anxious than what they had reported prior to their exam, and
especially so if at the time of recall they knew they had passed (Keuler & Safer,
1998). Therefore, these studies found that people tend to show a memory bias for
previous mental states in that they recall more intense negative emotional levels
compared to what they had initially reported, which suggests that they adopt an
implicit theory of change to an extent that goes beyond the actual degree of change.
In other words, the perceived amount of change is greater than the actual amount of
change.
Overall, the psychopathological aspects of the three areas of study reported above
have been relatively unexplored. In the present study we will report a follow-up
investigation of the relationship between the issues of accuracy of prediction, reality
monitoring, and memory biases for previous mental states on the one side, and
anxiety and depression on the other. Unfortunately, due to the high drop out rate on
the part of the outpatients we were unable to follow up a sufficiently large number of
participants to preserve our original tripartite clinical group subdivision (i.e. mainly
depressed, mainly anxious, and mixed anxious and depressed), so that our clinical
sample includes outpatients from the three initial groups. However, since also our
original depressed and anxious groups showed moderate levels of anxiety and
depression respectively, the resulting clinical sample will be a mixed anxious
depressed group composed by outpatients who at the time of initial assessment could
be located within Goldberg and Huxley's (1992) two-dimensional space defined in
Chapter 2 (Section 2. 6. 2.) and represented graphically in Figure 2. 6. Therefore, in
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the present investigation a newly formed mixed anxious-depressed group and control
participants will be followed up and tested on measures of accuracy of prediction,
reality monitoring, and memory biases for previous attitudes. These measures will be
based on, and related to, the participants' initial probability judgements of generated
and presented future life events assessed in Chapter 4. Specifically, participants will
be asked to indicate whether or not such events occurred (estimating accuracy of
prediction), whether each event was internally generated (PFT) or externally
presented (SPJT) (assessing reality monitoring), to re-judge each event for future
probability and also recall their previous ratings (measuring memory bias for
previous attitudes). This will allow us to extend these three areas of study to a
clinical sample with mixed anxious and depressive symptomatology.
In accordance with the background literature reviewed above, it is expected that:
a) outpatients will tend to be generally less accurate in their prediction of life events
relative to normal controls;
b) outpatients will exhibit poorer reality monitoring compared to controls and this
will be mediated by levels of dissociation;
c) outpatients will display a memory bias for previous probability judgements that
will go in a direction consistent with positive change over time (i.e.
overestimation of previous ratings for negative events and underestimation of
previous ratings for positive events), whilst the control group will not show any
memory bias indicating no significant change over time.
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5. 3. Method.
5. 3. 1. Experimental design.
Two separate experimental designs were employed depending on whether generated
or presented life events were considered. The first, regarding generated events, was a
2><2 mixed design with one within-subjects variable - Event (2: positive, negative)
- and one between-subjects variable - Group (2: mixed, control). When the
presented events were taken into account, a 3 x 2 experimental design with one
within-subjects variable - Event (3: depression relevant, anxiety relevant, positive) -
and one between-subjects variable - Group (2: mixed, control) was used. The
dependent variables were: the actual occurrence of the events, the estimated source
of events, prospective and retrospective judgements.
5. 3. 2. Participants.
There were two groups of participants who were recruited from the outpatients and
control subjects who took part in the studies described in the previous Chapter. The
first group comprised of 22 outpatients from the three clinical groups described in
Chapter 4 (Section 4. 4. 1. 2.). Of these, 7 were originally included in the depressed
group at which point in time they had met DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria for major
depression (MD) and: dysthymic disorder (DD) (1); sub-threshold GAD (2); DD and
sub-threshold GAD (1); DD and sub-threshold GAD and social phobia (SP) (1); DD
and sub-threshold GAD and panic disorder (PD) (1); and DD and sub-threshold PD
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and OCD (1). Six more outpatients had originally been included in the anxious group
since they had initially met criteria for GAD (1) or GAD and: PD with agoraphobia
(AP) (1); PD with AP and sub-threshold OCD (1); sub-threshold PD with AP (1);
PD, SP, and sub-threshold MD (1); and sub-threshold DD (1). Finally, 9 outpatients
were originally included in the mixed group because they had met criteria for: MD
and GAD (2); MD, DD, and GAD (1); MD, GAD, and PD with AP (2); MD, PD
with AP, and SP (1); DD, GAD, and sub-threshold MD and PD (1); MD, DD, GAD,
PD with AP, and SP (1); and MD, GAD PD with AP, SP, and OCD (1).
In order to ensure that the group of outpatients who took part in this study did not
differ from the group of outpatients who did not return at follow-up (i.e. dropouts),
between group comparisons were carried out on basic demographics, self-report
measures, and experimental control tasks used in the studies reported in the previous
Chapter, which provide some general measures of education and cognitive
functioning. The results of these analyses, reported in Table 5. 1. below, show no
significant group differences for any of the measures.
The control group was composed of 17 out of 20 of the original control sample with
no known history of emotional disorder.
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Table 5. 1. Group comparisons of clinical participants vs. clinical dropouts at
follow-up.
Variable Patient Group Test P<
Participants (« = 22) Dropouts (w = 31)
Gender (M/F) 10/12 13/18 X2(l) = 0.65 .80
Age 35.82 (10.20) 33.42 (11.90) GD II O -J .45
Initial measures
BDI-II 28.59 (9.98) 29.16 (14.35) GD II O o\ .87
STAI
State 49.86 (13.54) 48.48 (12.72) *(51) = 0.38 .71
Trait 61.09 (8.27) 59.58 (12.75) r(51) = 0.52 .60
MASQ
GD 44.68 (10.82) 44.06 (11.82) GD II O \o .85
N-SA 30.45 (6.68) 28.81 (7.30) oooIIin .41
AA 35.73 (11.77) 30.87 (10.84) *(51) = 1.55 .13
N-SD 37.09 (10.35) 38.48 (12.72) CN"SfrOII
■
iin .67
AD 82.95 (11.63) 80.06 (17.68) /(51) = 0.72 .48
BHS 12.64 (3.72) 12.42 (6.00) oIIin .87
PSQW 67.64 (8.42) 64.84 (12.19) t(51) = 0.93 .36
Self-Esteem -5.91 (8.11) -6.26 (8.13) GD II O GD .88
MHVS 20.36(4.17) 20.74 (4.55) r(51) = 0.31 .76
FAS-Test 37.59 (10.30) 41.84 (12.14) *(51) = 1.33 .19
SPRT 2559.73 (1006.49) 2294.61 (733.27) *(51) = 1.11 .27
Note: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory;
MASQ = Mood and Anxiety Symptom Questionnaire; GD = General Disturbance;
N-SA = Non-Specific Anxiety; AA = Anxious Arousal; N-SD = Non-Specific
Depression; AD = Anhedonic Depression; BHS = Beck Hopelessness Scale; PSWQ
= Penn State Worry Questionnaire; MHVS = Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale; FAS-Test
= Verbal Fluency Test; SPRT = Subject-Paced Reading Task. Standard Deviations in
parentheses.
5. 3. 3. Apparatus and materials.
Questionnaires. The following self-report questionnaires were used and
administered in the given order (see Appendix 2.): Beck Depression Inventory-II
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(BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996); State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et ah,
1983); Mood and Anxiety Symptoms Questionnaire (MASQ; Watson et ah, 1995a;
1995b); Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck et ah, 1974); Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer et ah, 1990); Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES;
Bernstein & Putnam, 1986); Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965).
Experimental task. The experimental task used in this study consisted of a "paper-
and-pencil" questionnaire (see Appendix 3. for an example). Each questionnaire was
individually prepared for each participant and contained the positive and negative life
events the person had generated during the PFT and all of the 72 depression relevant,
anxiety relevant and positive life events every participant was presented during the
SPJT. Therefore, each questionnaire was composed of a common set of events, equal
for all participants, and a personal set of events, specific to each participant, so that
the final number of events contained in each questionnaire varied depending on the
number of events each participant was able to generate during the PFT. Participants
had been previously exposed to both types of events, presented and generated, twice:
in the PFT during the generation and judgement phases, and in the SPJT during the
course of the two experimental conditions (subliminal and supraliminal). All
generated sentences were changed slightly to fit the format of the presented events in
order to make a homogeneous set of life events and to prevent easy recognition of the
generated events. For example, if a participant generated the event "My husband
(name) will leave me", this sentence would be changed into "Your partner will leave
you". Questionnaires were prepared so that both types of events (generated and
presented) were randomised and different random orders were used for each
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participant's task. The only restriction to the randomisation process was the
presentation of a positive event at the beginning of the task and 2 positive events at
the end, in order to minimise the risk of a final negative mood induction. Participants
were asked to consider each of the events in turn and indicate whether they had
happened since the first experimental session, whether they had been generated by
themselves or presented to them during the previous experimental session, and also
rate each event on 10-point scales (1 = Not at all likely, 10 = Extremely likely) for
probability of the event happening, or happening again, in the next 12 months and
finally to recall what their original probability rating was.
5. 3. 4. Procedure.
All participants to the experiments described in Chapter 4 were informed that a
second and final research session would follow in a few months time. Thus,
approximately 4 months after the first session participants were invited to attend,
individually, a second time. Participants were administered the questionnaires and,
after a brief reminder of what the first research session had involved, they were
introduced to the task. Subjects were given the exact date of the first session to be
used as time frame and were informed about the formatting of the generated events.
Moreover, they were encouraged to answer and guess if necessary all the questions
asking whether the events had been generated or presented and about their previous
probability ratings. After the completion of task, participants were debriefed and the
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders - Research Version
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(SCID-I; First et al., 1996) was used to ascertain the participants' current clinical
status.
5. 4. Results.
5. 4. 1. Subject characteristics.
Following clinical interviews with the outpatients it became clear that whilst the
majority of our clinical sample had undergone Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT;
e.g. Hawton, Salkovskis, Kirk & Clark, 1989) or was in process of receiving
psychological treatment, a smaller group had declined or had not yet received such
treatment. Therefore we collected data from people who had improved somewhat
their mental state and people whose condition had remained relatively stable over
time. Since severity of symptomatology is likely to affect performance on the task
administered and one of the main aims was to look at memory biases for previous
mental states and attitudes following change, it was decided to split our clinical
sample into two groups. The majority of outpatients (n - 16), who had shown clear
signs of improvement, were included in our main clinical sample referred to as
"recovery" group. Outpatients in this group had either received or were in process of
receiving CBT treatment. A smaller sample of outpatients (n = 6) who had either
declined or not yet commenced CBT treatment and who showed no sign of
improvement over time was referred to as "stable" group. Outpatients in the stable
group met DSM-IV-TR criteria for: MD and sub-threshold GAD (2); MD, DD, and
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sub-threshold GAD and PD (1); MD, GAD, and PD with AP (1); MD, GAD, PD
with AP, and SP (1); and MD, GAD, PD with AP, SP and 0CD (1). In the recovery
group, outpatients met criteria for: MD and GAD (1); MD and sub-threshold OCD
(1); sub-threshold GAD (1); sub-threshold MD and GAD (2); sub-threshold MDE,
GAD and PD (1); sub-threshold MD, PD and SP (1); sub-threshold MD, GAD, PD
with AP (1); and only very mild or no anxious or depressive symptomatology for the
remaining 8 outpatients. Important for the present study is the fact that also where (in
two cases) full criteria were met for an anxiety or depressive disorder, the severity of
such disorders was reduced compared to what was registered during the initial
assessment approximately four months previously, thus indicating that a certain
amount of change had occurred. This subdivision was supported by results obtained
















































































































































































Note:BDI-II=eckDepressionInventory-II;STAI=tat T aitAnxietyInventory;M SQ= danAnx etySymptom Questionnaire;GD=ner lDisturbance;N-SAon- pec ficA xiety;=iousArousal;N-SDon- pe ificD r s on;
=AnhedonicDepress on;BHSckHop l ssnessScale;PSWQ= nt tW rryQu tion aire;DES=is ociativeExperie ces Scale.Withineachrow,mea sth ts resubscriptlett rinlower a ediffersig ificantlyf mmeanreportinghmel tt r uppercase(<.05,atle st).StandardDeviationsi parentheses.
Table 5. 2. shows that the three groups did not differ in terms of gender, age and
number of days between the initial research session and the second follow-up
session, although the time gap between the two tended to be slightly longer for the
clinical samples due to a general tendency on the part of the patients to procrastinate
their follow-up appointment for personal reasons. The top half of Table 5. 2. shows
that the control group scored lower than both clinical groups on the questionnaires
administered during the first research session, and also that the two clinical groups
did not differ from each other on these measures apart from a higher Anxious
Arousal component in the stable group. The bottom half of Table 5. 2., which refers
to the measures administered at follow-up, also shows that the control group scored
significantly lower compared to the other two groups, however, the recovery and
stable groups differed from each other with the former obtaining intermediate scores.
In order to quantify the amount of change occurred over time separate t-tests were
carried out for each of the repeated measures within the three groups. Consistent with
the hypotheses, results indicated that no significant change had occurred in the
control group, and that only a negligible amount of change had occurred in the stable
group, that is slightly lower scores at follow-up for two of the repeated measures:
STAI-T 1(5) = 2.60, p < .05 and PSWQ l(5) = 3.31, p < .05, although these may be
due to the small number of cases in this group. However, in the recovery group there
was a substantial change as measured by large reductions on self-report scores
obtained at follow-up. Specifically, this decrease was evident for scores on BDI-II
1(15) = 5.98, p < .001; STAI-T 1(15) = 4.99, p < .001; STAI-S 1(15) = 3.51, p < .01;
MASQ-GD 1(15) = 4.02, p < .001; MASQ-NSA 1(15) = 3.54, p < .01; MASQ-AA
1(15) = 2.43, p < .05; MASQ-NSD 1(15) = 5.11, p < .001; MASQ-AD 1(15) = 5.87, p
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< .001; BHS 1(15) = 5.86, p < .001; RSES 1(15) = 4.41, p < .001; and a nearly
significant trend for PSWQ 1(15) = 2.06, p < .057.
Therefore, results so far support our group division in terms of stability and change,
and suggest that the two clinical groups identified could be though of individuals
varying in their levels of mixed anxious and depressive symptomatology who could
be positioned somewhere within the two-dimensional space suggested by Goldberg
and Huxley (1992).
5. 4. 2. Experimental task.
Data reduction. Participants' original probability judgements on the PFT and mean
probability judgements on the SPJT (since in this task each event was rated twice)
were recoded as indicating a positive probability judgement (i.e. "Yes, it will
happen") if the original rating was > 5, and as a negative probability judgement (i.e.
"No, it will not happen") if the rating was < 5. Then, for two of the three parts of this
study, accuracy of prediction and reality monitoring, indexes were computed for each
participant. An Accuracy Index (AI) was calculated by subtracting the number of
incorrect predictions from the number of correct predictions and dividing the
difference by the total number of predictions (i.e. [(correct - incorrect) / N],
Consequently, -1 would be the lowest possible accuracy score and +1 the highest
possible accuracy index score. A similar procedure was followed for the reality
monitoring data, so that a Reality Monitoring Index (RMI) was computed for each
participant by subtracting the number of incorrect source estimates from the number
of correct source estimates and dividing the difference by the total number of
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estimates (i.e. [(correct - incorrect) / N], Consequently, -1 would be the lowest
possible RMI score and +1 the highest possible RMI score. In both cases indexes
were calculated separately for generated (positive and negative) and presented
(depression relevant, anxiety relevant, and positive) events. Finally, for the third part
of the study regarding memory biases, retrospective judgements were subtracted
from prospective judgements to gain a measure ofperceived change (+ve number =
now more likely to happen, and -ve number = now less likely to happen); previous or
original judgements were subtracted from prospective judgements to obtain a
measure of actual change (+ve number = now more likely to happen, and -ve
number = now less likely to happen); and retrospective judgements were subtracted
from previous judgements to get a measure of memory bias for previous attitudes (-
ve number for negative events and +ve number for positive events = negative
memory bias for previous mental states: "It was really bad", worse than it actually
was; whereas, +ve number for negative events and -ve number for positive events =
positive memory bias for previous mental states: "It wasn't that bad"). As for the
indexes described above, these measures were calculated separately for generated
(positive and negative) and presented (depression relevant, anxiety relevant, and
positive) events and for each participant. These newly computed measures were then
used for the statistical analyses described below.
Accuracy of prediction. A summary of the descriptive statistics (means and
standard deviations) regarding AI for the generated and presented events in each
group is shown in Table 5. 3. and Table 5. 4. respectively.
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Table 5. 3. Accuracy of prediction. Mean Al for each group in the negative




Negative .27 (.27) .16 (.40) .31 (.40)
Positive .28 (.69) .27 (.34) .33 (.32)
Table 5. 4. Accuracy of prediction. Mean Al for each group in each of the




Depression relevant .24 (.19) .29 (.35) .59 (.23)
Anxiety relevant .42 (.20) .51 (.22) .67 (.25)
Positive .36 (.45) .35 (.23) .49 (.18)
When generated events were considered, a 2 x 3 ANOVA with Event (positive vs.
negative) as a within-subjects variable and Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a
between-subjects variable showed no significant effects of any of the factors,
indicating that none of the groups was particularly accurate for generated negative or
positive events (see top half of Figure 5. 1. below). Conversely, a 3 x 3 ANOVA
with Event (depression, anxiety, and positive) as a within-subjects factor and Group
(stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects factor carried out for the
presented events revealed significant main effects of Event A(2,35) = 4.36, p < 0.05
and Group F{2,36) = 8.12,/? < 0.001 (see bottom half of Figure 5. 1. below).
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Figure 5. 1. Accuracy of prediction. Mean Al for generated and presented

























































Within-group analyses indicated no difference in accuracy in the stable group F(2,4)
= 4.04, ns. On the other hand, the recovery group was more accurate for anxiety
relevant compared to depression relevant events F(l,15) = 6.11, p < 0.05. The
control group was also more accurate for anxiety events but compared to positive
ones F(l,16) = 5.83, p < 0.05. Between-group analyses showed a main effect of
depression events F(2,36) = 6.00, p < 0.01 with Scheffe's post hoc analyses
indicating that contrary to prediction the control group was more accurate than the
clinical groups (p < 0.05) in this condition. A main effect of anxiety events was also
found F(2,36) = 3.41, p < 0.05 indicating some group variability but no two groups
differed from each other significantly.
Reality monitoring. Table 5. 5. and Table 5. 6. show descriptive statistics for RMI
in the three groups for generated and presented events respectively.
Table 5. 5. Reality monitoring. Mean RMI for each group in the negative and




Negative .46 (.40) .46 (.44) .21 (.53)
Positive .69 (.24) .62 (.38) .47 (.43)
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Table 5. 6. Reality monitoring. Mean RMI for each group in each of the three




Depression relevant .29 (.38) .53 (.36) .75 (.21)
Anxiety relevant .38 (.21) .36 (.41) .64 (.26)
Positive .51 (.20) .50 (.40) .52 (.19)
The results of a 2 x 3 ANOVA with Event (positive vs. negative) as a within-subjects
variable and Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects variable for
generated events, revealed a significant main effect of Event F(l,36) = 4.44, p <
0.05, but no other within or between-groups differences were found indicating that
generally all groups had better reality monitoring for positive compared to negative
events (see top half of Figure 5. 2.). Turning to presented events, a 3 x 3 ANOVA
with Event (depression, anxiety, and positive) as a within-subjects variable and
Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects variable showed a
significant interaction Event x Group F(4,72) = 4.12, p < 0.01 (see bottom half of
Figure 5. 2.). Within-group analyses showed that the stable group yielded a higher
RMI score for positive than anxiety and depression events F(l,5) = 7.43, p < 0.05;
whereas, the recovery group obtained a higher RMI score for depression relevant and
positive events compared to anxiety relevant events F(l,15) = 9.02, p < 0.01. In
contrast, the control group showed better reality monitoring for depression and
anxiety relevant than for positive events F(2,15) = 27.04, p < 0.001.
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Figure 5. 2. Reality monitoring. Mean RMI for generated and presented








Between group analyses showed a main effect of depression events F(2,36) = 5.33, p
< 0.01 with post hoc tests indicating a significantly higher RMI score for control
group compared to the stable group {p < 0.05) in this condition. Also for anxiety
events a main effect was found F(2,36) = 3.42, p < 0.05 but no group differences
were significant.
In order to test the hypothesis that levels of dissociation would mediate reality
monitoring, separate linear regressions were computed for each RMI with DES
scores as the independent variable. Results revealed the DES scores significantly
predicted RMI levels only in the depression relevant condition of the presented
events R = 0.36, R2 = 0.13, F(l,36) = 5.33,p < 0.05.
Previous probability judgements. Although previous probability judgements have
been dealt with in Chapter 4, since the group formation has changed and these ratings
will be used to look at memory biases, below is a summary of the ratings for
presented (Table 5. 7.) and generated events (Table 5. 8.) for the three groups in each
condition.
Table 5. 7. Previous probability judgements. Mean probability judgements for
each group in the negative and positive conditions of the
generated events. (Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Event type Group
Stable Recovery Control
Negative 6.74 (2.10) 5.72 (0.76) 4.71 (2.15)
Positive 6.52 (2.36) 6.81 (1.41) 7.58 (1.69)
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Table 5. 8. Previous probability judgements. Mean probability judgements for
each group in each of the three conditions of the presented
events. (Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Event type Group
Stable Recovery Control
Depression relevant 5.71 (0.94) 5.65 (1.36) 3.13 (0.85)
Anxiety relevant 5.52 (1.14) 5.36 (0.87) 3.55 (0.84)
Positive 4.43 (1.13) 5.10(1.31) 7.33 (1.09)
A 2 x 3 ANOVA with Event (positive vs. negative) as a within-subjects variable and
Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects variable for generated
events, revealed a significant main effect of Event F(l,36) = 12.40,/? < 0.001 and a
significant interaction Event x Group F(2,36) = 6.55,/? < 0.01 (see top half of Figure
5. 3.). Moreover, both the recovery and control groups had lower expectancy for
negative compared to positive events Z(15) = 2.49,/? < .05 and /(16) = 6.35,/? < .001
respectively, but not the stable group t(5) = 0.19, ns. Between-group analyses
revealed a main effect of negative events F(2,36) = 3.49,/? < 0.05 indicating a certain
degree of variability in this condition but no groups differed significantly from each
other. A 3 x 3 ANOVA with Event (depression, anxiety, and positive) as a within-
subjects variable and Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects
variable was carried out to look at ratings for presented events. This showed a
significant main effect of Event 7^(2,35) = 4.89,/? < 0.01, Group F{2,36) = 4.90,/? <
0.01 and a interaction Event x Group F(4,72) = 9.59, p < 0.001 (see bottom half of
Figure 5. 3.). No within-group effects were found for the two clinical groups, but the
control group showed higher expectancy for positive compared to depression
relevant and anxiety relevant events F(2,15) = 71.33,/? <0.001.
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Figure 5. 3. Previous probability judgements. Mean judgements for generated





























Finally, between-groups main effects were found for depression relevant F{2,36) =
25.41, p < 0.001, anxiety F{2,36) = 20.39, p < 0.001 relevant and positive events
F(2,36) = 20.39, p < 0.001, with post hoc analyses showing that, compared to the
two clinical groups, the control group reported lower expectancy for depression and
anxiety events and higher expectancy for positive events (p < 0.05).
Prospective probability judgements. A summary of means and standard
deviations for prospective probability ratings for generated and presented events is
given below on Table 5. 9. and Table 5. 10.
Table 5. 9. Prospective probability judgements. Mean probability judgements
for each group in the negative and positive conditions of the
generated events. (Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Event type Group
Stable Recovery Control
Negative 6.80 (1.43) 4.75 (1.50) 4.31 (1.93)
Positive 5.80 (2.94) 7.27(1.49) 7.54(1.54)
Table 5. 10. Prospective probability judgements. Mean probability
judgements for each group in each of the three conditions




Depression relevant 5.60 (0.98) 4.40 (1.17) 3.43 (1.53)
Anxiety relevant 5.82 (1.21) 4.44(1.01) 3.65 (1.37)
Positive 4.58 (0.98) 6.09 (1.26) 7.00(1.06)
The 2x3 ANOVA with Event (positive vs. negative) as a within-subjects variable
and Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects variable carried out
283
for generated events, showed a significant main effect of Event F(l,36) = 12.89, p <
0.001 and a significant interaction Event x Group F(2,36) = 6.60, /? < 0.01 (see top
half of Figure 5. 4.). Further within-group tests revealed that both the recovery and
the control group had higher expectancy for positive than negative events /(15) =
4.45, p < .001 and t(16) = 6.38,p < .001 respectively, but no difference was found in
the stable group /(5) = 0.64, ns. Between-groups analyses indicated a main effect in
the negative events condition F(2,36) = 4.82, p < 0.05, with post hoc tests showing
that the stable group rated negative events as being more likely to happen compared
to the control group (p < 0.05) and recovery group (trend approaching significance,/?
< 0.054). When presented events were considered, a 3 x 3 ANOVA with Event
(depression, anxiety, and positive) as a within-subjects variable and Group (stable,
recovery, and control) as a between-subjects variable showed a significant main
effect of Event F(2,35) = 10.19,/? < 0.001, and a interaction Event x Group F(4,72)
= 6.56,/? < 0.001 (see bottom half of Figure 5. 4.). Within-group analyses indicated
that both the recovery and the control groups had higher expectancy for positive than
depression or anxiety relevant events F(2,14) = 6.45,/? < 0.01 and F(2,15) = 46.53,/?
< 0.001 respectively, but no difference within the stable group F(2,4) = 1.85, ns.
Finally, between-groups analyses showed the presence of significant main effects in
the three conditions of depression relevant F(2,36) = 6.39, p < 0.01, anxiety relevant
F(2,36) = 7.33, p < 0.01, and positive events F(2,36) = 10.24, p < 0.001, with post
hoc analyses showing that in both the depression and anxiety relevant events
conditions the control group had lower expectancy compared to the stable group, and
that in the positive events condition the both recovery and control groups reported
higher expectancy ratings than the stable group (p < 0.05).
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Figure 5. 4. Prospective probability judgements. Mean judgements for









Retrospective .probability judgements. Table 5. 11. and Table 5. 12. below
summarise the retrospective probability judgements for generated and presented
events reported by the three groups.
Table 5. 11. Retrospective probability judgements. Mean probability
judgements for each group in the negative and positive




Negative 7.00 (1.39) 6.46(1.48) 4.49 (1.86)
Positive 5.74 (2.72) 6.19 (2.00) 7.48 (1.40)
Table 5. 12. Retrospective probability judgements. Mean probability
judgements for each group in each of the three conditions




Depression relevant 5.43 (1.05) 5.51 (1.44) 3.36 (1.52)
Anxiety relevant 5.70 (1.24) 5.38 (1.25) 3.50(1.19)
Positive 4.90 (0.76) 4.25 (1.22) 6.76 (1.12)
A 2 x 3 ANOVA with Event (positive vs. negative) as a within-subjects variable and
Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects variable carried out for
generated events, showed a significant interaction of Event x Group F(2,36) = 11.23,
p < 0.001 (see top half of Figure 5. 5.). T-tests indicated that the control group rated
positive events as being more likely to happen than negative ones t(16) = 5.94, p <
.001, whilst no within-group differences were found for the other two groups.
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Figure 5. 5. Retrospective probability judgements. Mean judgements for
















Also when presented events were considered, a 3 x 3 ANOVA with Event
(depression, anxiety, and positive) as a within-subjects variable and Group (stable,
recovery, and control) as a between-subjects variable showed a significant interaction
Event x Group F(4,72) = 9.16, p < 0.001 (see bottom half of Figure 5. 5.). Within-
group analyses indicated that whilst the stable group did not differ significantly in its
ratings across conditions F(2,4) = 1.23, ns, the recovery group provided higher
ratings for depression and anxiety events compared to positive ones F(l,15) = 4.84,/?
< 0.05, and the control group showed the opposite pattern by giving higher
probability ratings for positive events compared to depression or anxiety relevant
events F(l,16) = 70.73,p < 0.001. Between-groups analyses showed significant main
effects for all the conditions: depression events F(2,36) = 10.63 ,P< 0 .001, anxiety
events F(2,36) = 12.55,/? < 0.001, and positive events F(2,36) = 21.52,/? < 0.001. As
expected, Scheffe's post hoc tests indicated that, compared to the two clinical groups,
the control group reported lower expectancy ratings for depression and anxiety
events and higher ratings for positive events (/? < 0.05).
Perceived change. A summary of the amount of change perceived by each group
for generated and presented events is given below on Table 5. 13. and Table 5. 14.
Table 5. 13. Perceived change. Mean perception of change for each group in
the negative and positive conditions of the generated events.
(Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Event type Group
Stable Recovery Control
Negative -0.20 (0.50) -1.71 (1.66) -0.18 (0.88)
Positive 0.07 (0.77) 1.08 (1.87) 0.06 (0.95)
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Table 5. 14. Perceived change. Mean perception of change for each group in




Depression relevant 0.17 (0.42) -1.11 (1.10) 0.07 (0.50)
Anxiety relevant 0.12 (0.21) -0.94 (1.13) 0.15 (0.31)
Positive -0.31 (0.47) 1.85 (0.92) 0.24 (0.43)
When a 2 x 3 ANOVA with Event (positive vs. negative) as a within-subjects
variable and Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects variable was
carried out for generated events, it showed a significant main effect of Event ^(1,36)
= 11.93, p < 0.001 and a significant interaction Event x Group F(2,36) = 9.67, p <
0.001 (see top half of Figure 5. 6.). As predicted, t-tests indicated a reduction in
negative expectancy only in the recovery group /(15) = 4.33, p < .001, whereas the
other two groups remained relatively constant over time. Between-groups analyses
also revealed a significant main effect in the negative events condition F(2,36) =
7.26, p < 0.01, with post hoc tests indicating that, compared to the stable and control
groups, the recovery group reported a reduction in expectancy ratings for negative
events {p < 0.05). Similarly, when a 3 x 3 ANOVA with Event (depression, anxiety,
and positive) as a within-subjects variable and Group (stable, recovery, and control)
as a between-subjects variable was carried out for presented events, it showed a
significant main effect of Event F(2,35) = 8.22, p < 0.001, and a interaction Event x
Group F(4,72) = 8.28, p < 0.001 (see bottom half of Figure 5. 6.). As predicted,
within-group analyses showed a significant increase in expectancy for positive
events and a decrease for depression and anxiety events in the recovery group
7^(2,14) = 22.69, p < 0.001.
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Figure 5. 6. Perceived change. Mean perception of change for generated and


































































Conversely, the stable group showed a reduction of expectancy for positive events
compared to anxious relevant ones -F(l,5) = 7.41, p < 0.05, and no change was
evident for the control group F(2,15) = 0.49, ns. Finally, between-groups analyses
revealed significant main effects for the depression F{2,36) = 10.64, p < 0.001,
anxiety F(2,36) = 9.40,/? < 0.001 and positive events conditions F(2,36) = 32.65,/? <
0.001, with post hoc tests indicating that, compared to the stable and control groups,
the recovery group reported reduced expectancy ratings for depression and anxiety
events and increased ratings for positive events (/? < 0.05).
Actual change. Means and standard deviations for the amount of actual change in
probability ratings for generated and presented events in the three groups are
reported on Table 5. 15. and Table 5. 16. below.
Table 5. 15. Actual change. Mean actual change for each group in the
negative and positive conditions of the generated events.
(Standard deviations in parentheses.)
Event type Group
Stable Recovery Control
Negative 0.06(1.71) -0.97(1.63) -0.40 (2.15)
Positive -0.71 (4.41) 0.47 (1.51) -0.04(1.29)
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Table 5. 16. Actual change. Mean actual change for each group in each of




Depression relevant -0.11 (0.54) -1.25 (1.30) 0.30(1.47)
Anxiety relevant 0.30 (0.83) -0.93 (1.14) 0.10(1.10)
Positive 0.15 (0.57) 0.99 (1.12) -0.34 (0.70)
The results of a 2 x 3 ANOVA with Event (positive vs. negative) as a within-subjects
variable and Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects variable
carried out for generated events, showed no significant effects. However, as
predicted within-group analyses indicated that the recovery group reported a
decrease in expectancy ratings for negative compared to positive events r(15) = 2.55,
p < .05 (see top half of Figure 5. 7.). No between-groups differences were found. On
the other hand, when a 3 x 3 ANOVA with Event (depression, anxiety, and positive)
as a within-subjects variable and Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-
subjects variable was carried out for presented events, it showed a significant
interaction of Event x Group F(4,72) = 5.82, p < 0.001 (see bottom half of Figure 5.
7.). Once again, the recovery group reported a decrease in expectancy ratings for
depression and anxiety events and an increased expectancy for positive events
F(2,14) = 10.94, p < 0.001, whereas the other two groups did not show significant
within-group effects. Between-group s analyses revealed main effects for the
depression F(2,36) = 5.96, p < 0.01, anxiety F(2,36) = 4.74, p < 0.05 and positive
events conditions A(2,36) = 9.27, p < 0.001, and post hoc tests indicated that the
recovery group reported a reduction in expectancy ratings for depression and anxiety
events and an increase in ratings for positive events compared to controls {p < 0.05).
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Figure 5. 7. Actual change. Mean actual change for generated and presented









Memory bias. The amount of memory bias exhibited by the three groups in their
probability ratings for generated and presented events are reported below on Table 5.
17. and Table 5. 18.
Table 5. 17. Memory bias. Mean memory bias for each group in the negative




Negative -0.26 (1.58) -0.74(1.30) 0.22 (2.06)
Positive 0.78(4.14) 0.62 (1.44) 0.10 (1.21)
Table 5. 18. Memory bias. Mean memory bias for each group in each of the




Depression relevant 0.28 (0.49) 0.14(1.34) -0.23 (1.42)
Anxiety relevant -0.18 (0.74) -0.01 (1.03) 0.05 (0.93)
Positive -0.47 (0.78) 0.86 (0.79) 0.57 (0.64)
A 2 x 3 ANOVA with Event (positive vs. negative) as a within-subjects variable and
Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects variable carried out for
generated events showed a significant main effect of Event F(l,36) = 4.43, p < 0.05
(see top half of Figure 5. 8.). As hypothesised, within-group analyses indicated that
only the recovery group showed a negative memory bias for presented events t(15) =
3.82, p < .01, whilst no between-groups differences were found.
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Figure 5. 8. Memory bias. Mean memory bias for generated and presented















When a 3 x 3 ANOVA with Event (depression, anxiety, and positive) as a within-
subjects variable and Group (stable, recovery, and control) as a between-subjects
variable was carried out for presented events, no significant main effects were found.
However, as expected, only the recovery group exhibited a negative memory bias for
positive events compared to depression and anxiety relevant F(l,15) = 5.51,p < 0.05
(see bottom half of Figure 5. 8.). Finally, between-groups analyses showed a
significant main effect in the positive events condition F(2,36) = 7.30,/? < 0.01, with
post hoc tests indicating that the recovery and control groups reported a negative
memory bias in this condition compared to the stable group (p < 0.05).
5. 4. 3. Results summary.
To summarise the results of this study, outpatients were less accurate in their
prediction of future negative (depression and anxiety relevant) events, and had
poorer reality monitoring for the same negative events compared to controls.
Moreover, only the recovery group exhibited a negative memory bias for previous
mental states and attitudes. This was due to the fact that their perception of positive
change was greater than the actual amount of change, resulting in the patients
overestimating their expectancy for prior negative events and underestimating their




The results of this follow-up study are mainly consistent with the experimental
hypotheses put forward earlier in this Chapter. Starting from accuracy of prediction
in psychopathological and normal states, it was hypothesised that outpatients would
be less accurate than controls. Although all groups were found to be moderately
accurate, in that accuracy index (AI) values in all conditions were positive, no within
or between-groups differences were found for the generated events. However, when
comparing groups' performance on accuracy of prediction results from a
predetermined set of life events (i.e. presented) may be more precise in that it is
possible to control for idiosyncratic features of events that might interfere directly
with the probability of such events happening. For example, if outpatients had the
tendency to generate events that were over-general (e.g. Williams et al., 1996) or
unrealistic, such as "I will stop worrying about things" then the probability of them
happening would be lower than a specific event such as "I will go to a dinner party in
three weeks time". Conversely, when presented events were considered, the two
clinical groups were generally less accurate in their predictions of future life events,
and significantly so for depression relevant ones. These results are consistent with
previous research findings that showed lower levels of accuracy of prediction in
mildly depressed students and greater accuracy in controls (e.g. Dunning & Story,
1991), but are inconsistent with studies that have found dysphorics being more
accurate for pessimistic predictions (e.g. Dowse & McClure, 1996; Shrauger et al.,
1998). In fact, outpatients in our sample did make more pessimistic predictions
compared to the control group by showing greater expectancy for depression and
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anxiety events and lower expectancy for positive events, but showed no improved
accuracy for such events. The only sign in this direction was the greater accuracy for
anxiety compared to depression events in the recovery group, but this seems to be
circumscribed to this type of event and does not reflect a general increase in accuracy
level for negative events in this group, especially because it is unaccompanied by an
equivalent tendency in the stable group. Given the considerable group difference
between the two clinical groups and the control group for anxiety and, especially so,
for depression events, these results seem to suggest that outpatients were generally
less accurate for negative life events. On the other hand, the control group exhibited
relatively less accuracy for positive events, which is consistent with literature
showing overconfidence in predicting positive compared to negative events (Pulford
& Colman, 1996). The main limitation of this investigation of accuracy of prediction
regards the timeframe. Specifically, original predictions referred to a time frame of
twelve months, whereas the follow-up session took place approximately four months
later. Therefore, is it plausible that some of the predicted events had not yet
happened at the time of testing. However, the timeframe was equivalent for all
participants and mean AI ranged from .24 to .67 on a scale ranging from -1 to +1,
indicating that most events had already taken place (at least once) and that predicting
life events over longer periods of time did not interfere with accuracy levels.
Consistent with this view are results that indicate that the use of different timeframes
does not affect individuals' expectancy for future positive and negative events
(MacLeod et al., 1997a; 1998). Hence, this investigation extends the assessment of
accuracy of prediction to a clinical population with varying severity of mixed
anxious and depressive symptomatology.
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Turning our attention to reality monitoring, participants were found to be generally
able to distinguish between internally generated and externally presented events, as
the positive reality monitoring index (RMI) values indicate. Analyses of RMI for
generated events showed only a general tendency for all groups to be more accurate
in their source attribution for positive than negative events, and although controls
seem to have poorer RMI, no within or between-groups differences were found.
However, when we considered presented events, control subjects were found to
possess better reality monitoring than outpatients for depression and anxiety events
as hypothesised, but, contrary to expectation, not for positive events. For presented
events, a lower RMI indicates that participants are endorsing events of a particular
type erroneously, since all events have in fact an external source. Conversely, a
higher RMI indicates that the person is attributing the source of events of a particular
type correctly to an external source. As a result, compared to controls, outpatients
tended to think that more negative events had an internal origin (i.e. "I must have
thought that"), whereas controls tended to distance themselves from such negative
events. Interestingly, the recovery group yielded an intermediate RMI score for the
depression relevant events compared to the other two groups, which might reflect
their improved condition. The phenomenon of endorsement of negative events or
attributes (e.g. Dozois & Dobson, 2001; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999) is therefore held
responsible for the poorer reality monitoring in the outpatients groups.
Another factor implicated in the ability to discriminate internally generated from
externally presented events was the level of dissociation. DES scores were found to
significantly predict part of the variance observed in the depression relevant events
condition. The stable group obtained DES scores significantly higher compared to
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controls, and the recovery group yielded intermediate scores. This pattern resembles
closely the one obtained in the RMI depression relevant condition, and is consistent
with recent evidence that DES scores were significantly associated with positive
response biases on a life events inventory (Merckelbach et al., 2000). Therefore it
would appear that outpatients had the tendency to endorse the generation of negative
life events and that levels of dissociation mediated this process.
The analyses of previous probability judgements showed an interesting effect in the
negative condition of the generated events indicating that not only the control group
but also the recovery group (although not as strongly) had reported lower probability
ratings for negative relative to positive life events. Thus, the performance of the
recovery group resembles our anxious group's performance on the PFT judgements.
However, this similarity disappears when presented events where considered. In this
case, in fact, both the stable and recovery groups showed comparable probability
ratings for all of the event types (i.e. depression, anxiety, and positive) unlike any of
the original three clinical groups. This effect is plausibly due to the fact that our
current outpatient sample comprises individuals deriving from the original depressed,
anxious and mixed groups, so that the distinguishing features among the three
clinical groups have been here levelled out. However, for the present investigation
these previous judgements constitute only a baseline against which accuracy of
prediction and memory biases following change were compared. Moreover,
following treatment, any original group distinction would only hold a nominal value,
since, as argued by Goldberg and Huxley (1992) (see Chapter 2, Section 2. 6. 2.),
individuals do not occupy a fixed position within the two dimensional axes of
anxiety and depression, but move around in response to environmental stresses and,
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to say it with the authors, "restitution" processes. Consequently, our present clinical
groups, divided following current clinical interview and self-report measures, reflect
well a sample with mixed anxious and depressive symptomatology varying in terms
of severity and of its perceived/actual change.
Consistent with our hypothesis, when retrospective judgements were analysed, the
recovery group showed important changes, in that the original "optimism" registered
in the negative condition of the PFT events vanished with an equivalent rating being
reported for positive and negative events, and its even-handed attitude exhibited in
the original judgements of SPJT events turned into a more pessimistic view with
lower expectancy ratings given to positive events. On the other hand, the prospective
judgements of the recovery group did show a brighter view of the future with
expectancy ratings very similar to the ones given by the control subjects. As a result,
the magnitude ofperceived change was greater than the amount of actual change. In
fact, analyses of perception of change in attitudes towards future events (i.e.
prospective judgements - retrospective judgements) revealed that the recovery group
had lower expectancy for negative events (both generated and presented depression
and anxiety relevant) and increased expectancy for positive events (especially
presented ones) differing significantly from the other two groups. However, when the
extent of actual change (i.e. prospective judgements - previous judgements) was
examined, the magnitude of such change was reduced so that no group differences
were found for the generated events, and the recovery group did not differ from the
stable group in their change of attitudes for presented events. Therefore, in line with
our predictions, the recovery group exhibited a memory bias (i.e. previous
judgements - retrospective judgements; or perceived change - actual change) for
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previous attitudes and mental states. Specifically, for generated life events the
recovery group remembered having greater expectancy for negative events and lower
expectancy for positive events than it actually did; and for presented events, it
showed relative accuracy for negative (depression and anxiety relevant) events, but
again reported having had lower expectancy for positive events than it actually did.
All in all, these results are consistent with previous studies that demonstrated that
individuals who are asked to remember their emotional states of either when they
were anticipating or when they were coping with a negative life event, typically
overestimate the intensity of prior negative emotional levels (e.g. Breckler, 1994;
Bryant, 1993; Schrader et al., 1990) and, as in our case, underestimate the degree of
positive emotions. Moreover, since our group was recovering from a past anxious
and/or depressive episode, our findings confirm that this memory bias is especially
evident when people are in a better position then they were previously (Keuler &
Safer, 1998). These results are also consistent with the theory of temporal self-
appraisal mentioned earlier in this Chapter (Ross & Wilson, 2000). In fact, by
recalling past selves as possessing a particularly bad view of the future (i.e. "Things
looked really bad then"), outpatients in the recovery group can feel better about their
present mental states and their future prospects. However, instead of considering
memory biases as some sort of self-deceptive mood-regulatory system devised to
make us feel better about ourselves, it might be more valuable to regard them as the
result of overoptimistic estimates of positive change. In other words, outpatients try
to quantify and integrate the amount of positive change in their reconstruction of past
selves, but since their perception of change is greater than the actual change
(probably due to the fact that a relatively small reduction in symptomatology is
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accompanied by a larger perceived improvement of their quality of life), they need to
reconstruct a worse picture of their past in order to explain and incorporate their
current mental state and preserve a coherent view of their selves (e.g. Greenwald,
1980).
In summary, we have seen that outpatients with mixed anxious and depressive
symptomatology are less accurate in their predictions of future personal life events.
This lack of accuracy is even more evident when judging the probability that
negative events might occur, which suggests the presence of an unrealistic negative
expectation in this group. In addition, our clinical group was also found to have
poorer reality monitoring compared to controls, and once again this was manifest for
negative (depression and anxiety relevant) events but not positive ones, indicating
that outpatients endorsed the source of more negative events relative to the control
group, but that their ability to discriminate the origin of positive items remains
accurate. Moreover, it was found that levels of dissociation mediated in part the
presence of this strong false-positive bias for negative materials, especially for
depression relevant events, suggesting that its effect might not be extended to reality
monitoring in general, but only to reality monitoring for specific self-referent
materials. Finally, results also showed the presence ofmemory biases for past mental
states: outpatients in the recovery group who had experienced change in their
personal condition depicted a negatively biased view of their previous attitudes by
reporting higher expectancy for negative events and lower expectancy for positive
events compared to their actual original probability judgements.
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5. 6. Conclusions.
In this study we made use of a prospective design to investigate the way individuals
with varying severity of mixed anxious and depressive symptomatology bridge
together their past and future depending on their current perspective. We have found
that the whole of our clinical sample revealed problems with accuracy of prediction
and reality monitoring. However, memory biases for previous mental states and
attitude were a function of the perception of change occurred over time in patients
who were recovering from their episode of anxiety and/or depression. We observed
that a more pessimistic view of previous attitudes emerged in these outpatients in an
attempt to accommodate their overoptimistic perception of change and maintain a
coherent sense of self over time. It is assumed that such reconstructive processes in
autobiographical memory occur continually on a smaller scale and that individuals
use their implicit theories of consistency and change to evaluate possible mutations
and adjust accordingly. As a result, we have also seen that our clinical sample cannot
be considered a group of individuals with fixed symptomatology. In Chapter 2 we
emphasised the fact that anxiety and depressive symptomatology and disorders tend
to wax and wane in the same individuals and that the way in which this occurs
constitutes one of the main features of overlap. It is therefore the temporal
relationship between anxiety and depression that we will address in the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF THE TEMPORAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANXIETY AND DEPRESSION.
"There are no conditions of life to which a man cannot get accustomed"
(Leo Tolstoy, "Anna Karenina ")
6. 1. Introduction.
Earlier in this thesis (Chapter 2, Section 2. 5. 1.) we have seen that the temporal
relationship between anxiety and depression represents one of the most important
features of the overlap between the two disorders. Anxious and depressive
symptomatologies often overlap both within and across episodes. Within a single
episode, symptoms of anxiety are more likely to precede symptoms of depression
and, across episodes, a depressive disorder is more likely to follow an anxiety
disorder than vice versa. Moreover, both at symptomatic and diagnostic levels it is
more likely that someone with a depressive disorder will show levels of anxiety than
the reverse. Consequently, it is more common to come across "pure" anxiety
disorders than mood disorders (e.g. Alloy et al., 1990; Mineka et al., 1998).
In this final experimental Chapter we shall address the temporal relationship of
anxiety and depression in order to shed some light on the possible mechanisms
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behind such common sequential pattern between the two disorders. This relationship
will be examined on a non-clinical student sample with the deployment of a variety
of mood induction procedures and neuropsychological testing.
6. 2. Review of relevant research and experimental hypotheses.
In an attempt to clarify the mechanisms behind the temporal relationship between
anxiety and depression, Alloy et al. (1990) extended the Hopelessness theory of
depression (Abramson et al., 1989) to the Helplessness-Hopelessness model of
anxiety and depression. According to this model, the interaction of three cognitive
components - helplessness expectancy, negative outcome expectancy and certainty
of these expectancies - will affect the types of symptoms an individual will
experience (see Table 2. 2., Chapter 2, Section 2. 6. 1.). In particular, a state of pure
anxiety will be experienced when an individual is uncertain about his/her ability to
control the outcome of important life events (uncertain helplessness expectancy).
When a person becomes certain about his/her helplessness, but still uncertain about
the occurrence of a negative outcome, a state ofmixed anxiety-depression will be the
result (certain helplessness expectancy + uncertain negative outcome expectancy).
Finally, if an individual becomes certain also about the negative outcome of a valued
life event, a state of hopelessness depression will arise (certain helplessness
expectancy + certain negative outcome expectancy). Thus, the sequential
development from anxiety to depression (both within and across episodes) is
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accounted for by the progression through the cognitive continuum form helplessness
to hopelessness.
This line of thought is also consistent with previous findings that anxiety and
depression are associated with different types of life events. Specifically, anxiety
may emerge as a response to anticipated "threat or danger", resulting in increased
hyper-vigilance and autonomic arousal in preparation for future life events. Whereas,
depression may be seen as a reaction to a major past "loss", which results in
rumination about past events and pervasive negativity. The coupling of a "threat"
with a "loss" event would lead to a mixed anxiety-depression (MAD) syndrome (e.g.
Brown et al., 1993; Finlay-Jones & Brown, 1981). Therefore, "threat" events would
cause a sense of uncertainty about the future, helplessness and anxiety. On the other
hand, "loss" events would lead to hopelessness and depression. An analogous
discrimination between the roles played by future threat in the development of
anxiety and by past loss in depression, has also been put forward by Beck and his
associates, and it is referred to as the "content-specificity" hypothesis (e.g. Beck,
1976; Beck, Brown, Steer, Eidelson & Riskind, 1987; Beck et al., 1985).
However, the pre-morbid occurrence of negative life events in depression and
anxiety is a subject of controversy (e.g. Monroe, 1990 for a review) and indeed Alloy
et al. (1990) stated explicitly that the chain of events postulated by their model,
leading to hopelessness depression, is only one possible causal pathway to
depression but it is not a necessary cause. Additionally, the percentage of MAD
patients who report at least one severe loss or danger event prior to the onset of
anxiety or depressive symptoms can vary widely between 30 and 80%, which leaves
a large percentage of cases unaccounted for (Brown et al., 1993; Finlay-Jones &
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Brown, 1981). Moreover, at odds with the conceptualisation of the relationship
between anxiety and depression in terms of subsequent negative (danger and loss)
life events is also some evidence derived from clinical practice with MAD patients.
During clinical interview, many MAD patients report being anxious first (e.g. "I have
always been an anxious person") and becoming depressed later on in life - which is
consistent with Alloy et al.'s (1990) view - but also that the appearance of the
depressive symptomatology is often unrelated to a particular life event (negative
outcome or loss event). Rather, it seems to be the result of being in a prolonged
(more or less acute) state of anxiety. Similarly, Tyrer (1985; 1989) posited that in the
general neurotic syndrome (equivalent to MAD), symptoms of anxiety, as its core
feature, are manifest even in the absence of major life events but can occur in the
presence of underlying personality disorders (e.g. dependent, avoidant). Thus,
although the critical role of severe negative life events in the emergence of anxiety
and depression is undisputed, they seem to be contributory rather than a necessary
cause.
Metalsky and colleagues investigated some of the mediating factors implicated in the
differential reaction to negative life events within a stress-diathesis theoretical
framework (Metalsky, Abramson, Seligman, Semmel & Peterson, 1982; Metalsky,
Halberstadt & Abramson, 1987; Metalsky, Joiner, Hardin & Abramson, 1993). They
carried out a series of prospective experiments with undergraduates who were tested
before and after they received their midterm grades and found that students with a
stable and global attributional style for negative events (attributional diathesis)
showed a more enduring depressive mood reaction after receiving low grades
(specially if their self-esteem was also low) than did students with no attributional
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diathesis style. However, contrary to prediction, there was no difference in the initial
depressive reaction to low grades in the two groups, which was predicted solely by
the exam outcome. Although these results offer some support for the Hopelessness
theory of depression (Abramson, et ah, 1989), they do not address the main issue of
the extended Helplessness-Hopelessness model of anxiety and depression (Alloy et
ah, 1990).
To date, to the best of our knowledge, only one experimental study has been carried
out that explicitly investigates the temporal relationship between anxiety and
depression (Whittal & Dobson, 1991). In their study, the authors classified a group of
undergraduate psychology students as being either high or low in cognitive
vulnerability to interpersonal evaluation. Participants were told that they would be
meeting another student for the first time and then rating each other on a number of
personality characteristics. After a brief social interaction, subjects received false
negative feedback indicating social disapproval. Self-report questionnaires indicated
an increase in anxiety, depression and hostility scores only in the high vulnerability
group, who were more anxious before the experimental manipulation. However, the
design included only two measurements (before and after a negative event) testing
for changes from anxiety to depression as the threat event changed from future to
past oriented. Moreover, self-report questionnaires were here used as the only
measure, which may be susceptible to bias or distortion (e.g. Cronbach, 1990).
Although this study seems to support Alloy et al.'s (1990) Helplessness-
Hopelessness model of anxiety and depression, it might be possible that alongside
the "pre/post-critical event" modus operandi, a separate "pre-critical event"
mechanism may also be in operation.
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In order to test the possibility that a depressive state may occur prior to any valued
life event taking place as a result of a long-lasting and sustained period of anxiety,
the following experiment was designed. First year undergraduate psychology
students were invited to take part in this study, during which the handing back of
their marked first essay (critical event) would take place. A variety of anxiety mood
induction techniques were also used to ensure that an appropriate level of anxiety
necessary to test our hypothesis was reached. A number of self-report questionnaires
and performance on a modified version the Chimeric Faces Task (CFT) (Levy et al.,
1983) were used as the dependent measures. To probe the possibility that a shift from
an anxiety to a depressive state may occur as an effect of a prolonged state of
anxiety, two separate measurements (Time 1 and Time 2) were taken on the CFT
under mood induction before the marked essay was returned to the students. A third
part (Time 3) of the CFT, without mood induction, followed the critical event to test
for the effects of a valued real life event on mood.
In its original form, the CFT is a free-vision chimeric face perception task and
consists of a booklet of 36 pages with pairs of human faces. Each face is composed
of half neutral and half happy expression of the same person. On each page the pairs
of faces are mounted one above the other and are the mirror image of one another.
Typically, when asked to decide which of the two faces looks happier, normal
subjects (both right and left handed) judge as happier the face with the smile
appearing to the left hemispace. The presence of this strong perceptual asymmetry
has been regarded as evidence that the posterior region of the right hemisphere of the
brain (the parieto-temporal lobe) is specialised in the processing of emotional faces
(Levy et al., 1983). This neuropsychological test has also been used to differentiate
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anxiety and depression and different patterns of perceptual asymmetry have been
identified. Specifically, anxiety (Trait anxiety, in particular) is associated with a
larger left hemispatial bias (reflecting increased cortical activation), whereas
depressed individuals are less lateralised compared to controls, indicating a possible
decrease in brain activity of the right posterior regions (Heller, Etienne & Miller,
1995; Jaeger, Borod & Peselow, 1987; Keller, Nitschke, Bhargava, Deldin, Gergen,
Miller & Heller, 2000).
A modified computerised version of the CFT, which included different emotional
faces (angry, disgusted, fearful, happy and sad), was employed in this experiment as
a reliable candidate for the provision of a sensitive measure of mood shifts from
anxiety to depression. In accordance with our experimental hypothesis we expected
to observe a higher level of lateralisation on the CFT at Time 1 (in general and
specially for mood-congruent emotions) and a general decrease of the amount of bias
at Time 2. No specific predictions were made regarding the magnitude of biases at




6. 3. 1. Experimental design.
The design was a repeated measures design (5 x 3) with two within-subjects
variables - Emotion (5: angry, disgusted, fearful, happy, sad) and Time (3: Time 1,
Time 2, Time 3). The dependent variables were the lateralisation scores and reaction
times.
6. 3. 2. Participants.
A group of 41 first year undergraduate psychology students were recruited as
participants. Of these, 28 were female (reflecting the higher proportion of females in
the undergraduate psychology population) %2(1) = 5.48, p < .05. However, as Levy et
al. (1983) found similar asymmetry scores in males and females, this was not
explored further. The group's mean age was 18.71 (SD = 1.89, Range = 17-28 yrs).
All participants were informed that they were to receive their marked first essay at
some point during the experiment.
6. 3. 3. Apparatus and materials.
Questionnaires. The following self-report questionnaires were administered (see
Appendix 2.): Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (EHI; Oldfield, 1971); Beck
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996); State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
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(STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983); Positive Affect Negative Affect Scales - State
version: "Moment" (PANAS; Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988); Visual Analogue
Mood Scale (VAMS; e.g. McCormack, Home & Sheather, 1988). The VAMS used
in this study was composed of nine scales, 10 cm horizontal lines, anchored from 0%
(Not at all) to 100% (Extremely). Above each scale was written "How xxx do you
feel right now?" The nine adjectives used were: disgusted, anxious, energetic, sad,
angry, happy, tense, tired, and confused. Subj ects were asked to place a mark across
the line at the point that best described how they were feeling at that particular
moment. The scores on each scale were the number of millimetres rounded to the
nearest integer.
Mood Induction. A combination of three different mood induction techniques was
used in order to enhance their effectiveness: mood-descriptive self-referent
statements (e.g. Velten, 1968) music (e.g. Slyker & McNally, 1991) and video clips
(e.g. Gross & Levenson, 1995). Twenty self-referent statements were used: 10
cognitive and 10 somatic (see Table 6. 1. below). These were divided into two sets
(A and B) each containing 5 cognitive and 5 somatic sentences. Sets A and B were
matched for length and were used in counterbalanced order for the CFT either during
Time 1 or Time 2.
313




I am terrified about what is happening to me.
I'm finding it difficult to concentrate because of uncontrollable thoughts.
I'm worrying too much over something that doesn't really matter.
My thoughts are racing.
The tension is so oppressive I feel like I will snap.
Set B
I am uneasy about something that seems about to happen.
I feel like I am losing out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
I feel worried and on edge.
I can't get these nervous thoughts out ofmy mind.
I'm noticing every little unimportant thing around me.
Somatic
Set A
I feel my muscles twitching and shaking even though I try to relax.
I feel my palms sweating with my growing uneasiness.
I feel restless and highly-strung.
My breathing is very shallow.
I'm feeling immobilized.
Set B
All the tension is collecting in my neck and shoulders.
My mouth is dry.
I'm feeling more and more jittery in my body.
My heart is pounding so fast it feels like it will give out.
My face feels flushed as if I were blushing.
Two audio tracks served as musical mood induction: these were edited compilations
of several soundtracks (e.g. extracts from "X-Files", "The Shining"), and were also
used in counterbalanced order during the CFT at Time 1 or 2.
Finally, two short video clips were also used to induce anxiety: these were sequences
from "The Silence Of The Lambs" (chase in the basement of the house) - slightly
longer version than the one used by Gross and Levenson (1995) - and "The Blair
314
Witch Project" (final part: searching around the house), which provided two
equivalent video clips in terms of setting and dynamics. These were shown in
counterbalanced order either before Time 1 or before Time 2 of the CFT.
The self-referent statements were taken from previous research (Slyker & McNally,
1991), whilst the audio tracks and video clips were rated by seven independent
judges on a series of 16 emotional scales so as to match Gross and Levenson's
(1995) procedure. The ratings obtained compared very closely with those reported by
Gross and Levenson (1995) for fearful materials. Audio tracks were played on a
minidisk player (Sharp MD - MT821H (GL)) and the video clips were presented by
computer (RM - Pentium III, 800MHz) and shown on a 17" CTX - PR705F
computer monitor, full screen, with the Creative SoundBlaster Live "Stone room"
(reverb 50 %) sound effect. In both cases, subjects used headphones (Sony - MDR-
15).
Chimeric Faces Task. Each of the three CFTs consisted of 60 pairs of chimeric
faces (12 pairs for each of the 5 emotions: angry, disgusted, fearful, happy and sad).
The photographs used here were taken from standardised material (Ekman &
Friesen, 1976). Half of the posers were male faces and half were female. On
constructing the chimeras, the neutral emotion derived always from the right half of
each of the original photos, whereas, the other emotional expressions were always
taken from the left half of the original photos. All original photographs were first
digitised and then, for each poser, chimeric faces were formed by collating the half
neutral face with each of the 5 half emotional faces. Once these were ready, each
photo was duplicated and rotated so as to create a mirror image of the original
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chimera. Finally, each pair of faces was mounted one above the other twice, so that
the emotional side would be the left for the top face and right for the bottom face,
and then vice versa. The size of the each chimeric face was 90 mm (H) x 60 mm (W)
and each pair was separated by 50mm (see Appendix 6. for example of chimera
used). The CFT was carried out by computer (see above) and programmed with the
E-Prime experiment generator package version 1.0 (Schneider, 2000).
6. 3. 4. Procedure.
In order to provide good vision of the stimuli and video clips, participants were
tested individually in a laboratory room softly illuminated by a 40W desk lamp. They
were told that the aim of the study was to look at the judgement of emotional faces,
and also that the task was divided into three parts and that they would be given their
marked essay after the second part of the task. At the beginning of the experimental
session participants were administered the following questionnaires: EHI, BDI-II,
STAI (Trait and State), PANAS, VAMS to check for handedness, levels of anxiety,
depression, positive and negative affect, and other current mood states. Then the
main instructions for the CFT were given by computer and rephrased by the
experimenter (these also included the handing back of the marked essay after the
second part), and a short practice followed. The practice consisted of the presentation
of a practice self-referent sentence for 15 sec in the middle of the screen (red colour
font on light grey background) followed by six pairs of chimeric faces covering all
the different emotions once, apart from "fear" which was presented twice. The pairs
appeared randomly one at a time in the middle of the screen (light grey background)
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and each was preceded by a fixation point, also at the centre of the screen, for 1 sec.
As each of the pairs of chimeric faces appeared, subjects were instructed to press
either the "9" (top face) or the "3" (bottom face) key on the numeric pad of the
keyboard to indicate which of the two faces looked more emotional. Since the CFT is
a free viewing perception task, no time restriction was given, and throughout the
practice, subjects listened to the beginning of one of the audio tracks (used also
during the first part of the task). Then, one of the video clips was shown and another
mood rating (VAMS-T2) checking for the efficacy of the induction was taken,
followed by the first part of the CFT (Time 1). The format of the first part of the CFT
was essentially the same as for the practice. Participants listened to one of the audio
tracks whilst completing the task, which included the random presentation of 60 pairs
of chimeric faces (12 for each emotion, 6 male and 6 female, and 6 with the
emotional side on the top left and right bottom faces, and 6 vice versa) each preceded
by a fixation point for 1 sec. Ten self-referent sentences (either set A or B) were also
used and presented randomly one at the time for 15 sec before the presentation of
every 6 pairs of faces. This way the mood induction continued throughout the task.
After the CFT at Time 1 was completed, another mood check was taken (VAMS-T3),
before the next video clip was shown. After this, subjects re-rated their mood
(VAMS-T4) and then carried out the CFT at Time 2, with a different audio track and
set of sentences. At that point, the marked essay was handed back, a rating of
satisfaction with the mark obtained was taken (0 to 100 %), and some time was given
to the subjects to have a brief look at the comments on their work. Then, the
following questionnaires were re-administered: STAI (State only), PANAS-12, and
VAMS-T5, before the CFT at Time 3 took place. In order to test the effects of the
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critical event, no mood induction of video, music or sentences was used for the last
part of the task. Thus, only 60 pairs of randomly presented chimeric faces constituted
the CFT. Finally, another VAMS-T6 was filled in. During the execution of the
different parts of the task, participants sat at a distance of approximately 50 cm from
the computer screen for the CFT and approximately 80 cm when watching the video
clips. At the end, subjects were debriefed as to the nature of the experiment and were
given the opportunity to ask questions on the study itself or educational
methodological questions whilst listening to some pleasant pop music in order to
induce a positive mood state.
6. 4. Results.
Data Reduction. Following the Levy et al. (1983) procedure, general asymmetry
scores for each CFT were computed for each participant by subtracting the number
of faces judged to be more emotional when the emotion was on the left side of the
face, from the number of faces judged to be more emotional when the emotion was
on the right side and dividing the difference by 60, the total number of face pairs
(i.e., [(7? - L) / 60]). Consequently, -1 would be the highest possible leftward bias
score and +1 the highest possible rightward bias score. Twelve of the 41 participants
showed a positive (rightward) bias. Since we were interested in changes in the size of
the biases in a within-subject design, indicating shifts in the amount of lateralisation
over time, and not in the side of the lateralisation per se, we inverted the sign of the
general bias scores (from positive to negative) for these participants so as to obtain a
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uniformly lateralised group and facilitate analyses. As we distinguished among five
types of emotions (angry, disgusted, fearful, happy, sad), we also calculated for each
subject separate bias scores for every emotion (i.e., [(/? - L) / 12]). Again, biases
belonging to the 12 positively lateralised participants were inverted in sign.
Out of 41 participants, 5 were left-handed and 1 ambidextrous. However, all of these
subjects showed a leftward bias of a size comparable to the rest of the group.
Because the hypothesis is twofold and assumes the presence of two different
mechanisms operating at different times during the course of our experiment - that is
between Time 1 and 2 (pre-critical event), and after Time 3 (post-critical event) - we
will consider the two sets of results separately.
Pre-critical event. For this part of the analyses the following inclusion criteria were
used: a) general biases at either Time 1 or Time 2 should deviate statistically from 0
(no bias); b) different amounts of general biases at Time 1 and 2. The first criterion
was achieved by calculating the standard error using the following formula: SE
= ^[(R + L)/N2] (Levy et al., 1983). Because in our task subjects were not given the
option of deciding that the two faces looked equally emotional, the SE = 0.129 for
every subject. Z scores were then calculated and used to establish whether subjects
were lateralised at least to some extent. A value ofp < 0.1 (1-tailed), was used here
in order to allow for the possibility that the mood manipulation might have reduced
the amount of bias to a certain degree already at Time 1. Two participants did not
show any significant lateralisation at any point (including Time 3) during the
experiment and were therefore excluded from these and later analyses. Eight more
subjects were excluded from this first set of analyses because they did not meet the
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inclusion criterion a. Finally, one subject (although significantly lateralised) failed to
meet the inclusion criterion b, showing no change in the amount of bias between
Time 1 and 2 as a result of the mood induction. Of the remaining thirty subjects, 18
showed a smaller bias at Time 2 compared to Time 1 (Group 1), and 12 showed the
opposite pattern (Group 2). Consequently, they were treated as two separate groups.
It was hypothesised that subjects in Group 1 might have been more anxious to begin
with, and therefore had experienced a more prolonged and sustained (during Time 1)
state of anxiety, which was effective enough to caused the shift towards a depressive
asymmetry pattern at Time 2. On the other hand, if participants in Group 2 were less
anxious at the outset, it might have taken them longer to reach the necessary
conditions for this presumed mechanism to operate. Analyses of the self-report
measures confirmed that Group 1 had a significantly higher level of Trait anxiety
t(28) = 1.84, p < .05 (1 -tailed) compared to participants in Group 2. Previous
research has shown that Trait anxiety is more likely to show asymmetric activity of
the right posterior regions of the brain, because it is more stable that State anxiety
(e.g. Heller, 1993; Heller, Etienne & Miller, 1995). Group 1 reported also lower
scores on the Happy scale of the VAMS-J3 /(28) = 2.40, p < .05 and VAMS-T4 t(28)
= 2.83, p < .01 (both 2-tailed), which provides more support and validation of the
distinction between the two groups. No more between groups significant differences
were found on the self-report measures, although generally Group 1 scored higher on
negative scales and lower on positive ones compared to Group 2 (see Table 6. 2. and
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Table 6. 3. also shows the effectiveness of the mood induction procedure with
participants being significantly more anxious and tense during the CFT at Time 1 and
2 with higher peaks following the presentation of the video clips (see also top half of
Figure 6. 1. - VAMS-n and t4 below). On the other hand, a reverse pattern is
observed for the Happy-VAMS subscale.
Figure 6. 1. also shows that, as hypothesised, the increase in anxiety levels in the two
groups corresponds to an increase in dysphoric mood (i.e. sadness) in the same
groups. However, only in Group 1 the Sad-VAMS-t3 and 74, which indicate sadness
levels present between the CFT at Time 1 and 2, are significantly higher compared to
the baseline levels (VAMS-ti) - see Table 6. 3. for within-groups statistical
significance (p < .05, at least). This finding corroborates further the distinction
between the two groups based on both Trait anxiety and direction of CFT bias at
Time 2.
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Figure 6. 1. Bar charts of Anxiety and Sadness VAMS-Subscales: "pre-critical
event" (VAMS-n, 72, T3, and 74) mean scores for Groups 1 and 2.
VAMS - Anxiety Subscale
70 1
Group 1 Group 2









Group 1 Group 2
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The results of a 2 x 2 ANOVA with Group (1 and 2) as a between-subjects factor and
General Bias (Time 1 and 2) as a within-subjects factor showed a significant
interaction ofGroup x General Bias F(l,28) = 52.18 ,p< 0.001. Groups 1 and 2 were
similarly lateralised at Time 1 (M = - .372, SD = .216 and M = - .311, SD = .290
respectively) but differed significantly in the amount of bias attained at Time 2 (M =
- .187, SD = .292 and M = - .497, SD = .249 respectively) t(28) = 3.01, p < .01. As
predicted, Group 1 showed a substantial reduction in lateralisation score from Time 1
to Time 2 t(17) = 5.84, p < .001 whereas Group 2, reported a significant increase
/(11) = 4.50, p < .001 (see Figure 6. 2. below).
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Figure 6. 2. Bar charts of mean lateralisation scores (biases) in general and
for each emotion (angry, disgusted, fearful, happy, sad), on the
Chimeric Faces Task (CFT) for each Group at Time 1, 2, and 3.
CFT - General Biases
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
CFT- Angry Biases
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
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Figure 6. 2. Bar charts of mean lateralisation scores (biases) in general and
for each emotion (angry, disgusted, fearful, happy, sad), on the
Chimeric Faces Task (CFT) for each Group at Time 1, 2, and 3
(continued i).
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Figure 6. 2. Bar charts of mean lateralisation scores (biases) in general and
for each emotion (angry, disgusted, fearful, happy, sad), on the
Chimeric Faces Task (CFT) for each Group at Time 1, 2, and
3(continued ii).
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Table 6. 4. Mean reaction times (general and for each of the 5 emotions) on






G 1 3055a (1074) 2372a(716) 2219a(776)
G 2 3507a (1407) 3042 (2018) 2961a(1653)
G 3 3305a (1204) 2937 (1411) 2534a(1083)
Angry
G 1 2949a (1055) 2364a(825) 2181a (788)
G 2 3226 (1260) 2831 (1720) 2816 (1505)
G 3 3186a (1065) 2876 (1293) 2498a(1087)
Disgusted
G 1 3018a (1105) 2524a(786) 2350a(994)
G 2 3469(1479) 3117 (2238) 2933 (1716)
G 3 3333a(1150) 3098 (1537) 2452a(915)
Fearful
G 1 2754a (941) 2021a(649) 199G (698)
G 2 3208 (1331) 2861(2020) 2783 (1708)
G 3 3116a (1146) 2559a(1295) 2377a(1138)
Happy
G 1 3340a (1385) 2480a(753) 2329a(823)
G 2 3686a (1714) 3321 (2330) 2935a(1969)
G 3 3381a (1447) 3071 (1365) 2822a(1453)
Sad
G 1 3215a (1148) 2470a(888) 2244a(881)
G 2 3944a (1546) 3082a(1952) 3338a(1677)
G 3 3512a (1490) 3084 (1703) 2521a(971)
Note: Group 1 = High Trait Anxiety; Group 2 = Low Trait Anxiety; Group 3 =
Lateralised only at Time 3. Within each row, means that share a subscript letter in
lowercase differ significantly from the mean reporting the same letter in uppercase {p
< .05, at least). Standard Deviations in parentheses.
Table 6. 4. shows that reaction times decreased significantly as participants
performed across from CFT at Time 1 to 2 and 3 indicating a general increase in
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speed with practice. This was especially true for Group 1 which also appeared to be
faster in all conditions, although none of the between groups differences reached
statistical significance.
An overall 3-way ANOVA (2x2x5) with Group (1 and 2) as a between-subjects
factor and Time (1 and 2) and Emotional Biases (angry, disgusted, fearful, happy,
sad) as within-subjects variables revealed a significant main effect of Emotional
Biases F(4,25) = 3.34, p < 0.05 and interaction of Group x Time .F(l,28) = 52.18, p <
0.001.
In order to clarify the nature of these effects, separate 2x2 ANOVAs were
computed for each of the five emotions with Group (1 and 2) as a between-subjects
variable and Emotional Bias (Time 1 and 2) as a within-subjects variable. They all
showed significant interactions of Group x Emotional Bias (p < 0.05, at least).
Between groups comparisons confirmed effects similar to those seen for General
Bias. That is, also for each of the separate emotions Group 1 and 2 were likewise
lateralised at Time 1 but diverged significantly at Time 2 (p < 0.05) except for
"angry" biases (see Figure 6. 2.). In particular, at Time 2 Group 1 became
significantly less lateralised (p < 0.05, at least) apart for "fearful" stimuli, whilst
Group 2 became generally more lateralised, and significantly so for "fearful" (p <
0.01) and "sad" (p < 0.05) stimuli.
In addition, we carried out analyses of variance of Emotional Biases (angry,
disgusted, fearful, happy, sad) by Time (1 and 2) for each group. These showed
significant main effects of Time both for Group 1 F(l,17) = 34.17,/? < 0.001 and
Group 2 F(l,ll) = 20.28, p < 0.001 indicating that lateralisation scores for the
different emotions varied in the two parts of the CFT. Separate repeated measures
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ANOVAs were then calculated for Emotional Bias within each Time and for each
group to test for the "mood-congruent" hypothesis. For Group 1, results indicated no
notable change in lateralisation scores across the five emotions at Time 1 F(4,14) =
1.38, ns. However, a main effect of Emotional Bias was found at Time 2 F(4,14) =
3.85, p < 0.05. Planned orthogonal contrasts pointed out lower scores for "happy"
faces compared to "angry", "disgusted" and "fearful" {p < 0.05, at least) and also
lower scores for "sad" compared to "fearful" stimuli F(l,17) = 5.36, p < 0.05,
supporting our hypothesis. On the other hand, no main effect of Emotional Bias was
found for Group 2 at either Time 1 or 2.
Further analyses of reaction times with Group (1 and 2) as a between-subjects
variable and Time (1 and 2) and Emotional RTs (angry, disgusted, fearful, happy,
sad) as within-subjects variables showed significant main effects of Emotional RTs
F(4,25) = 6.53, p < 0.001 and Time F(l,28) = 17.70, p < 0.001. Within Group 1
these main effects were confirmed (p < 0.01, at least) and separate ANOVAs for
Time 1 and 2 were performed. At Time 1, a main effect of Emotional RTs was found
F(4,14) = 3.58, p < 0.05 and planned orthogonal contrasts showed that participants
were significantly faster for "angry" and "fearful" stimuli compared to "happy" and
"sad" {p < 0.01, at least). At Time 2, a main effect of Emotional RTs was also found
F(4,14) = 9.00, p < 0.001 and contrasts indicated that "fearful" stimuli elicited
reaction times which were significantly faster than for any other emotional material
(p < 0.01, at least). Within Group 2 a main effect of Emotional RTs was only found
at Time 1 F(4,8) = 4.58, p < 0.05 with contrasts showing faster reaction times for
"angry" and "fearful" material in comparison to "sad" stimuli (p < 0.01, at least).
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Post-critical event. The only inclusion criterion for this part of the analyses was the
presence of a significant amount of lateralisation at Time 3 (p < 0.1, 1-tailed, as
above). Thus, as well as Groups 1 and 2, a third group was composed of those
individuals who did not meet inclusion criteria for the previous set of analyses. As
already mentioned above, 8 of the participants did not show a significant bias at
Time 1 and 2, but they did show a dramatic increase in lateralisation at Time 3 in
response to the critical event taking place. Another subject, although lateralised at
Time 1 and 2, did not meet inclusion criterion b (see above), but was included in
Group 3 as he also presented a further increase in bias at Time 3, which resembles
the general pattern of the rest of the group. The three groups did not differ in terms of
essay marks obtained nor degree of satisfaction with their marks; however, as it
might have been expected, they exhibited a significant increase in their STAI-State
and PANAS-Negative Affect scores compared to those reported at the beginning of
the experiment (see Table 6. 2.).
No significant between groups differences were found for either the amount of bias
(in general and for each emotion) or their respective reaction times at Time 3.
Within groups analyses showed that, at Time 3, Group 1 returned to lateralisation
levels similar to those reached at Time 1. The increase in bias from Time 2 was
significant in general F(l,17) = 8.63, p < 0.01 and for "happy" F(l,17) = 6.83, p <
0.05 and "sad" material F(l,17) = 8.64, p < 0.01. Of interest, also at Time 3 Group 1
was faster for "fearful" stimuli, particularly compared to "disgusted", "happy" and
"sad" emotional material {p < 0.05, at least). Group 2 reported a general decrease in
lateralisation scores at Time 3, although not substantially different from Time 2.
However, in this last part of the CFT a differential emotional bias emerged.
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Specifically, participants in this group showed a greater bias for "fearful" stimuli
compared to "angry" and "sad" material (p < 0.05, at least) and for "disgusted"
compared to "sad" stimuli A(l,ll) = 6.56, p < 0.05. Analyses of reaction times
indicated that Group 2 was significantly faster when rating "angry" stimuli
compared to "sad" faces F(l,l 1) = 10.27,/? <0.01.
The magnitude of lateralisation scores at Time 3 for Group 3 differed substantially
from either Time 1 or 2, generally and in each of the individual emotional conditions
except "sad" (p < 0.05, at least). No other within group comparison reached
significance levels.
6. 5. Discussion.
The main findings of this study seem to support the hypothesis that a sustained
period of intense anxiety alone can lead to a significant shift towards a depressive
performance on a modified version of the CFT, a neuropsychological test that well
discriminates anxious form depressive states. They also provide further evidence that
a dysphoric state can occur in the absence of negative life events. This is not only
evident from the groups' performance on the CFT, but also from the change in mood
as measured by the VAMS. Specifically, participants (Group 1 in particular) showed
an increase in disgust, anger and sadness, and a decrease in levels of happiness, as a
result of the combined anxiety mood-induction procedures alone (see Table 6. 3. and
Figure 6. 1.).
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For the first part of the study (/^re-critical event) we distinguished between two
groups based on their initial anxiety levels, Trait in particular (see Results: Section 6.
4., page 320). Group 1 (high in Trait anxiety) was significantly more anxious at the
beginning of the experiment indicating that participants experienced a longer and
more persistent anxiety state before and during Time 1. This allowed a depressive
pattern to emerge at Time 2 as a consequence of the anxiety mood induction. On the
other hand, Group 2 (low in Trait anxiety) arrived to Time 1 less anxious so that,
presumably, it would have taken them longer (Time 2) to reach the necessary
conditions before any decrease in lateralisation scores would become visible.
At Time 1, which represents our baseline, both groups reported similar lateralisation
biases across all conditions, and differential effects of emotional materials were
observable only from reaction times. Consistent with our hypothesis, participants
were faster when rating anxiety relevant stimuli (i.e. angry and fearful) than when
rating depression relevant faces (i.e. happy and sad), indicating clear mood-
congruent biases.
However as expected, Group 1 showed a substantial decrease in lateralisation scores
from Time 1 to Time 2. Noticeably, at Time 2 (M = - .187, SD = .292) they
performed similarly to high-depression students (M = - .117, SD = .441; Heller et al.,
1995) and clinically depressed patients (M = - .238, SD = .380; Jeager et ah, 1987).
Moreover, participants were significantly less lateralised when rating "happy" and
"sad" emotional faces which is in tune with the presence of a depressive state. On the
other hand, the decrease in biases at Time 2 was evident in all emotional conditions
apart from "fearful", to indicate that participants were able to maintain a certain
degree of lateralisation but only for selective threat stimuli, which were still able to
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elicit a stronger bias. Additionally, participants were significantly faster for "fearful"
stimuli than for any other emotional material suggesting that although their general
performance moved towards a depressive pattern, the ongoing anxiety mood
induction still reflected in the concurrent anxious biases.
In contrast, Group 2 became significantly more lateralised at Time 2 with a particular
increase for "fearful" and "sad" stimuli, however subjects did not exhibit any mood-
congruent effect either in terms of emotional bias scores or reaction times. As
hypothesised, this would indicate a general increase in anxiety and tension levels and
their effects on the participants' performance on the CFT at Time 2 (M = - .497, SD
= .249) which is comparable to that obtained by high-anxiety students in Heller et
al.'s (1995) study (M= - .517, SD = .445).
For the second part of the study (post-critical event), Groups 1 and 2 were also
compared to a third group of participants who were excluded from the first part
because they were not lateralised at Time 1 and 2, but who showed a significant
increase in lateralisation scores generally and across the emotional conditions at
Time 3.
Table 6. 2. shows that students were on the whole satisfied their marks which implies
a predominantly positive appraisal of the critical event. No between groups
differences were found in the mean essay mark obtained, degree of satisfaction with
the mark, amount of lateralisation or reaction times. However, within group analyses
at Time 3 revealed a significant general increase in lateralisation scores in Group 1
with similar levels to those reached at Time 1. This increase was particularly large
for "happy and "sad" emotional faces, which were most affected by lower scores at
Time 2. Interestingly, subjects did not show any particular emotional bias for any of
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the conditions, but they were still faster at rating "fearful" stimuli compared to the
other emotional faces except "angry". Altogether, this shows a performance
comparable to that at Time 1 and a return to higher anxiety levels following the
appraisal of a real and valued personal life event.
As anticipated, Group 2 showed a general decrease in lateralisation scores, but not
substantially different from Time 2. It was thought that this group was "a step
behind" Group 1 and this was confirmed by the changes at Time 2 as the group
displayed a general increase in biases. The decrease at Time 3 is another indication
that Group 2 was now "ready" for its shift towards a depressive state, had it not been
for two important factors. The first is the absence of anxiety mood induction and the
second factor is the appraisal following the receiving of the marked essay, which
conceivably had a similar "lifting" effect on lateralisation scores as for participants in
Group 1 and Group 3 (lateralised only at Time 3). Therefore, we plausibly assisted
to a clash of counteracting forces, which resulted in only a slight decrease in
lateralisation scores. This conflict of emotions is expressed by significantly lower
lateralisation scores for "sad" faces and higher scores for "fearful" stimuli on the one
hand, and by slower reaction times for "sad" material compared to "angry" faces on
the other.
Adding together both parts of the experiment, one reasonable explanation that might
account for the patterns of results obtained in this study is the following. Given the
presence of unremitting psychological/environmental stressors that cause the
emergence of (and maintain) an anxiety state, the shift towards a depressive state
may have an adaptive function. That is, give the individual the opportunity to recover
from an exhausting state of continuous heightened vigilance (although this was not
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possible when the stimuli were threatening in valence). In evolutionary terms,
disengagement under these circumstances might have the scope of preserving energy
for a more necessary (or valued) pursuit, in our case, receiving the marked essay (see
Costello, 1976 for a similar account).
Therefore, Group 1 (high in Trait anxiety) was anxious at Time 1, showing a
consistent left hemifield bias, but it was unable to keep a high level of activation at
Time 2. At this point, the proposed mechanism entered in operation allowing the
students to "disengage" from the continuous anxiety mood induction (stressor) and
save important resources for the impending critical event. This resulted in a general
decrease in lateralisation biases in all conditions, except for threatening stimuli, for
which an automatic deployment of extra resources was "necessary". Following the
critical event and the mainly positive appraisal of its outcome, students returned to
high levels of hypervigilance similar to those seen at Time 1. Here the use of the
available resources, set aside at Time 2, was required as the students were to confront
the outcome of a personal valued event. Also in Group 2 an analogous process took
place, but in this case the series of events was delayed due to the fact that this group
was less anxious at the outset.
Strong evidence of physiological correlates for this adaptive mechanism comes from
neuropharmacological studies of anxiety and depression. As reviewed in Chapter 2
(Section 2. 3. 2.), the general view is that the shift from anxiety to depression is
reflected by the depletion of neurotransmitters such as noradrenaline and serotonin
typically associated in opposite fashions to anxiety and depression. Serotonin (5-
HT), in particular, would appear to be implicated with adaptive responses to aversive
stimuli. 5-HT2 receptors mediate acute adaptive responses (e.g. avoidance of
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aversive stimuli), whereas 5-HT]A receptors are thought to be involved in long-term
adaptation to chronic stress and are therefore related to resilience. When this
resilience system breaks down a depressive state will be the consequence (e.g.
Deakin, 1998; Stahl, 1997).
Since Group 3 was able to lateralise similarly to Groups 1 and 2 at Time 3, one
possible justification for the small lateralisation scores attained at Time 1 and 2
might be that this group was "one step ahead" of Group 1. As Table 6. 2. and Table
6. 3. show, this group of participants was more anxious (Trait and State anxiety) and
tense than the other two groups before the beginning of the experiment. This state of
affairs might have led them to give a depressive performance throughout Time 1 and
2, under the continuous influence of the anxiety mood induction, until a more valued
event took place, for which more activation was necessary. Another similarity with
the other two groups is the increase in lateralisation for "fearful" stimuli at Time 1
and 2, for which the employment of some extra attentional resources was
unavoidable (see Figure 6. 2.).
Therefore, altogether the present findings support the hypothesis that a depressive
state may arise in the absence of certainty of negative outcome expectancy (e.g. as a
reaction to a "loss" event). Closely related to this view is the information-processing
model of learned helplessness (Kofta & Sedek, 1998; Sedek & Kofta, 1990; Sedek,
Kofta & Tyszka, 1993; von Hecker & Sedek, 1999). The authors provide evidence
that prolonged exposure to an uncontrollable situation such as inconsistent task
information (i.e. cognitive effort without cognitive gain) in the absence of negative
outcome or evaluative feedback is sufficient for the appearance of a psychological
state termed cognitive exhaustion. This is essentially a transitory state of generalised
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impairment of constructive information-processing with equivalent cognitive,
behavioural and motivational symptoms of learned helplessness and depression.
Compellingly, a strong analogy can be noticed between the "emotional exhaustion"
(or prevention of) seen in our study and the state of "cognitive exhaustion" put
forward by Sedek and colleagues (1990; 1993). They both appear to take place
before the occurrence of any negative outcome and they seem to describe a twin
phenomenon from different angles (i.e. emotional and cognitive).
The presence of a pre-critical event mechanism that might operate alternatively or
alongside a pre/post-critical event one is not taken into account by the Helplessness-
Hopelessness model of anxiety and depression (Alloy et al., 1990). This model
attempts an explanation of the sequential relationship of anxiety and depression
within a framework based on expectancy of negative life events (or non-occurrence
of positive events) and the person's attributional and control styles over these valued
events. Thus, the shifting from anxiety into depression coincides with the
helplessness expectancy becoming hopelessness. However, the authors emphasise
that fact that the model only takes into account one subtype of depression
(hopelessness depression) and that other factors may be responsible for the
development of a depressive state. Moreover, although the original Hopelessness
theory of depression is based on previous formulations that have much empirical
support, the extended Helplessness-Hopelessness model of anxiety and depression
still awaits empirical verification. For example, the model does not predict any
negative outcome expectancy (certain or uncertain) in anxiety, whilst predicting
certain negative outcome expectancy in depression. Conversely, as we have
demonstrated in Chapter 4, research in prospective cognitions shows that, depending
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on the task employed, anxious individuals report an increased anticipation of
negative events (especially on SPJT), whereas depression may be associated with a
decreased expectancy for positive events but an equal anticipation of negative life
events compared to controls (especially on PFT). Other recent studies have also
failed to find the predicted association between anxiety and helpless causal
attributions (Swendsen, 1997; Waikar & Craske, 1997). On the contrary, the findings
of this study provide support for neuropsychological models of emotional disorders
and regional brain specialisation described in Chapter 1 (Section 1. 4. 2.) (e.g.
Davidson, 1999; Heller et ah, 1998). Moreover, a key point has emerged as we found
evidence of mood-congruent lateralisation biases; that is, the importance of
discriminating among different types of emotional information processing in
neuropsychological testing such as the CFT.
It might be argued that anxious patients may perceive the experience of
uncontrollable anxiety symptoms as a loss of self-functioning or autonomy and
subsequently develop depression, but this was certainly not the case with the students
in our study. Moreover, such cognitive appraisal does not preclude a "restoring-
economical" mechanism to become operative after a negative outcome. Following
the occurrence of a negative event, an individual will have to reconsider his/her goals
and reformulate a plan of action before employing resources. A compatible
perspective is the view that depression is a period of disengagement from goals that
are perceived to be unobtainable (Klinger, 1993). Subjects in our study seemed to
have moved back to a state of anxiety/activation, following the outcome (perceived
mostly as positive) of the critical event. Presumably, had the outcome been negative,
an initial period of autonomic activation would have given way to a period of
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depressive state during which a reappraisal of the event would have taken place in
terms of the students' goal (i.e. pass the Psychology course). This would account for
the unexpected findings in Metalsky et al.'s (1982; 1987; 1993) studies that both
student groups, high and low in cognitive vulnerability, reported an initial depressive
reaction after receiving low exam grades. In this sense the individual's appraisal of a
valued negative outcome event would allow the organism to recover and save
important resources for a more favourable time or vital goal. For this reason, pre and
post event factors are not seen as mutually exclusive.
Consequently, what is proposed here is a more general mechanism that might explain
some of the basic aspects of the temporal relationship between anxiety and
depression in terms of evolutionary adaptation. This mechanism may be in operation
both before and in concomitance with the occurrence of a valued life event. Its
double function is to prevent the organism from exhaustion prior to an important
event and to restore (and not dissipate), especially after negative outcome, necessary
resources whilst a more beneficial and advantageous use, aimed to achieve a valued
goal, is found.
In conclusion, in this study we have seen a good example of emotion regulation in
healthy individuals and their employment of a basic coping mechanism when facing
a valued real life event. Clinically, this adaptive mechanism seems to be still in
operation in those cases of spontaneous recovery (most of which are probably
unknown, as they are less likely to come in contact with psychological services) but
it breaks down in the clinical population that requires therapeutic intervention
presumably for the presence of vulnerability factors. The obvious issue that needs
further analysis therefore relates to the identification of the specific factors that might
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be directly involved in the malfunctioning of this evolutionary useful coping
mechanism. Another important question regards the investigation of the temporal
relationship between anxiety and depression both within and across episodes in the
clinical population. The present study only used students as participants with a
combination of mood induction and real life events within a neuropsychological
framework of cognition and emotion. As a result, any generalisation of these findings
to clinical levels of anxiety and depression should be made with extreme caution.
6. 6. Conclusions.
In this final experimental Chapter we have addressed one of the central issues in the
study of mixed anxiety and depression, namely their sequential relationship. Using a
small scale prospective design with a non-clinical sample we have demonstrated that
a dysphoric state can emerge in the absence of the occurrence of a negative outcome
(or feedback indicating the lack of positive outcome) as a result of a prolonged state
of anxiety. Although in the present investigation we used a student sample and
results cannot be generalised to clinical levels of anxiety and depression, our findings
suggest that at a symptomatological level the overlap between the two disorders
might be caused by the mere presence of an anxiety state. Even though the
importance of the occurrence of negative life events (or non-occurrence of positive
life events) in the development of mood and anxiety disorders is unquestioned, their
causal role may be contributory rather than necessary. In this sense it has been
proposed that the development of a depressive state following a prolonged state of
344
severe anxiety may serve an evolutionary adaptive mechanism primarily devoted to




"The past has gone, the future is uncertain, and the present is a mess!"
(A. J. Richards)
7. 1. Introduction.
In the first part of this thesis we have introduced one of the most topical current
issues in psychopathology: the co-occurrence of anxiety and depressive disorders.
The issue of mixed anxiety depression has important implications for theories,
empirical research, diagnostic classification and treatment (e.g. Maser & Cloninger,
1990; Mineka et al., 1998). The main intention behind the work reported in this
thesis has been that of clarifying what the qualitative features of overlap between the
two disorders might be and the resulting consequences in terms of cognitive
functioning for individuals affected by mixed anxiety depression.
A major aim was to provide evidence of discriminant group validity among three
clinical groups of outpatients with depression, anxiety, and mixed anxiety
depression. This was achieved by investigating the specific ways in which the three
groups responded to experimental tasks that examined fundamental areas of
cognition: attentional, mnemonic, and prospective processes. As a corollary
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investigation of these mental processes, a follow-up study examined the dynamic
integration of the above-mentioned basic processes and their impact on accuracy of
prediction, reality monitoring, and memory biases for previous attitudes and mental
states in a clinical sample of recovered and non-recovered outpatients with mixed
anxious and depressive symptomatology varying in severity. A final intention was to
provide a clearer understanding of some of the mechanisms that might be involved in
the typical manifestation of the two disorders. With this aim we addressed
experimentally - in a non-clinical sample, within a mood-induction paradigm - one
of the central features of overlap: the temporal relationship between anxiety and
depression.
In the next Sections we shall summarise the main findings of the empirical work
carried out and evaluate the extent of its contribution in addressing the question of
mixed anxiety depression.
7. 2. Summary of the main findings.
The encouraging results of our preliminary investigation, a comparative study of
depression, anxiety and mixed anxiety depression, showed qualitatively different
patterns in the performance of the three clinical groups on tests of implicit and
explicit memory. On the word identification task - with depression relevant, anxiety
relevant, emotional positive, and neutral words - measures of priming effects (i.e.
percentage of primed words - the percentage of unprimed words correctly identified)
in the three groups revealed that the depressed outpatients exhibited an overall
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positive implicit memory bias (but also a mood-congruent bias for depression
relevant primed words) supporting the view that depression is associated with the
maintenance of attention (and not its automatic initial shift) towards self-referent
information, which results in a greater difficulty in disengaging from negative
material once patients have focussed on it (e.g. Mogg & Bradley, 1998; 1999a). On
the other hand, anxious individuals presented an overall higher priming effect in the
implicit memory test compared to the other groups, suggesting that anxiety is
associated with hypervigi lance for any kind of information coming from the external
environment (Eysenck, 1992; 1997). Lastly, opposite results were observed in the
mixed group, which showed no implicit memory bias and no difference from the
control group in the amount of priming effect for any word type. These surprising
results were interpreted as an indication that mixed anxiety depression might reflect a
dysfunctional adaptive mechanism devoted to the protection from the hyperactive
engagement with the external environment typical of anxiety states, and the passive
disengagement from the external environment characteristic of depression, so that a
more adequate level of interest can be maintained.
Also on the incidental free recall, used as a measure of explicit memory, the three
groups exhibited different cognitive profiles with the depressed patients showing the
predicted mood-congruent memory bias for depression relevant words (e.g. Bradley
et ah, 1995); the anxious patients showing no bias (e.g. MacLeod & McLaughlin,
1995) and the mixed group recalling a higher number of anxiety relevant words
relative to any other word type and also in comparison with the depressed group,
which indicates that more controlled cognitive processes in the mixed group are
laden with worrisome concerns.
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Similarly, when prospective cognitions were assessed, individuals with mixed
anxiety depression presented a performance that distinguished them from the other
two clinical groups (i.e. depressed and anxious). Two modified experimental tasks
were used to test future-directed thinking: the personal future task (PFT) and the
subjective probability judgement task (SPJT). In the first task participants were asked
to generate possible positive and negative future life events, and then to provide
probability judgements for the same events. Although the depressed and mixed
groups behaved similarly by generating more negative than positive events (e.g.
MacLeod et al., 1997c; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996), but judging the likelihood of them
happening as equal, their performance differed on two fronts. Firstly, the difference
in the generation of positive vs. negative events was more pronounced (i.e.
statistically significant) in the mixed group; and secondly, the probability judgements
of the two groups differed in their relation to the control participants' ratings.
Specifically, the depressed group reported lower expectancy for positive events,
whilst the mixed group showed higher expectancy for negative future events. On the
other hand, the higher generation and expectancy ratings for negative events reported
elsewhere (e.g. MacLeod et ah, 1997c; MacLeod & Byrne, 1996) in the anxious
group was not observed in this study, suggesting the use of cognitive avoidance in
this group.
For the SPJT participants were asked to judge the probability that a number of
depression relevant, anxiety relevant, and positive events - preceded by subliminal or
supraliminal primes: sad, fearful, happy and neutral faces - might happen to them in
the next twelve months. Results showed that in general depressed patients reported
higher expectancy for depression relevant compared to anxiety relevant and positive
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events (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1997b; MacLeod & Cropley, 1995; Pyszczynski et al.,
1987) in both subliminal and supraliminal priming conditions. Moreover, depressed
individuals were able to perceive relevant subliminally presented primes, as shown
by reaction times, but these pre-attentive processes were unable to influence their
judgements, which could only be significantly modified by supraliminal (attentional)
primes, providing further evidence that depressed individuals tend to dwell more on
information that has entered their focus of attention as suggested by Mogg and
Bradley (1998; 1999a). Generally, the anxious group reported higher probability
judgements for negative (depression and anxiety relevant) events, replicating
previous research in this field (e.g. MacLeod et al., 1991; 1997b). However, anxious
participants exhibited a unique pattern mediated by avoidance strategy acting
differentially for subliminal and supraliminal relevant primes. Specifically, they rated
the likelihood that anxiety relevant events might happen as being less likely, relative
to positive events, only when they were preceded by salient "fear" subliminal primes
(showing automatic hypervigilance towards threatening information), or following
the presentation of supraliminal "sad", "happy" and "neutral" primes, suggesting that
avoidance did not take place when less salient stimuli were presented subliminally,
and could not take place when salient "fear" stimuli were presented supraliminally,
as a result of the experimental constraining attentional condition. Finally, as
predicted the mixed group judged both negative (depression and anxiety relevant)
events as being more likely to happen and positive events as being less likely to
happen. Moreover, this group differed also in other important ways from the
depressed and anxious groups. In fact, contrary to depressed individuals, the mixed
group was influenced by subliminal relevant primes in its probability judgements and
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was found to be generally faster in its response latencies, which corroborates also the
hypothesis that the mixed group is more adequately engaged with the environment.
Contrary to anxious participants, the mixed group reported a general increase in
depression relevant events expectancy and a decrease in positive events expectancy,
and did not exhibit cognitive avoidance as indicated by the particularly high
expectancy for anxiety relevant events in the subliminal "fear" priming condition,
which is also consistent with the finding that the mixed group recalled an increased
number of anxiety relevant words in the explicit memory task.
In addition to the differential performance of the three clinical groups on all of the
experimental tasks used in our research, we have also been able to identify some of
the specific circumstances (e.g. types of prime and their presentation conditions)
under which the observed performances occur and some of the common mechanisms
and processes (e.g. types of heuristics, automatic vs. controlled) that are used
differentially by the three groups of participants. Therefore, taken together the results
reported above suggest that mixed anxiety depression represents a distinct clinical
group.
We also investigated some other important issues that have received relatively little
attention, particularly in reference to anxiety and depression. Accuracy of prediction,
reality monitoring, and memory biases for previous attitudes and mental states were
examined in a follow-up study linked to the previous investigation on prospective
cognitions. Recovered and non-recovered outpatients with mixed anxious and
depressive symptomatology were asked to indicate whether or not the previously
judged events had happened, whether those were events generated by themselves
during the PFT or presented to them during the SPJT, and also to rate the likelihood
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that such events might happen (or happen again) in the next twelve months as well as
to estimate their previous probability judgements. As predicted, results indicated that
outpatients with mixed symptomatology were less accurate in their prediction of
future negative (depression and anxiety relevant) events (Dunning & Story, 1991),
and that they have poorer reality monitoring for the same negative events compared
to controls. Such deficit reflects a tendency to endorse incorrectly negative materials
and seems to be partly mediated by levels of dissociation (Merckelbach et al., 2000).
Moreover, only outpatients who had recovered or were recovering from their
episodes of anxiety and/or depression exhibited a negative memory bias for previous
mental states and attitudes. Specifically, this bias was due to the fact that their
perception of positive change was greater than the actual amount of change, resulting
in the patients overestimating their expectancy for prior negative events (e.g.
Schrader et al., 1990) and underestimating their past expectancy for positive events.
Therefore, this investigation has extended the assessment of important cognitive
processes that integrate past and future within the individual's current perspective to
a mixed anxious depressed sample, and has shown that outpatients with mixed
symptomatology are less accurate in their predictions of future personal life events,
have poorer reality monitoring for negative but not for positive events compared to
controls, and that during or after recovery tend overestimate the intensity of prior
negative emotional levels and underestimate the degree of positive emotions.
Finally, an experimental investigation of the temporal relationship between anxiety
and depression was undertaken in a non-clinical student sample by assessing mood
shifts from anxiety towards depression during the performance on a
neuropsychological test - a modified version of the Chimeric Faces Task, CFT (Levy
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et al., 1983) - under anxiety mood-induction. Participants were asked to rate half-
neutral/half-emotional (i.e. angry, disgusted, fearful, happy and sad) chimera for
emotionality and their perceptual asymmetry scores were measured twice under
mood-induction and a third time (without mood-induction procedure) following the
outcome of a personal valued event. Consistent with the experimental hypotheses,
results showed a significant mood shift in the predicted direction (i.e. from anxiety
towards depression), as measured by changes in lateralisation scores, due to a
prolonged exposure to sustained levels of anxiety and prior to the occurrence of any
negative outcome (or non-occurrence of positive outcome). This study addressed a
central question about the overlap between anxiety and depression and results
suggest that the development of depression following the presence of an anxiety state
may serve an evolutionary useful mechanism devoted to the prevention of exhaustion
(cf. Sedek et al., 1990; 1993), which underlines an important theme that has emerged
at various points, namely, the role of anxiety and depression as adaptive emotions
(cf. Costello, 1976). If these findings were to be confirmed by future studies carried
out with clinical samples they would have deep implications for our current
understanding of the phenomenon of overlap between anxiety and mood disorders.
7. 3. Theoretical evaluation and implications for future research.
In Chapter 2 the issue of overlap between anxiety and depression was addressed.
From a more general perspective, three competing conceptual models that define the
relationship between the two disorders were presented. A first classic dichotomous
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position views anxiety and depression as discrete disorders, qualitatively different
(e.g. The Newcastle Group: Gurney et al., 1972; Mountjoy & Roth, 1982a; 1982b;
Roth et al., 1972). A second unitary position views anxiety and depression as
quantitatively different symptomatic stages of a single continuum of affective
disorder (e.g. Gulley & Nemeroff, 1993; Lesse, 1982; Paul, 1988). A third
intermediate mixed standpoint views anxiety and depression as qualitatively and
quantitatively different, when both present, from either pure anxiety or depression
(e.g. Boulenger & Lavallee, 1993; Lydiard, 1991; Stahl, 1993). Within this last
conceptual position we have also identified a comorbid, and a less strict sub¬
threshold approach, which emphasises the additive nature of mixed states, and a
more flexible sub-syndromal approach, which highlights the phenomenological
uniqueness of sub-syndromal mixed states as a chronic lifetime vulnerability factor
for an anxiety, depressive or mixed anxiety depressive disorder.
The scientific evidence reviewed throughout this thesis, coupled with our own
findings, propend towards the validity of the mixed sub-syndromal approach. This is
not to say that either the dichotomous or the unitary positions are less valid, but the
mixed approach appears to provide a more useful perspective since it is more able
than its opponent models to explain both clinical and experimental data. In fact, on
the one hand it is more flexible in its predictions about the development of clinical
anxiety, depression, or mixed anxiety depression in accordance with dimensional
models, such as Goldberg's (1994; 1996; Goldberg & Huxley, 1992) biosocial
model, and Clark and Watson's (1991) tripartite model. On the other hand, it is able
to accommodate most of the evidence reviewed in Chapter 2, and also our findings
that mixed anxiety depression outpatients could be distinguished both quantitatively
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(in terms of symptoms severity) and qualitatively (in terms of task performance)
from the depressed and anxious groups. Moreover, the qualitative differences found
in our investigation did not resemble a mere additive phenomenon as implied by the
comorbid view, but reflected distinct cognitive profiles.
In Chapter 2, three theoretical models were also put forward that explicitly addressed
the issue of overlap between anxiety and depression from different angles. According
to one of these models, the helplessness-hopelessness model (Alloy et al., 1990), the
relationship among the three cognitive components of helplessness expectancy,
negative outcome expectancy, and certainty of these expectancies, will determine the
relationship between anxiety and depression. Specifically, it is predicted that
cognitively vulnerable individuals will experience "pure" anxiety if they are
uncertain of whether or not they will be helpless in trying to control important future
outcomes; if they become certain of their helplessness but they are still uncertain
about whether a negative outcome will occur, they will experience mixed anxiety
depression; and if they become certain also about the occurrence of an important
negative outcome (or non-occurrence of a positive outcome), they will experience
hopelessness depression. However, in Chapter 4 we found data that goes contrary to
most of these predictions. In particular, the anxious group reported high negative
expectancy in the SPJT and the mixed group reported both a clear reduction in
positive expectancy and also high expectancy for negative events (both in the PFT
and SPJT), compared to controls. Therefore, although the depressed group gave
expectancy ratings that are in line with the predictions of this model, the
conceptualisation of anxiety, depression, and mixed anxiety depression in terms of
helplessness expectancy, negative outcome expectancy, and certainty of these
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expectancies is not confirmed in our study. Another limitation of this model, still
related to the outcome of negative events (or non-occurrence of positive events),
regards its predictions about the temporal relationship between anxiety and
depression. According to this model, the sequential development from anxiety to
depression is entirely accounted for by the correspondent progression from
helplessness to hopelessness due to the occurrence of adverse life events. However,
in Chapter 6 we provided evidence that a dysphoric state can arise without the
occurrence of an important negative outcome, but can follow a prolonged and intense
state of anxiety. Thus, although the helplessness-hopelessness model can account for
the temporal relationship of anxiety and depression in those cases in which
unfavourable actual life events occur, it does not consider the possibility of an
alternative route for this sequence, which is plausibly linked to less acute but more
persistent and chronic states.
This last aspect is better accommodated by the second of the models put forward:
Goldberg's (1994; 1996; Goldberg & Huxley, 1992) biosocial model. This represents
a wider perspective that incorporates biological and social factors and explains the
overlap between anxiety and depression by arguing the commonality of both types of
variables, responsible for the "vulnerability", "destabilisation", and "restitution"
processes, in the two disorders. This model offers a more flexible view of the
temporal relationship between anxiety and depression, compared to the helplessness-
hopelessness model, in that, their sequence is not solely dependent on the actual
occurrence of negative life events (although this also plays a major part) but can be
explained by resorting to the reciprocal inhibition between the reward and
punishment systems, and the neurobiological correlates of BIS/BAS (Gray, 1982;
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1987) and neurotransmitters (e.g. Deakin, 1998). However, even if this model can
accommodate both kinds of sequential mechanisms, it does' not provide any
explanation for the more common progression of anxiety to depression rather than
the reverse. In fact, according to Goldberg (1994) "whichever is released first, the
other is likely as a secondary consequence" (p. 67). Therefore, given the rather
general predictions (note also the absence of any predictions regarding expectancy)
this model is more resilient to empirical falsification.
The last of the three theoretical models is Clark and Watson's (1991) tripartite model
of anxiety and depression. This model provides a phenotypic structure of depressive
and anxious symptomatology with the proposal that they can be divided into three
factors. The first factor, negative affect (NA), is responsible for the overlap between
anxiety and depression and includes non-specific symptoms common to both types of
disorders, such as dysphoria, poor concentration, irritability, and sleep disturbance.
The second factor, low positive affect (PA), is relatively specific to depression and
includes symptoms such as, anhedonia, lack of energy, disinterest. The last factor,
physiological hyperarousal (PH), is relatively unique to anxiety and encompasses
autonomic symptoms, such as feeling dizzy or light-headed, difficulty breathing,
racing heart. Generally, we found good correspondence between this symptomatic
structure and our group subdivision with high scores of general disturbance (MASQ-
GD non-specific subscale) reflecting high levels of NA in the three clinical groups;
high scores of anhedonic depression (MASQ-AD depression specific subscale)
reflecting low levels of PA reported by the depressed and mixed groups; and high
scores of anxious arousal (MASQ-AA anxiety specific subscale) reflecting high
levels of PH found in the anxious and mixed groups.
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Although this model does not make any explicit predictions regarding the association
between the three factors and expectancy ratings for future positive and negative life
events, in Chapter 4 we were able to test this indirectly by utilising specific types of
life events in the SPJT (i.e. depression relevant, anxiety relevant, and positive). In
line with predictions, we found that the depressed group gave higher probability
ratings for depression compared to anxiety relevant events (reflecting NA) and low
ratings for positive events (reflecting low PA); the mixed group showed high
expectancy for both depression and anxiety events (reflecting high levels ofNA and
PH) and low expectancy for positive life events compared to controls (reflecting low
PA); whereas our anxious group, prevalently composed by GAD outpatients, did not
show specificity for anxiety relative to depression relevant events, probably due to
PH being more specific to panic disorder than to GAD, and showed low expectancy
for positive events only in some experimental conditions, confirming that low PA is
not a characteristic feature of anxiety.
All in all, the three theoretical models considered provided a useful framework and a
practical guide in the generation of our experimental hypotheses. Given the evidence
gathered in this thesis it would be unfair to deem any of these models as being right
or wrong. As stated above, it is more fruitful to say that there are models that are
more or less useful and models that fit the data more or less well. Unfortunately,
these two criteria often move in opposite directions, in that, the more specific a
model is and the more experimentally testable predictions it makes, the more useful
it is for the advancement of our understanding. Conversely, as we have seen above,
the more general and the less falsifiable a model is, the better it can fit the available
evidence.
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By definition, good experimental hypothesis need to be precise while the level of
specificity can vary considerably. However, since the level of specificity of a
hypothesis has been here related to its usefulness, it is recommended that future
research concentrate on testing the specific predictions made by models.
Nonetheless, to a certain extent it is possible to deduct specific experimental
hypotheses from more general models either by inferential reasoning or by
complementing them with predictions that derive from affined models.
In more practical terms, at least two steps seem necessary when undertaking future
research in anxiety and depression: a) distinguish between common and specific
features of anxiety and depression in the definition of research groups; b) distinguish
between types of stimuli specific to anxiety and depression, and the differential
relevance and impact of specific types of emotional information.
We have provided evidence that the three clinical groups differ in terms of
mnemonic, attentional, and prospective cognitive processes. Although these novel
findings will need to be replicated by future studies, it would be particularly fruitful
to consider more complex and dynamic aspects that characterise anxiety, depression
and their relationship as we have done with the investigations reported in Chapters 5
and 6. In particular, a clinical investigation of the temporal relationship between
anxiety and depression, both within and across episodes, would be useful to further
investigate the proposal that the intertwining of anxiety and depression might have
an evolutionary adaptive function. A follow-up investigation would allow not only
the observation of the shift from an anxiety towards a depressive state, but also the
possibility of a reverse mechanism and the analysis of the conditions under which
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they both occur. Moreover, it would allow monitoring of the resulting changes in
terms of information processing that might operate at different stages.
A final proposal is the comparative therapeutic intervention of depressed, anxious,
and mixed anxious depressed outpatients, which would incorporate the use of a
number of experimental tasks, and would allow structural equation modelling of
whether or not similar models ofmaintenance/recovery apply in the different groups,
with obvious potential implications for the design of optimal therapeutic programmes
for the mixed anxiety depression group.
7. 4. Conclusions.
In the course of this thesis we have presented the ongoing theoretical debate
regarding the conceptualisation of the overlap between anxiety and depression and its
implications for clinical and other empirical experimental research. We have focused
on fundamental cognitive functions, such as attention, memory and prospective
cognitions and have provided evidence that depression, anxiety and mixed anxiety
depression can be distinguished not only quantitatively (i.e. symptomatological
severity) but also, and more importantly, in terms of qualitatively distinct features
that characterise the cognitive profile of the three clinical groups.
Until recent years, empirical research and resultant theoretical models have
concentrated on the study of anxiety and depression in isolation. Our findings
suggest that future comparative studies involving anxious and depressed patients in a
variety of experimental tasks should discriminate more in depth between common
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and specific factors, assess the integration of basic cognitive functions, examine their
dynamic sequential relationship and, possibly, include a mixed anxious depressed
sample.
The theoretical approaches considered in this thesis have provided a good framework
on which to base our experimental hypotheses. However we had to resort to one or
another model to explain particular results, and none of them can entirely
accommodate our data. Also the theoretical models that specifically consider the
phenomenon of overlap between anxiety and depression have been unable to account
for many aspects of our findings, either because these models are too specific or too
general to include those instances or because their predictions are simply inaccurate
or incomplete; hence, the need ofmore comprehensive frameworks.
Is mixed anxiety depression a genuine disorder in its own right? Although one might
propend for a positive answer to this question, it would be premature and certainly
fallacious to arrive to such conclusion at this stage. The provision of discriminant
group validity, as a subtype of construct validity, does not grant the inference of a
definite answer. However, it is believed we have gone a considerable way towards
the identification of key cognitive processes specific to mixed anxiety depression that
will hopefully aid the reaching of a more conclusive pronouncement on this issue.
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Appendix 1. List of primed and unprimed words used as stimuli divided by
category and their mean Length (L) and Frequency (F).
Depression Relevant Anxiety Relevant
Primed words Unprimed words Primed words Unprimed words
AWFUL ALONE ACCIDENT CANCER
CRYING DEATH AFRAID COFFIN
DISAPPOINTED DEPRIVED AMBULANCE DANGER
EXHAUSTED DESERTED ATTACK DISASTER
FAILURE DESPAIR CASUALTY DISEASE
GRIEF DISCOURAGED COLLAPSE DISGRACE
GUILTY DISMAL CRITICISM EMBARRASSED
HOPELESS DREADFUL EMERGENCY FEAR
ISOLATED DULL HARM NERVOUS
LOST GLOOMY MISTAKE PAIN
MISERY HORRIBLE MURDER PERSECUTED
REJECTED PESSIMISTIC PANIC STRANGLED
TERRIBLE SAD PARALYSED SUFFOCATE
TORTURED SUFFERING TRAGEDY TERRIFIED
UNFORTUNATE SUICIDE UNEASY VICTIM
UPSET WORTHLESS URGENT WORRY
1=7.25 F=33.53 L=l.\9 F=36.31 L=7.06 F=32.16 Z=7.19 F=30.72
Emotional Positive Neutral
Primed words Unprimed words Primed words Unprimed words
AFFECTION BEAUTY BRANCH BAG
APPLAUSE DEAR CHAIR BOWL
ART FANTASY FORK CHIN
CHARM FESTIVITY GARAGE CORNER
COMFORT FREEDOM INK CURTAINS
DREAM FRIEND KETTLE ELBOW
JOYFUL FUN MATERIAL FURNITURE
KIND HAPPY OATS GLASS
KISS HEAVEN PAPER HAT
LAUGH HOPE POLE ITEM
LUCKY HUG POTATO PENCIL
MIRACLE LOVELY SEAT PIPE
PEACE MUSIC STOVE PRODUCT
SPRING PLEASANT TABLE SHOES
TICKLE SUNSET UMBRELLA STREET
VICTORY WARMTH WINDOW STRING
L=5.75 F=57.88 L=5.69 F=64.81 L=5.31 F=54.28 1=5.31 F=53.88
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Appendix 2. Self-report questionnaires used in this thesis.
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Name: Marital Status: Age: Sex:
Occupation: Education: ,
Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully, and
then pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the way you have been feeling during the past two
weeks, including today. Circle the number beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the group
seem to apply equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than one
statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 18 (Changes in Appetite).
1. Sadness
0 I do not feel sad.
1 I feel sad much of the time.
2 1 am sad all the time.




I am not discouraged about my future.
I feel more discouraged about my future than I
used to be.
I do not expect things to work out for me.
I feel my future is hopeless and will only get
worse.
3. Past Failure
0 I do not feel like a failure.
1 I have failed more than I should have.
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures.
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person.
4. Loss of Pleasure
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the
things I enjoy.
1 I don't enjoy things as much as I used to.
2 I get very little pleasure from the things I used
to enjoy.
3 I can't get any pleasure from the things I used
to enjoy.
5. Guilty Feelings
0 I don't feel particularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty over many things I have done or
should have done.
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
3 I feel guilty all of the time.
6. Punishment Feelings
0 I don't feel I am being punished.
1 I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
7. Self-Dislike
0 I feel the same about myself as ever.
1 I have lost confidence in myself.
2 I am disappointed in myself.
3 I dislike myself.
8. Self-Criticalness
0 I don't criticize or blame myselfmore than usual.
1 I am more critical ofmyself than I used to be.
2 I criticize myself for all of my faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes
0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I would
not carry them out.
2 I would like to kill myself.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
10. Crying
0 I don't cry anymore than I used to.
1 I cry more than I used to.
2 I cry over every little thing.
3 I feel like crying, but I can't.
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0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual.
1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual.
2 I am so restless or agitated that it's hard to stay
still.
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep
moving or doing something.
12. Loss of Interest
0 I have not lost interest in other people or
activities.
1 I am less interested in other people or things
than before.
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people
or things.
3 It's hard to get interested in anything.
13. Indecisiveness
0 I make decisions about as well as ever.
1 I find it more difficult to make decisions than
usual.
2 1 have much greater difficulty in making
decisions than I used to.
3 I have trouble making any decisions.
14. Worthlessness
0 I do not feel I am worthless.
1 I don't consider myself as worthwhile and useful
as I used to.
2 I feel more worthless as compared to other
people.
3 I feel utterly worthless.
15. Loss of Energy
0 I have as much energy as ever.
1 I have less energy than I used to have.
2 I don't have enough energy to do very much.
3 I don't have enough energy to do anything.
16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern
0 I have not experienced any change in my
sleeping pattern,
la I sleep somewhat more than usual,
lb I sleep somewhat less than usual.
2a I sleep a lot more than usual.
2b I sleep a lot less than usual.
3a I sleep most of the day.




0 I am no more irritable than usual.
1 I am more irritable than usual.
2 I am much more irritable than usual.
3 I am irritable all the time.
18. Changes in Appetite
0 I have not experienced any change in my
appetite.
la My appetite is somewhat less than usual.
lb My appetite is somewhat greater than usual.
2a My appetite is much less than before.
2b My appetite is much greater than usual.
3a I have no appetite at all.
3b I crave food all the time.
19. Concentration Difficulty
0 I can concentrate as well as ever.
1 I can't concentrate as well as usual.
2 It's hard to keep my mind on anything for
very long.
3 I find I can't concentrate on anything.
20. Tiredness or Fatigue
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than
usual.
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things
I used to do.
3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the
things I used to do.
21. Loss of Interest in Sex
0 I have not noticed any recent change in my
interest in sex.
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.





Developed by Charles D. Spielberger
in collaboration with
R. L. Gorsuch, R. Lushene, P. R. Vagg, and G. A. Jacobs
STAI Form Y-l
Name Date S
Age Sex: M F T
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to
describe themselves are given below. Read each statement and then ^
blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of the statement to indi-
cate how you feel right now, that is, at thismoment. There are no right rj>- 1,^ 4^.
or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement ^ *0-
but give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. < frj
1. I feel calm ® © ® ©
2. I feel secure ® ® ® ©
3. I am tense ® © ® ®
4. I feel strained ® ® ® ®
5. I feel at ease ® ® ® ®
6. I feel upset ® ® ® ®
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes ® ® ® @
8. I feel satisfied ® ® ® ®
9. I feel frightened ® ® ® ®
10. I feel comfortable ® ® ® ®
11. I feel self-confident ® ® ® ®
12. I feel nervous ® ® ® ®
13. 1 am jittery ® ® ® ®
14. I feel indecisive ® ® ® ©
15. I am relaxed ® ® ® ©
16. I feel content © © ® ©
17. I am worried © ® ® ®
18. I feel confused © ® ® ®
19. I feel steady © ® ® ©
20. I feel pleasant ® ® ® ®
Consulting Psychologists Press





DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to
describe themselves are given below. Read each statement and then ^ V.
- ......
^blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of the statement to in- \ # ox.
dicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do ^ ^not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer ^ ^7-s.which seems to describe how you generally feel.
21. I feel pleasant ® ® ® ©
• | O ® S ®22. I feel nervous and restless
23. I feel satisfied with myself ® ® ® ®
24. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be ® ® ®
25. 1 feel like a failure ® ® ®
26. 1 feel rested ® ® ®
27. 1 am "calm, cool, and collected" ®
28. I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them
29. I worry too much over something that really doesn t matter ® O w v--
„„ . .
® ® ® ©30. I am happy
31. I have disturbing thoughts ® ® ' ^
® ® ® ©32.^1 lack self-confidence
...
® ® ® ©33. I feel secure
34. I make decisions easily ® ^ ^
35. I feel inadequate ® ®
® ® ® '336. I am content
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me © ® d.
38. I take disappointments so keenly that I can t put them out of my
.... © ® ® ®mind
, . ® ® ® ©39. I am a steady person
40. I get in a stale of tension or turmoil as 1 think over my recent concerns
® ® ® ©and interests
Copyright I 968, 1977 hy Charles D. Spictberger. Reproduction of this test or any portion thereoj
by any process without written permission of the Publisher is prohibited.
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Name/ID#. ©Copyright, 1991, D.B.Watson & LA. Clark
MASQ
Below is a listof feelings, sensations, problems, and experiences that people sometimes have.
Read each item and then mark the appropriate choice in the space next to that item. Use the choice
that best describes how much vou have feltor experienced dungs this way during the pastweek.









5. Slept very well
6. Felt sad
7. Felt very alert
8. Felt discouraged
9. Felt nauseous


















. 23. Felt like 1 was having a lot of fun
. 24. Blamed myself for a lot of things
. 25. Felt numbness or tingling in my body
. 26. Felt withdrawn from other people
. 27. Seemed to move quickly and easily
. 28. Was afraid I was going to lose control
29. Felt dissatisfied with everything
30. Looked forward to things with enjoyment
31. Had trouble remembering things
3Z Felt like I didn't needmuch sleep
33. Felt like nothing was very enjoyable
34. Felt like something awful was going to happen
33. Felt like I had accomplished a lot
. 36. Felt like I had a lot of interesting tilings to do
. 37. Did not have much ofan appetite
. 38. Felt like beingwith other people
. 39. Fdt like it took extra effort to get started
. 40. Felt like I had a lot to look forward to
. 41. Thoughts and ideas came to me very easily
. 42. Fdt pessimistic about the future
. 43. Fdt like I could do everything I needed to do
_ 44. Fdt like there wasn't anything interesting
or fun to do
412
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1 2
not at all a little bit
45. Had pain in my chest
46. Felt really talkative
47. Felt like a failure
48. Had hot or cold spells
49. Was proud ofmyself
50. Felt very restless
51. Had trouble falling asleep
52. Felt dizzy or lightheaded
53. Felt unattractive
54. Felt very clearheaded
55. Was short of breath
56. Felt sluggish or tired
57. Hands were shaky
58. Felt really "up" or lively
59. Was unable to relax
60. Felt like being by myself
61. Felt like I was choking
62. Was able to laugh easily
63. Had an upset stomach
64. Felt inferior to others
65. Had a lump in my throat
66. Felt really slowed down
67. Had a very dry mouth
MASQ (cont)
3 4 5
moderately quite a bit extremely
68. Felt confident aboutmyself
69. Muscles twitched or trembled
70. Had trouble making decisions
71. Felt like I was going crazy
72. Felt like I had a lot ofenergy
73. Was afraid I was going to die
74. Was disappointed in myself
75. Heart was racing or pounding
. 76. Had trouble concentrating
77. Felt tense or "high-strung"
78. Felt hopeful about the future
79. Was trembling or shaking
80. Had trouble paying attention
81. Muscles were tense or sore
82. Felt keyed up, "on edge"
83. Had trouble staying asleep
84. Worried a lot about things
85. Had to urinate frequently
86. Felt really good about myself
87. Had trouble swallowing
88. Hands were cold or sweaty
89. Thought about death or suicide





DIRECTIONS: This questionnaire consists of 20 statements. Please read the statements carefully one by
one. If the statement describes your attitude for the past week including today, mark the 'T' indicating
TRUE in the column next to the statement. If the statement does not describe your attitude, mark the 'F'
indicating FALSE in the column next to the statement. Please be sure to read each statement carefully.
1. I look forward to the future with hope and enthusiasm. T F
2. I might as well give up because there is nothing I can do about making
things better for myself. T F
3. When things are going badly, I am helped by knowing that they cannot
stay that way forever. T F
4. I can't imagine what my life would be like in ten years. T F
5. I have enough time to accomplish the things I want to do. T F
6. In the future, I expect to succeed in what concerns me most. T F
7. My future seems dark to me. T F
8. I happen to be particularly lucky, and I expect to get more of the good
things in life than the average person. T F
9. I just can't get the breaks, and there's no reason I will in the future. T F
10. My past experiences have prepared me well for the future. T F
11. All I can see ahead ofme is unpleasantness rather than pleasantness. T F
12. I don't expect to get what I really want. T F
13. When I look ahead to the future, I expect I will be happier than I am now. T F
14. Things just don't work out the way I want them to. T F
15. I have great faith in the future. T F
16. I never get what I want, so it's foolish to want anything. T F
17. It's very unlikely that I will get any real satisfaction in the future. T F
18. The future seems vague and uncertain to me. T F
19. I can look forward to more good times than bad times. T F
20. There's no use in really trying to get anything I want because I probably





Please indicate how typical you feel each of the statements below are of you,
from 1 = not at all typical of you, to 5 = very typical of you.
Not at all
1. If I do not have enough time to do
everything, I do not worry about it.
2. My worries overwhelm me.
3. I do not tend to worry about things.
4. Many situations make me worry.
5. I know I should not worry about things,
but I just cannot help it.
6. When I am under pressure I worry a lot.
7. I am always worrying about something.
8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts.
9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to
worry about everything else I have to do.
10. I never worry about anything.
11. When there is nothingmore I can do about
a concern, I do not worry about it any more.
12. I have been a worrier all my life.
13. I notice that I have been worrying about things.
14. Once I start worrying, I cannot stop.
15. I worry all the time.






































































This scale lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes hold.
Please read each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with what it says.
For each of the attitudes, please indicate your answer by placing a tick (</) under the column that best
describes how you think. Be sure to choose only one answer for each attitude. But please note that because
people are different, there is no 'right' or 'wrong' answer to these statements.
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep in mind what you















1. If I fail partly, it is as bad
as being a complete failure.
2. Ifothers dislike you, you
cannot be happy.
3. I should be happy all the
time.
4. People will probably
think less ofme if I make a
mistake.
5. My happiness depends
more on other people than it
does on me.
6. I should always have
complete control over my
feelings.
7. My life is wasted unless I
am a success.
8. What other people think
about me is very important.
9. I ought to be able to solve
my problems quickly and
without a great deal ofeffort.
10. If I don't set the highest
standards formyself, I am
likely to end up a second rate
person.
11.1 am nothing ifa person I
















12. A person should be able
to control what happens to
him/her.
13. If I am to be a worthwhile
person, I must be truly
outstanding in at least one
major respect.
14. Ifyou don't have other
people to lean on, you are
bound to be sad.
IS. It is possible for a person
to be scolded and not get
upset.
16.1 must be a useful,
productive, creative person or
life has no purpose.
17.1 can find happiness
without being loved by
another person.
18. A person should do well
at everything he/she
undertakes.
19. If I do not do well all the
time, people will not respect
me.
20.1 do not need the
approval ofother people in
order to be happy.
21. If I try hard enough, I
should be able to excel at
anything I attempt.
22. People who have good
ideas are more worthy than
those who do not.
23. A person doesn't need to
be well liked in order to be
happy.
24. Whenever I take a chance






Here are some questions about how you feel about yourself at the present time.
Please read each question carefully and decide if you agree or disagree with it. There are no
right or wrong answers.
For each question please put a circle around one number from -2 to +2 to indicate the extent to
which you agree or disagree.
Remember it's how you feel at the present time that's important.
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Agree
1. On the whole I am satisfied with myself. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
3. At times I feel I am no good at all. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
4. I am able to do things as well as most other
people.
-2 -1 0 +1 +2
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
6. I certainly feel useless at times. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
7. I feel that I am a person ofworth, at least on an
equal plane with others. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
8. I wish I could have more respect formyself. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
9. All in all 1 am inclined to feel that I am a failure. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself. -2 -1 0 +1 +2
418
THF, BASIC EMOTIONS SCALE
The purpose of this scale is to find out about how much or how often you experience certain emotions and then to
ask some questions about how you feel actually during particular emotions themselves.
The first part of the scale is designed to explore how you have felt DURING THE LAST WEEK.
For each emotion, please circle ONE number only between 1 and 7, to indicate how you have felt.
OVER THE PAST WEEK I HAVE FELT :
not at all all of the time
ANGER 1234567
SADNESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DISGUST 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HAPPINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FRUSTRATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DESPAIR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHAME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ANXIETY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
JOY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IRRITATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MISERY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GUILT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NERVOUSNESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ELATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AGGRESSION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DEFEATED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
REPULSION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TENSE 1234567
PRIDE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
JEALOUSY 1234567
GLOOMINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HUMILIATED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORRIED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LOVING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RESENTFUL 1234567
MOURNFUL 1234567
BLAMEWORTHY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CHEERFUL 1234567
419
In the second part of this questionnaire we would like to know about how you feel IN GENERAL.
The question asks about HOW OFTEN you feel the emotion.
Again, for each question please circle ONE number only between 1 and 7 to indicate how you feel.




























































































































In the third part of this questionnaire we would like to ask you for some information about HOW YOU FEEL
when you experience that emotion. Please note: even if you never experience a particular emotion, please answer
the question by imagining how you think you would feel ifyou did experience that emotion.
Again, for each part of the question, please circle ONE number between 1 and 7 to indicate how you feel.
A. How much in control do you feel ? B. Do you ever lose a sense of who you




out of control always
ANGER 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 S 6
SADNESS I 2 3 5 6 7 I 2 3 5 6
DISGUST 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 S 6
FEAR I 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 S 6
HAPPINESS 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
FRUSTRATION 1 2 3 5 6 7 I 2 3 S 6
DESPAIR 1 2 3 S 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
SHAME 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
ANXIETY 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
JOY 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
IRRITATION 1 2 3 S 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
MISERY 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
GUILT 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 S 6
NERVOUSNESS I 2 3 S 6 7 1 2 3 S 6
ELATION I 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
AGGRESSION I 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
DEFEATED 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 S 6
REPULSION 1 2 3 5 6 7 I 2 3 5 6
TENSE 1 2 3 5 6 7 I 2 3 5 6
PRIDE I 2 3 5 6 7 I 2 3 S 6
JEALOUSY 1 2 3 S 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
GLOOMINESS 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
HUMILIATED I 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
WORRIED 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
LOVING 1 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 S 6
RESENTFUL 1 2 3 5 6 7 I 2 3 5 6
MOURNFUL 1 2 3 S 6 7 I 2 3 S 6
BLAMEWORTHY I 2 3 5 6 7 1 2 3 5 6
SHY 1 2 3 5 6 7 I 2 3 S 6





DIRECTIONS: This questionnaire consists of 28 questions about experiences that you may have in your daily
life. We are interested in how often you have these experiences. It is important, however, that your answers show
how often these experiences happen to you when you were not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. To answer




Some people have the experience ofdriving a car and suddenly realising that they do not remember what




Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they suddenly realise that they did




Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no idea how they got there.
Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%L I 100%
Neva Always
Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that they don't rememba
putting on. Mark on the line to show what pacentage of the time this happens to you.
0% I J 100%
Neva Always
Some people have the experience of finding new things among their belongings that they do not rememba
buying. Mark on the line to show what pacentage of the time this happens to you.
0% L __J 100%
Neva Always
Some people sometimes find that they are approached by people that they do not know who call them by
anotha name or insist that they have met them before. Mark on the line to show what pacentage of the
time this happens to you.
0% L | 100%
Neva Always
Page 1 of 4
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Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling as though they are standing next to themselves or
watching themselves do something, and they actually see themselves as if they were looking at another
person. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | _J 100%
Never Always
Some people are told that they sometimes do not recognise friends or family members. Mark on the line
to show what percentageof the time this happens to you.
0%| 1100%
Never Always
Some people find that they have no memory for some important events in their fives (for example, a
wedding). Mark on the fine to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%| 1100%
Never Always
Some people have the experience ofbeing accused of lying when they do not think they have lied. Mark
on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%| 1100% -
Never Always
Some people have the experience of looking in amirror and not recognising themselves. Mark on the fine
to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling that other people, objects and the world around
them are not real. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | I 100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling that their body does not seem to belong to them.
Mark on the line to showwhat percentageofthe time this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
Some people have the experience ofsometimes remembering a past event so vividly that they feel as if they
were reliving that event. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
Some people have the experience ofnot being sure whether things that they remember happening really






Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but fining it strange and unfamiliar. Mark
on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
Some people find that when they are watching television or a film they become so absorbed in the story
that they are unaware ofother events happening around them. Marie on the line to show what percentage
of the time this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes find that they become so involved in a fantasy or daydream that it feels as though




Some people find that they sometimes are able to ignore pain. Mark on the line to show what percentage
of the time this happens to you.
0%| | 100%
Never Always
Some people find that they sometimes sit staring off into space, thinking of nothing, and are not aware of
the passage of time. Marie on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% 1 1100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes find that when they are alone they talk out loud to themselves. Mark on the line
to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
Some people find that in one situation theymay act so differently comparedwith another situation that
they feel almost as if theywere two different people Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time
this happens to you.
0% | 1100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes find that in certain situations they are able to do things with amazing ease and
spontaneity that would usually be difficult for them (for example, sports, work, social situations, etc.).
Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%| 1100%
Never Always
Page 3 of 4
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Some people sometimes find that they cannot remember whether they have done something or have just
thought about doing that thing (for example, not knowing whether they have actually posted a letter or
have just thought about posting it). Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens
to you.
0% | [ 100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes find evidence that they have done something but cannot remember having done
it. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% | _J 100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes findwritings, drawings or notes among their belongings that they must have done
but cannot remember doing. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%| I 100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes find that they hear voices inside their head that tell them to do things or comment
on things that they are doing. Mark on the line to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0% L_ 1100%
Never Always
Some people sometimes feel as if they are looking at the world through a fog so that people and objects








Please indicate your preferences in the use of hands in the following activities by
putting + in the appropriate column. Where the preference is so strong that you would
never try to use the other hand unless absolutely forced to, put + +. If in any case you
are really indifferent put + in both columns.
Some of the activities require both hands. In these cases the part of the task, or object,
for which hand preference is wanted is indicated in brackets.
Please try to answer all the questions, and only leave a blank if you have no experience







6 Knife (without fork)
7 Spoon
8 Broom (upper hand)
9 Striking Match (match)
10 Opening Box (lid)
L. Q. Leave these spaces blank DECILE
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PANAS (Tj)
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at thepresent moment.
Use the following scale to record your answers.
1
very slightly



























DIRECTIONS: Below are nine sets of scales. For each scale, place a mark across the line at
the point which best describes how you are feeling right now.
1. How disgusted do you feel right now?
0% | I 100%
Not at all Extremely
2. How anxious do you feel right now?
0% | I 100%
Not at all Extremely
3. How energetic do you feel right now?
0% | | 100%
Not at all Extremely
4. How sad do you feel right now?
0% | | 100%
Not at all Extremely
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5. How angry do you feel right now?
0% | | 100%
Not at all Extremely
6. How happy do you feel right now?
0% | I 100%
Not at all Extremely
7. How tense do you feel right now?
0% | I 100%
Not at all Extremely
8. How tired do you feel right now?
0% | 1 100%
Not at all Extremely
9. How confused do you feel right now?
0% | | 100%
Not at all Extremely
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The Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale, Form I Senior
In each group of six words below underline the word which means the same as the word in heavy















































































































































Directions: Below is a list of events that were either generated by yourself or presented to you during the
first part of the study. Please read each event and then answer the four questions by ticking the
appropriate boxes and by circling the numbers that best describe your probability judgements.
I. You will get on well with your family.
• Did it happen?
• Was this an event you generated or presented to you?
• How likely is it that this event will happen again in the next 12 months?
Not at all 123456789 10
likely
• How likely did you think this event was to happen when you first rated it?










2. Your job will be under threat.
• Did it happen?
• Was this an event you generated or presented to you?
• How likely is it that this event will happen again in the next 12 months?
Not at all 123456789 10
likely
• How likely did you think this event was to happen when you first rated it?










3. A close friend will move away.
• Did it happen?
• Was this an event you generated or presented to you?
• How likely is it that this event will happen again in the next 12 months?
Not at all 123456789 10
likely
• How likely did you think this event was to happen when you first rated it?











Appendix 4. Passage used for the Subject-Paced Reading Task (SPRT),
broken into 15 sentences.
Edinburgh is the historic capital of Scotland
and one of the most beautiful cities in Europe.
Along with its famous castle,
medieval Old Town and stunning panoramic views,
it is also surrounded by beautiful coast and countryside.
With a wide choice of places to visit
- castles, palaces, historic towns and villages,
museums and galleries, including the Royal Museums
and the National Galleries of Scotland -
visitors are assured of a varied and enjoyable stay in the area.
Add to this an all-year round programme
of top quality events and entertainment,
excellent accommodation, restaurants and shopping
and you will discover that Edinburgh and the surrounding area
has something for everyone.
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Appendix 5. Example of emotional face used as prime for the Subjective
Probability Judgement Task (SPJT).
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Appendix 6. Example of chimera used for the Chimeric Faces Task (CFT).
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